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# Near East/North Africa Report

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MUSLIM LEAGUE RAPS QADHDHAFI

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 22 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

MENA, Oct. 21 (SPA) — The Muslim World League issued a statement here Tuesday vigorously condemning President Muammar Qaddafi of Libya for attacking the Kingdom and belittling the value of the pilgrimage.

The constituent assembly of the league categorically rejected Qaddafi's claims made during a speech in his country recently, that the United States was occupying the holy places in the Kingdom and that its warplanes were overflying the holy places. "The only planes that were seen over the areas were helicopters flown by Saudi Arabian pilots," the statement said.

It condemned Qaddafi's sarcastic remarks about the pilgrimage and reiterated the significance of the ritual as one of the fundamental pillars of the faith.

"The members of the assembly strongly denounce the allegations made by Qaddafi which have nothing to do with the facts," the statement said. "His claims that the holy places of Mecca and Medina were occupied are totally unfounded as two million pilgrims, including those from Libya, have seen for themselves. Nor were there any American planes screaming over Mecca, Medina and Arafat as he claimed.

"The assembly denounces the use of Islamic sacred places in political controversies and slander matches because such use will hurt the feelings of Muslims and create doubts and dissension as well as offend the reputation of Islam. His attack on the pilgrimage and his ridiculing of the rites are a

clear transgression of the holy rites of Islam as if Qaddafi denied the word of God who exhorted the people to uphold his rites and seek his forgiveness.

"Such pronouncements are unfit to be made by the head of a state whose people have been known for their religious zeal and heroic struggle for the sake of Islam over the ages.

"His appeal for jihad, holy struggle, to liberate the holy places from the Americans and Christians as he claimed, instead of performing the pilgrimage, is a call to suspend the holy rite behind a false screen in the name of jihad.

"He also attempts to incite bloodshed of Muslims in the holy months in the holy places of this holy land. His call is also aimed at diverting the attention and efforts of Muslims from their main battlefield, to liberate Palestine and the holy city of Jerusalem from Zionist occupation.

"Qaddafi should have appealed to the Islamic states of Iran and Iraq to stop fighting and unite their resources and those of other Muslims to liberate the occupied lands."

The assembly appealed to all Muslim leaders to strive for the unification of Muslims to help those Islamic nations which are subject to aggression everywhere.

The statement was signed by 31 members from Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Singapore, Cameroon, Egypt, Palestine, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Uganda, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Jordan, Upper Volta, Gambia, Nepal, Qatar, Kuwait, Tunis, Mauritania, Burma, Libya, Chad and Bahrain.

NATIONAL SYRIAN SOCIAL PARTY CHIEF INTERVIEWED ON LEBANON

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 26 Aug 80 pp 18-19

[Interview with Chief of National Syrian Social Party In'am R'ad by Salih Qallab; date and place not given]

[Text] "In'am R'ad in Lengthy Interview with AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM; Sarkis Followed Erroneous Course in Dealing with Crisis; He Tried To Throw Ball in Court of Syria and National Movement; Al-Huss, Karami, Malik Salam Are National Movement's Candidates for Prime Minister; We Reject the Accord That Constitutes Cover for Zionist Sympathizers; Sarkis Vetoed Most Successful Lebanese Prime Minister; We Are in Process of Formulating National Position Again; We Will Fight To Defend Every Inch of Lebanon."

The National Syrian Social Party elected In'am R'ad its new president early this August. He will succeed Dr 'Abdallah Sa'adah who is devoting himself to national missions outside organizational frameworks.

In'am R'ad is a well-known figure who needs no introduction. In addition to being one of the deputies of the chairman of the National Movement's Central Political Council, he has played a very prominent role throughout the last harsh years in Lebanon.

Before that In'am R'ad was known as a strong and an unyielding fighter. He moved from one location to another and from one sector to another in the battle for national and democratic struggle. Because of his clear positions he was harassed, and most Arab borders were closed to him.

In addition to this, In'am R'ad is known for meticulously keeping up with matters and for assuming positions. He is famous for not subjecting judgements to abstract logic despite the fact that he is a lawyer. R'ad subjects his judgements to the circumstances of concrete material facts which are consistent with the supreme national and pan-Arab interests.

If an interview with In'am R'ad always assumes the quality of universality and produces something new with every time, an interview with him at this stage assumes its importance from the fact that the man is in a position of responsibility. He is one of those who are privy to the secrets of affairs, and he is one of those who take



part in making decisions. In this interview which was conducted with him by AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM In'am Ra'd speaks with considerable candor and clarity. When he talks, he always tends to gather information. He is not satisfied with analysis. Therefore, what he said [in the interview] appears like a storehouse of information that allows the observer and the reader to draw [his own] conclusions and positions.

[Question] It is being said that the current crisis of government is the prelude to the coming presidential battle. What is your opinion of the National Movement?

[Answer] The [factor] which prescribes the organization of government or sets forth the crisis of government transcends this political emergency, if one may use that term. The [factor] which prescribes a governmental crisis lies in the continued absence of a solution to a set of questions and problems, and that leads to the destruction of the legitimate authority in Lebanon and to the fragmentation of the unity of its land, its people and its institutions.

These are the questions that were presented in the initiative of the Lebanese National Movement a few months ago. They were adopted by the president in the message in which he proclaimed what was described as indisputable principles concerning the pan-Arab identity of Lebanon and its Arab commitment. [The president] rejected all forms of division and affirmed the unity of Lebanon and all the other principal questions as well.

The principles of national accord have suffered a major setback because it is not enough to proclaim those principles as theoretical indisputable principles and then to contradict them in practice, in fact, on the field. This is actually what happened with the establishment of the divided forms of the Phalangist state.

Defining one's position vis-a-vis this phenomenon has become the standard for gauging the credibility of the principles of accord on the one hand, as well as the credibility of the legitimate government's commitment to the principles it proclaimed. And yet, there is now a huge gap between the principles of accord and practices, as compared with those who violated the principles of accord.

This is the actual crisis of the government; it goes beyond government organization.

Therefore, when the file of the recent government crisis was opened, our party had a specific position. We emphasized these questions, and we refused involvement in the ministerial fair beyond the questions and beyond how to solve and realize them.

We considered, or rather, we proclaimed the two slogans of accord, whatever the case may be, leading to a government of activists to be leading not to a solution but rather to the continuation of the crisis. What is required is a solution to the crisis. Accordingly, it was our opinion to harden the national position, not for the purpose of escalating the crisis, but rather because the purpose of this hardening is to achieve correct solutions to the crisis instead of continuing to [come up with] stopgap solutions. The majority of the Lebanese people who reject partition and Zionism must resolve again their public will to prescribe to the government a formula of government that would oppose the distasteful divisive forms that appeared after the 7 July massacre in some areas that are under the control of the Phalangist militias. Otherwise, embracing these forms without impairing them and bringing their advocates to government would be a course in the same mode that is being proclaimed by some Arabs under the slogan of Arab solidarity. This is the course through which those Arabs are trying to restore al-Sadat to the Arab rank.



Embracing treason cannot be construed as solidarity just as embracing Zionism and partition cannot be construed as national accord. This is our view of the basic questions in the Lebanese crisis which, as I said, may be reflected on the next president. However, this is not the basis [for the crisis]; the basis is the objectivity of these questions which constitute the features of the Lebanese crisis and how it is to be confronted.

[Question] On this basis do you believe that the government crisis will be prolonged?

[Answer] The Lebanese crisis is lengthy, but the government's crisis may be shortened if we were to bring a government that would confront the Lebanese crisis. This is the sound premise: to select persons in relation to the questions. Our hope would then be great for solving the questions. If we were to bring [to government] a homogeneous working team on the basis of a program for solving these questions, these questions will be solved.

This is the formula as we see it from here. We insisted that we begin with the subject of the prime minister after we complete a redefinition of the questions because the prime minister symbolizes the government.

We may be asked, "Why do we want to redefine the questions since they have been defined in the president's message and in the principles of accord with which you began?"

We would say because new facts have emerged on the scene. The position vis-a-vis these facts must be redefined; a detailed program must be designed; and a prime minister must be brought who can confront these questions and adhere to this program.

In this context the names of three political figures emerge: Dr Salim al-Huss, Mr Malik Salam and Mr Rashid Karami. They can be listed in any order you wish to use, but these three names, in our opinion, are those which are suitable to [the task of] bearing the burdens of this stage.

[Question] It is believed that the purpose of the president's proposal of a government of political activists was to embarrass the National Movement and to embarrass Syria.

[Answer] President Sarkis is the president of the Republic of Lebanon. We are supposed to treat him with respect, but the political realities also require that we speak objectively in a manner that does not comply with anyone.

Our evaluation of President Sarkis's course is that it is erroneous. We told him so when we met him, and we also told the people throughout the year in the statements and announcements we made. First, President Sarkis used to start out by making a wager on the crisis in the entire area. Perhaps some of his advisers helped him in making such a wager.

It is our opinion that Lebanon has no choice in the matter of geography or in that of national destiny regarding the matter of determining its position vis-a-vis the crisis in the area. In his accord message President Sarkis ultimately came to proclaiming [Lebanon's] rejection of Camp David. This was a significant and a good state of affairs, but I believe that this rejection came very late, that is, approximately 1 year after the Camp David [accords] were announced. Lebanese policy, however,

remained as though it were fluctuating between two positions. We support a Lebanese policy that adheres to our pan-Arab surroundings and our pan-Arab depth. That is, we support a policy that is totally allied with Syria and with the Opposition and Resistance Front.

We are saying that Lebanon cannot possibly dissociate itself from this pan-Arab commitment.

It is true that in return Lebanon did sacrifice more for the cause of nationalism in opposing the Zionist enemy. But this is an honorable [course] for Lebanon and something to its credit even though it represents a material, moral and a historical burden to it.

We are proud of all those who become victims and all those who lost their lives in battle; and we are proud of all the land that has been scorched. This is a very small price to pay for forging national freedom. If it is the historical and geographic destiny of Lebanon to have the battles of the pan-Arab question fought on its territory, this would be a great honor for it.

Implied in this commitment is an idea [for solving the crisis] other than that which states, "Let us use the hardships that Syria is facing and the difficulties that the resistance is facing to impose the de facto government that we wish."

We oppose such an opportunist policy because it departs from the essential commitment to pan-Arab destiny. This is not a commitment to accommodate. Official Lebanon may not continue to be accommodating on the pan-Arab question.

This is a basic point. A second point is the fact that whenever the Lebanese Front breaks up, President Sarkis tries to restore respect to it and to its remains on the basis of his view that these remains represent the political Maronites.

In this area we disagree with President Sarkis in this line of thinking. When the events began, the Lebanese Front did in fact represent Christian and Maronite clout. In this regard, however, we want to emphasize that a Christian majority had rejected the Lebanese Front since 1975. At the forefront of that majority was our Syrian National Social party which extends across all sects; its Christian base fought with heroism and with courage in the heart of al-Jabal.

But now the objective reality has changed to the better. The Lebanese Front broke up, and President Franjiyyah, who was its president and the president of the republic, dissociated himself from it because he has always chosen his pan-Arab and national commitment over any suspect relationship with the enemy; and the general staff of the front had become involved in such a relationship.

President Franjiyyah paid a high price for this national and pan-Arab commitment: his son, his family and the victims who lost their lives with him in the massacre.

President Franjiyyah was a power base in the Lebanese Front. The fact that he left the Lebanese Front and presided over the National Christian Group was a major gain for Lebanon and for Arabism. President Sarkis should have embraced this gain in the interests of legitimacy and the unity of Lebanon. However, President Sarkis and the legitimate government developed a Sulayman Franjiyyah complex, and this is a matter that boggles the minds and the hearts.

And here we can see how the Phalangists are devouring their Sham'un ally!

Notwithstanding our opinion and our evaluation of Sham'un and of the extent of his ties and because of the position we have taken on him, he is still in his course and in his conduct a member of the Lebanese Front. However, a bloody conflict did occur between him and the Phalangists. Consequently, the Phalangists became isolated in the face of a vast Christian majority.

Therefore, when President Sarkis sets forth [the notion of] a government of activists, he should not afterwards hesitate to place the Phalangists on one scale of a balance and all of Lebanon with its various parties, sects, political forces and activists on the other scale.

The Phalangists have become a party that controls two and one half districts of Lebanon. This party is deferred to on this basis. But if armed people do have clout, this is another matter. We believe that the clout which armed people have is not always in the interests of the Phalangists. The legitimate government is not supposed to evaluate matters on the basis of the power wielded by armed people, but rather on the basis of popular effectiveness.

We are saying that the vast majority of citizens in the areas which are controlled by the Phalangists are suppressed and repressed. It is the duty of the legitimate government to liberate them from this repression and this suppression. It has to crystallize their free will to support the unity of Lebanon's territory, its people and its institutions.

The sum total of this analysis leads us to conclude that proposing a government of activists was tantamount to closing the file of the 7 July massacre. This accordingly means--whether it was deliberate or nondeliberate, we do not address ourselves to intentions--that the legitimate government threw the ball in the court of Syria and the Lebanese National Movement.

From the beginning President Sarkis wavered around the person of the prime minister. The veto came from him and not from us because he was the one who vetoed the most successful prime minister in Lebanon's political history at this stage: Dr Salim al-Huss. He was the one who removed Prime Minister al-Huss and rejected the national names that were proposed afterwards to organize the government. He is the one who is responsible for the crisis and not those who had reservations on the government organization as it was proposed.

[Question] You are saying that President Franjiyyah's position is a great national and pan-Arab resource. Why did you not form with him a national rescue front for all of Lebanon?

[Answer] I believe that the statement which was issued from Ihdin and Tripoli following the visit of the Lebanese National Movement delegation and the meeting it had with President Franjiyyah and Prime Minister Karami did place the foundations for such a notion. Although we did not call this [association] a front, we considered it a national gathering that included the National Movement, President Franjiyyah and Prime Minister Karami.

The meeting defined political principles and a practical course for realizing common objectives.



It is natural [to ask] why did we delay until this happened. We are saying that an attempt was begun 2 years ago when Mr Walid Jumblatt, President Franjiyyah and Prime Minister Karami announced the Ihdin communiqué.

Although the Ihdin communiqué was brief and shorter than the joint communiqué that has now been issued, it did formulate basic assumptions for national cooperation or for a national gathering of this kind.

Then there were circumstances that killed this communiqué. This was announced previously by Mr Walid Jumblatt to AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI because of a lack of follow-up.

But we have now reorganized everything on an objective basis in the light of a National Movement delegation such as the basic parties in the National Movement. Among them and at their forefront is the Socialist Progressive party.

I believe that in the next few days Mr Jumblatt, chairman of the Central Political Council of the National Movement and president of the Socialist Progressive party will visit Ihdin to meet with President Franjiyyah. Thus we see that steps are being taken towards the crystallization of this national gathering.

As the Social Syrian National party we have been establishing discretionary bilateral relations with President Franjiyyah for 2 years. As I said we consider him to be the head of this national Lebanese Christian gathering which is confronting the Phalangist, separatist, divisive project.

We are also in the same battle position with President Franjiyyah. His fighters and ours are standing [together] in al-Jabal, al-Matn, al-Kurah and as far away as Zgharta. This battle position is that of opposing the Zionist, divisive, separatist project.

[Question] Bashir al-Jumayyil is making daily threats that he will "liberate" all of Lebanon. Therefore, due to the gravity of this problem in the light of your understanding of it, will you oppose him with weapons?

[Answer] We responded to this question as a party in several basic and official statements that were issued in recent years. Among those statements was the speech I delivered at the graduation of the fighters of the Social National Syrian party in Upper al-Matn a few days ago. There was a clear definition of our course in that speech. As a Social National Syrian party and as a Lebanese National Movement we do not support an outbreak. We do support a political solution to the Lebanese crisis. We do support a return of normal life to Lebanon. As a party with an ideology, I believe that a political solution and a return to a democratic political struggle is in the interests of Lebanon because as I said in my speech at the graduation of a class of our fighters, we support a political because we want to return to those areas. We are confident that our people [who reside] in those areas which are controlled by Fascist terror and guerrilla terror are yearning for the return of this intellectual, ideological political struggle. Ultimately, our people will choose the idea that will unite them with the rest of their people; they will not choose the idea that would try to isolate them or divide them especially since that idea led to their destruction and led them to commit suicide in spite of themselves. We are confident that a good idea will win over an evil one. We are confident that good beliefs will win over evil beliefs. We are confident that the national question

with its secular and social progressive content will win over racist and sectarian questions, and we are confident that democracy will win over terrorism and people will win over guerrillas.

For us, an outbreak is not imminent, and we oppose an outbreak. However, we will naturally not resign ourselves to Bashir al-Jumayyil's state if that state wanted to expand itself.

We are in a position of defending ourselves, and we will defend ourselves with the ferocity for which we have been known.

But we will not advance towards any area unless the people in that area rise up against their executioners. We would then be the reserves for those people to support their free will.

[Question] Through the developments that surrounded the resignation of Prime Minister al-Husse and the authorization of Taqi al-Din al-Sulh [with the task of forming a government] we have noticed that positions within the National Movement vis-a-vis this problem were dissimilar.

[Answer] I believe that you read [this] in the newspapers and [noticed it] in some of the meetings that took place between the leaders of the National Movement. This is based on an executive committee decision that was made by all the parties regarding the necessity of reformulating a unified position for the National Movement. Naturally, we believe that what happened--and may Brother Abu Shakir, Ibrahim Qulaylat, permit us to use an expression he had used at this stage by way of expressing an opinion. But if opinions were to go beyond the acceptable and reasonable, they would become disputes.

We look upon what brings us together in the National Movement to be above every secondary dispute and every secondary opinion. For this reason we are in the process of reformulating a standard position for the National Movement.

There was an opinion which stated that the advent of a government of activists would bring about the end of the separatist state. This is an opinion that is based on a nationalist assumption. It may be an erroneous opinion, but it has a nationalist basis.

In our judgment we may know more than what is known by [people in] those areas, where the Phalangist state is being established, that the security solution which President Sarkis was hinting at as part of a government of activists--that is, the army's advancement into al-Matn so as to separate Kasrawan from al-Ashrafiyah--was merely an apparent trick because the army is located in those areas. The army saw the massacres [that took place there], but it did not take action. The army saw the smuggling [that was going on] from Beirut to Juniyah, and it did not take action. The army has been surrounding the borders of the Phalangist compound, and it has been protecting it. This is not a matter of the army entering into an area, but it is rather a matter of army organization which allows that army to carry out a decision. Then it is a matter of a political decision made by the president to confront this divisive state and not to appease its advocates by bringing them into the government.

Perhaps it is our knowledge of what is happening in those areas that has prescribed our rigid position on this matter. Our purpose, as we said, is not to create a crisis, but rather to reach a correct solution so that we do not get trapped into the pitfalls of mirages and imaginary solutions.



[Question] Bashir al-Jumayyil waged a battle to liquidate Sham'un under the cover of security. There are those who are saying that if he succeeds in establishing security, he will throw the ball in the court of the National Movement, especially since the security situation in the western region is shaky.

[Answer] The truth is that we did suffer a great deal in the past years because we have been shouldering the moral responsibility but not the practical responsibility for the security that has eluded us. The nightmare that prevailed over our thoughts in general and then prevailed over the thoughts of some of us in particular was that we did not want to establish our own security and find ourselves involved in the game of partition and counter partition.

It is on this basis that we have always supported the legal government with its internal security forces and the Arab deterrent forces. These are the forces that were able to establish peace when they came.

But you will recall that the role of these forces began to shrink after the Bayt-al-Din conference. Consequently, they no longer had a free hand to impose security. Therefore, after the legal government began to refrain from using them adequately, they began to avoid what is called the long, narrow security line.

This situation with its returns recalled that of the national forces because on the one hand they do not use their adequate security and, on the other hand, because security was no longer stable.

Therefore, we are in the course of formulating a new view of this matter, and we are coordinating [our efforts with those] of the Arab deterrent forces and the other legal forces such as the internal security forces.

I would like to affirm that we frown upon security irregularities but that they are organized and institutionalized there. Theft and extortion are driving people away from their homes and all these matters are organized to the point that His Eminence the Maronite Patriarch condemned what was happening in those areas in several appeals he made.

Excesses are reprehensible in our area, and it is possible to suppress them if there is coordination between our national security--and I am not saying our own security [forces]--and the legal security [forces] which we consider to be the basis.

[Question] Developments in South Lebanon indicate that there are possibilities for creating further tension in security. Do you expect the problem of South Lebanon to be tied to the question of the Middle East? What measures will you take [in this regard] as a national movement with a commitment to this part of the Lebanese homeland?

[Answer] There is a general view and there is information regarding an expected Israeli attack. Some are saying it will come before the U.S. elections, and some are saying that it will come after the U.S. elections but that its purpose will be to establish new facts on the land.

Because we are a national party that views the scene in its entirety in relation to the consequences of what is happening on the Lebanese scene and the intended results of the conspiracy on the Jordanian scene, we do look upon the matter from this

perspective: there is a relationship between an attack that is directed against Syria, the resistance and the Lebanese national forces here and proposing an addendum to Camp David on the Jordanian scene, not to mention the basic Israeli plan to impose an Israeli peace which is based on sectarian and racist outbreaks.

Two small states or military camps have so far been established. One is on the border strip, and the other is east of the capital and in part of al-Jabal. These two states are models of this mode whose prevalence in the area is being sought. In addition, there are the historical regional ambitions that the Zionist entity and the Zionist organization have entertained on our waters and especially the Litani River.

The National Movement and the Palestinian Resistance have the joint responsibility of defending every inch of South Lebanon. This is a matter that we are serious about. In 1978 we had the honor of fighting in the south in the heroic fierce battle which lasted for more than 1 week. It may have been one of the longest Arab wars.

We must mention in this regard the heroism of the Palestinian resistance which had the largest mobilization of forces that were engaged in combat. We cannot but mention with reverence also the steadfastness of the Lebanese national fighters in a number of advanced positions, and I mention on this occasion, Bint Jubayl and al-Khayyam where our party participated with its fighters.

Thus we are not incidental to the subject of the south, and our readiness for a confrontation is serious, but as I said the whole scene must be taken in its entirety.

[Question] Did you propose this matter to the Syrian brothers in the context of the confrontation front?

[Answer] We always have a strategic meeting with the brothers in Damascus, and we look into all the concerns and questions of the Lebanese scene either for national security against the Zionist enemy or for national security against divisive and destructive attempts.

[Question] You met with the Romanian ambassador some time ago, and there is talk about a Romanian initiative. Do you have knowledge of the substance of this initiative and what is your position on it as a party and as a national movement?

[Answer] I cannot speak for the National Movement on a foreign matter because this would require a decision from the National Movement as a whole. But I can speak for the party, and I do know that several parties in the National Movement have relations with the Romanian Communist party and also with the Palestinian Resistance.

His Excellency the Romanian ambassador did bring to me a handwritten message from President Ceaușescu congratulating me on his behalf and on behalf of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist party on my election as party chairman. It was natural for me to thank him for this generous impulse, but we were careful in the statement that was issued by the party to indicate that the investigation dealt with the Romanian initiative from a rejectionist position. We had clearly affirmed that no initiative could be proposed before the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty were scuttled. We also affirmed--and this is our position as a national party--that international pressure was to be exerted on the Zionist entity and not on the people of Palestine. We used the following expression: "It is the thief who must be put behind bars and not the one whose land has been stolen."

We said more than this in a statement to the press that was published in Lebanese newspapers. [We said that] ever since it was established in 1947, the Zionist entity has not been honoring international resolutions. These resolutions have therefore lost their value. Furthermore, this Zionist entity basically contradicts international, human and national rights. This is our position. We disagree with anyone who makes international initiatives, and we warn against them. But the fact that we disagree with foreign countries about their policies on the area does not mean that there be no dialogue with these countries, even if that dialogue were to begin with disagreement over these questions. It is known that we must refer to the fact that President Ceausescu has amended his position in the last 2 years. This, however, does not mean that on our part we have accepted his position because we reject any initiative that stems from positions that [range from] supporting Camp David to saying that the Camp David accords are not adequate and to presenting alternatives to the accords. Naturally, we do not think that these alternatives meet [our] conditions, nor do we think them acceptable. But we must refer to the fact that this development has occurred, and we believe that it is occurring not only in Ceausescu's position, but also in the European position. This development, however, was very insignificant, and this is because of the armed struggle that our people are engaged in in Palestine under the leadership of the PLO. This is the struggle that has gone beyond an armed struggle and has become the uprising of a people which scuttled the autonomy conspiracy and set forth new facts on the land.

We are saying that Bassam al-Shak'a's two legs and Karim Khalaf's leg have done much to alter some international balances and international convictions, even though these convictions have not yet reached the point of being acceptable to us.

But we must always affirm that it is national opposition and national warfare that changed these formulas. Therefore, this struggle must be escalated.

With regard to the reason why neither the European initiative nor the Romanian initiative reached an acceptable point, we believe that the Arabs did not use their real clout in the strategic balance. And here we hold the oil countries responsible in a major way for formulating an Arab strategy that would initiate attack and not retreat as is the case now.

[Question] In your discussion you talked about Jordan's role, and you referred to a solution on the Jordanian scene. Is there a specific idea for this solution which is being proposed on the Jordanian scene?

[Answer] This is a lengthy subject, but we can summarize it [by referring] to what we read about Shimon Perez's notion of such a solution. Perez's notion is not far removed from that of the United Kingdom or from Allon's project and other projects. In addition, most initiatives--European or Maronite--are directed towards Jordan. The case is the same with regard to the dialogue that took place between King Husayn and President Carter. Although that dialogue was based on disagreement over Camp David, it was conducted in the context of looking for another solution.

This other solution that they were looking for did not deal once with scuttling Camp David, but it was rather being discussed as though it were to complete Camp David. The completion of Camp David means falling into the same old pothole.

It is because of our national responsibility that we are saying that it is very important to keep Jordan outside Camp David and its supplements. Despite the political differences between us and the Jordanian regime, we had no reservations whatsoever on having Jordan join the Baghdad summit to participate in the general Arab positions that condemned Camp David. There are, however, several questions that must be placed on record. These are:

First, why didn't Jordan go ahead with its unity with Syria? It is being said that the United States and Saudi Arabia exerted pressure on Jordan to pull Jordan out of these unity [schemes]. Had this unity been completed, Jordan would have been fortified in the positions of opposition.

Second, why is Jordan the existence of the Moslem Brothers and their setting out from Jordan to Syria?

Third, why is Jordan condoning the settlement?

Basically, Jordan has not said that it was rejecting Camp David in principle with regard to the normalization of relations with Israel; with regard to [the accord] being a peace treaty with the enemy; and with regard to the fact that [the accord] altogether scuttle the state of Palestinian affairs so as to propose inquiries around them.

To say that the Camp David [accords] are not enough, but that they may be completed by improving the conditions [of the accord] is a very serious statement. We appreciate the fact that Jordan has a long front with the enemy, and we appreciate the fact that Jordan needs support from its national heartland. However, instead of looking for international solutions to improve the conditions of the settlement, Jordan should have devoted its attention to how it could change the pan-Arab equation by uniting with Syria. This would have strengthened Jordan and made its long borders the same as those of the united Syrian army, of the Syrian air force and of the Syrian forces.

This qualitative move has not taken place. In its absence all the pitfalls exist; they are relevant, and they are moot as I have indicated.

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CSO: 4802



## BRIEFS

**ARAB LEAGUE-EEC MEETING**—Yesterday at the league's office, League of Arab States Secretary General Chedli Klibi received Mr Michel Courtier, the European Communities Commission delegate in Tunis, who came to say goodbye on the occasion of the completion of his mission in Tunisia. "We spoke," he said, "of current relations and particularly of the development of relations in terms of the European-Arab dialogue, resumption of which is hoped for on both sides." He added that he had looked into cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean with the secretary general of the League of Arab States, this cooperation being "a challenge and a source of reflection with an eye to enabling that sea to deliver a new message to the world at this level of north-south relations in the Mediterranean." Then Mr Chedli Klibi received Mr Nelson Hernandez, the Venezuelan ambassador to Tunis, who indicated that this meeting, which he described as friendly, had permitted him to engage in an exchange of views on the world situation with the secretary general of the pan-Arab organization. After stating that the establishment of peace is the goal sought by the Venezuelan Government and the countries that constitute the League of Arab States, Mr Nelson Hernandez said: "We have agreed to go on to a broader exchange of views among our nations since, as an OPEC member, Venezuela has many contacts with the Arab world." [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 10 Oct 80 p 7] 11466

**PRELIMINARY ALGERIAN-TUNISIAN MEETING**—A delegation of highly-placed Tunisian business leaders headed by Mr Moncef Belaid, director general of industry attached to the Ministry of Economy, visited in Algiers from 6 to 9 October. During its stay in Algeria, this delegation was received by Messrs Mohamed Liassine and Said Ait Messaoudene, members of the FLN [National Liberation Front] Central Committee and Algerian ministers of heavy and light industries respectively. The Tunisian delegation also held discussions with the leaders of the different expanded industrial sectors of housing, public works and the postal and telecommunications service. On this occasion, they engaged in an in-depth examination of the experiences the two countries have had in the field of industrial development. An increase in exchanges of information in the different fields as well as industrial cooperation were the object of particular attention. This mission, which falls under the heading of the application of measures decided on at the time of Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali's recent official visit to Algeria, is also planning to prepare for the proceedings of the big Algerian-Tunisian Commission which is to meet shortly in Tunis. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 11 Oct 80 p 2] 11466



ARAB INVESTMENT IN FRG--A West German news report quotes the head of the Arab Monetary Fund, Mr Jawad Hashim, as saying that the Arab oil-producing countries now wish to invest more of their billions of dollars of oil revenues in the Federal Republic of Germany rather than, as they have done so far, primarily in the United States. It is felt that these funds would be safer in Germany than in other West European Nations. The Arab countries are not going to invest any new oil revenues in America, but the deposits which are already there, totalling between 30 and 40 billion dollars, will not be withdrawn. This decision was made primarily as a result of America's freezing of Iranian assets. This caused the Arab oil-producing countries to become apprehensive about the possibility that America might undertake to take similar measures with regard to Arab financial assets in the event of a crisis. [Excerpt] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 16 Jul 80 p 12]

9468

CSO: 4802

## SOVIETS REPORTED TO KILL AFGHAN TROOPS

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 6 Oct 80 pp 1, 5

[Text] Peshawar, Oct. 5: According to latest reports, Soviet tanks and armoured cars opened fire and killed over 100 Afghan troops when they responded to Mujahideens' call and jumped out of a convoy sent to repair Asma-Birkot road in Kunar province. Ninety troops who succeeded in running away from the convoy surrendered before Mujahideen alongwith their arms and ammunition. The Mujahideen also destroyed two Soviet tanks.

It is also reported that most of troops are kept under constant watch of Afghan Government party workers as they are looking for an opportunity to defect to Mujahideen. Afghan Government which suspects the loyalty of troops has restricted their movement and forbidden them from writing letters even to their close relatives. Leave of all types has also been stopped. This has completely lowered the morale of Afghan troops and a state of uncertainty is prevailing all over the country.

It is further reported that the Soviets are going to remove anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons from Afghan army units because most of the Afghan-controlled weapons are finding their way to Mujahideen.

Meanwhile, there is acute shortage of consumer goods and the soaring prices are now beyond the reach of Afghan masses.

Another report adds:

According to a Press release of Hezbi Islami Afghanistan issued here today, reports from Kandhar province said that Mujahideen have fulfilled the following operations in Kandhar province during the last few days.

The Mujahideen entered the bazar and captured the son of the Director of the Prison, then a cassette was recorded by him and it was sent to his father to release the prisoners. Otherwise, he will be executed by the Mujahideen.

The Mujahideen captured alive a Communist by the name of Mangul on Sept. 27.

The Mujahideen killed two Khalqies, one on the road side while the other was killed in his house on Sept. 28. Next day the Mujahideen killed Zalmi, the representative of the Defence Committee.

On Sept. 29, Vice-Commander Dad Mahmad, a loyal sepoy to the Government, was captured and executed.

Reports from Chazni province said that the Mujahideen killed two Khalqies in the Armak school, because this school was the centre of the Communist and militia.

On Sept. 28, guerilla group attacked Ashor village, with the result that one high-ranking Khalqi who was also the bodyguard of Hafizullah Amin was killed.

Mujahideen destroyed two tanks and killed six soldiers and two officers in an attack on a convoy near Barikot, according to a Press release of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan.

In another fighting incident on September 25, the Mujahideen killed 27 Babrak soldiers, wounded 18 and captured eight of them. In this encounter the Mujahideen also captured six machineguns, one mortar and ammunition. In another incident, the Mujahideen captured three heavy machineguns and one mortar when 100 soldiers surrendered themselves to the Mujahideen.

On September 28 one tank was destroyed and three Russians killed when a mine, planted by Mujahideen, exploded.

According to another report from Kunar, Russian and Babrak troops attacked Smar on September 25. Fighting still continues. The invading troops have inflicted heavy casualties and four Mujahideen have been martyred.

A report from Badakhshan says that about three weeks ago Mujahideen destroyed seven Russian tanks and killed 36 Russians in fighting. The Mujahideen also captured some arms. Two of the Mujahideen were wounded.

According to another report from Badakhshan, heavy fighting took place between Mujahideen and Russian troops in Argo. The Mujahideen killed a large number of Russians--PPI.

CSO: 4920

SOVIETS BUILD UP TROOP STRENGTH

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 4 Oct 80 pp 1, 10

[Text] New Delhi, Oct. 3: Afthanistan Government announced yesterday that a trial court ordered jail for scores of school children after they pleaded guilty of staging a series of anti-Soviet demonstrations in Kabul last April and May.

The court decided that those who have not reached the legal age be put in reform jails, while it sentenced the others to imprisonment terms varying from five to 20 years, the Afghan Government Radio said in a broadcast monitored in New Delhi.

Thousands of school girls and boys chanted slogans criticising the Soviet Union and Afghan President Babrak Karmal, taunted Afghan Government soldiers and organised school strikes earlier this summer. Unofficial reports from Kabul said more than 350 were killed by gunshots and beatings.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union meeting still guerilla resistance, has rebuilt its troop strength in Afghanistan and is using 'scorched earth' tactics in an unsuccessful effort to subdue the country.

This is the assessment of U.S. officials who also told reporters on Wednesday that the Red Army has built permanent bridges across the Soviet border while slowly increasing troop strength to 85,000 men. Soviet forces were at that level in June, when President Leonid I. Brezhnev announced a partial withdrawal--a move that appeared to suggest a conciliatory attitude in the Kremlin and an opening for a negotiated settlement.

The U.S. official said, the Afghan Army has virtually collapsed forcing the Soviets to take on most of the fighting against guerillas. "The Soviets, in our view, are digging in for a long stay," said one official who asked not to be identified. "I don't think there is any doubt about this."

A Western diplomatic source said the thunderous explosion which roused Kabul residents from their sleep early on the morning of Sept. 24 was the detonation of a Public Works Ministry dynamite storage depot just sout of the capital.

One report said the cache was set off by anti-Marxist guerillas, said the source, who asked not be identified.

Six people reportedly were killed in the blast and the fighting that followed, he added.

The Muslim guerillas reportedly had removed one truckload of dynamite from the depot at Chakh-Ab, five kilometres from Kabul, before they were spotted at about 2:30 A.M. by security forces, the source said. They apparently decided to set off the rest of the explosives when it became clear they couldn't haul them away.

Ashes from the explosion drifted down on the capital for about two hours after the blast, and small arms fire was heard in the area until about 5:00 A.M., the source said.

An earlier report said 10 Soviet tanks were also seen moving through Kabul after the blast toward the site of the explosion.--APA.

CSO: 4920



## SOVIET ARMY SAID LOSING GRIP ON KABUL

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Oct 80 p 8

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Oct. 10: The Soviet army grip on Kabul has seriously slipped, allowing Afghan urban guerillas to attack Soviet and government targets more often, a diplomat said today.

Small arms fire, that lasts through much of the night, has spread and occurs several times a week. Beside this, unexplained loud explosions and prolonged electricity cuts have become common in the last two weeks, the diplomat said.

"It is rarely clear who is shooting at whom" the diplomat said "but there is evidence that Mujahideen attacks are increasing in number and around Kabul".

**LULL IN FIGHTING:** Meanwhile a source in Kabul said yesterday that Soviet military operations had at least temporarily ground to a halt, with no major fighting involving Russian soldiers reported in recent days.

However, the source said that fighting continued against guerillas by Afghan soldiers, militiamen and tribesmen recruited by the Government. But there has been no significant activity by the Soviet war machine in Afghanistan—currently estimated at 85,000 troops, backed by MiG jet fighters and helicopter gunships—since the Russian defeat recently in the Panjshir Valley, north of Kabul, said the source.

In that campaign, the Soviets launched a major offensive in late August to secure the strategic gorge, held by Muslim insurgents since 1978. Soviet troops led by scores of tanks and supported by pocket-bristling fighter-bombers and helicopters pushed 40 kilometres into the valley against heavy guerilla resistance. The advance was

stalled at Kokha, when the guerillas trapped Soviet tanks by blasting boulders down the hillsides, reports from Afghanistan said.

The guerillas claimed later to have killed more than 1,500 Soviet and pro-government troops and destroyed 35 tanks and a helicopter in the fighting.

**MEMBERSHIP RULES:** Western diplomatic sources said in the Indian capital today that the Ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), had made important changes in its membership rules, which would further weaken the influence and importance of the Khalq faction opposed to President Babrak Karmel's Parcham group.

The membership structure consist of a new three-tier system of full members, provincials and trainees.

Under the new rules, all those who have been 'inactive' for the past nine months have been relegated into a lower tier, the sources said.

The new rules would primarily affect the Khalq member, who have kept at a generally low profile since the Parchamite leader Babrak Karmel was installed in power by the Soviet Union in December last year. The Parcham faction outnumbered the Khalqis in government and party posts and observers believe the latest changes in the membership rules will make it difficult for the Khalqis to make a perceptible influence.

The changes in the membership rules are also considered to be a sequel to the continuing purges of Khalq elements from both the government and the party.  
—APA/UPI/AFP

USSR REPORTED TO TAKE HEAVY LOSSES IN KUNNAR

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 Oct 80 p 8

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Oct. 9: The Russian forces attacked Mazar Valley, in Kunar province recently.

According to a press release of Hezbi-Islami Afghanistan, issued here today, the Mujahideen defended themselves bravely against the Russians. In this encounter 330 Russians were killed. One Russian plane was also shot down.

On the Mujahideen side eight persons killed.

Reports from Alishang in district Langman said that in a fighting with the Soviet forces a few days back, the Mujahideen destroyed 18 enemy tanks and killed 235 Russian soldiers.

Due to heavy bombardments, 20 Mujahideen were killed. In another encounter in the same area, 14 Soviet soldiers were killed and two tanks were destroyed.

On the side of Mujahideen no casualties were reported.

Meanwhile, according to a report published today in the 'Indian Express', the Soviet soldiers, who lived in primitive self-built huts after their invasion last year, were getting ready for a comfortable second winter. Solid

barracks, the paper said, were being built in many important cities. Construction in the Afghan capital as well as in Jalalabad, Badakhshan, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Pul-i-Khumri is going on.

The highway from Kabul to the Soviet border, the paper said, would be widened into four-lanes. Wooden bridges have been built over the frontier river Oxus and will be replaced in the near future by permanent structures.

Western diplomats in the Indian capital pointed out that such actions need not necessarily mean that the Soviets now feel secure.

In Kabul, members of the Democratic People's Party have told journalists of Soviet offers to withdraw from Afghanistan, if Kabul can rebuild its army to its original level of 100,000 troops—an increase of two-thirds.

But the offer, according to a member of the Khalq party's (people's) wing, is by no means a sign that the Soviets have any plan to withdraw. As long as the Russians are in the country, recruitment of so many native soldiers will remain impossible, he said.  
—FPi

**MUJAHEDIN HALT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN PANJSHIR VALLEY**

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Oct 80 p 3

[Article by Frederic Smelt: "In Afghanistan the Russians Have Not Yet Learned Mountain Guerrilla Warfare--Unsuccessful Fall Offensive in Panjshir Valley"]

[Text] One night about 30 Soviet armored cars and supply vehicles drove through some streets, lighted only by a few naked lightbulbs, of the Kart-e-Parwan District of Kabul to their barracks. Many Kabul residents went out in front of their premises surrounded by walls to take a look at the dirtied vehicles and exhausted soldiers, who everyone thought were coming from the Panjshir Valley. There were sporadic cries of the resistance slogan "Allah-u-akbar" (God is great), but the majority remained silent in the knowledge that the Soviets' unsuccessful advance into the Panjshir Valley is not bringing their country a single centimeter closer to peace, and that even the couple of burned jeeps which were being hauled by wreckers could not hide the fact that no end is in sight of Russian occupation of part of the country. The soldiers looked neither right nor left and appeared to have but one thing in mind--to reach their barracks as quickly as possible. For a few seconds it was impossible to escape the impression that the people in this dark street on both sides would have expressed the same wish if they had been asked: the Afghans were wishing they were on the other side of the Amu Daria, and the Russians looked as if they too would rather be there. Four days later the remaining armored forces presumably returned to Kabul at night, and thus it appears to have been established that the people in the Panjshir Valley again managed to throw the Soviets out of the valley, though afterward some houses in Gulbahar were destroyed by helicopters.

According to reports of others and one's own observations, only one conclusion is possible concerning this commando action: even after 9 months the Soviets have not learned how to conduct mountain guerrilla warfare, even assuming that they did not want to occupy the valley permanently but merely intended to reduce the power of the local mujahedin through a "punitive expedition." For since the Soviets do not control the country outside the towns anyway, and in fact cannot do so with the existing forces, one cannot really see why they should have been bent on taking the Panjshir Valley, which is made for partisan warfare, particularly as winter will start in a few weeks and Russian logistics will have its hands full to supply its troops on the Salang Road more or less satisfactorily.

If anything, protection of the Salang Road, the main route of supply for the army of occupation, may be seen as the reason for the advance into the valley, for in Dehbabal-e-Serach this road passed very close to one of the accesses to the

Panjshir Valley. As far as is known, however--disregarding an attack against an Afghan money transport--the mujahedin did not attack the road there. Perhaps a more serious consideration for the Soviets is the fact that there are routes running all the way to Badakhshan and Pakistan from the Panjshir Valley.

In the clear autumn air not only the blue sky and the blue-green water but also the brown mountain boulders radiate in the Panjshir Valley. The valley is beautiful if one does not happen to have to earn his living here; to be sure, many a peasant looks at the panorama differently when he works for his daily living on the meager rocky soil, which needs to be irrigated artificially. The amount of land that can be cultivated being very small, many inhabitants of the valley migrated to Kabul to find some kind of work--without, however, losing their longing for the valley.

This close tie between Kabul and the Panjshir Valley explains among other things why the imminent Russian attack was known, the villages were vacated to some extent and peasants, shepherds and fishermen became guerrillas. In the mountain boulders, which in most locations rise right next to the river or the road, there are caves which normally serve as a place for the shepherds to stay during bad weather and are now serving as a refuge for the mujahedin.

If one sits with a group of Panjshir people in such a cave, one feels as if thousands of years of history had become a single day. Rifles and old Kalashnikovs, which were not purchased but captured, with whole stories connected with that, or the not very large supply of ammunition being kept in ammunition belts, small cases and sacks, or the three watches and one Japanese transistor radio make it clear that one is in the 20th century, as do sweaters and jackets manufactured in Europe or the United States. If, however, one goes through the rest of the cave inventory, time vanishes. Dried mulberries to sweeten tea, and dried peas, as well as grains of wheat and flour, are kept in stone or earthenware vessels. Piles of camel's-thorn are stacked in a corner for heating stones to bake flat bread with flour and water. There are no large supplies, for the Soviets are not expected to stay in the valley long, and at night one can reach the nearest village anyway. Cotton blankets rolled up to serve as cushions to sit on during the day complete the cave decor. In daytime the men need do only one thing: stay alive and not be discovered by helicopters. This is not particularly difficult as helicopters can be seen approaching a long time ahead.

According to the reports, the Soviets drove with armored cars and supply vehicles toward Rukha, the district capital, while helicopters circled above the convoys. As is often the case in Afghanistan, no exact figures about the number and type of the Soviet vehicles are available. The consensus is that there were a great many. In Kabul, the figures vacillate between 60 and 600, with the former figure probably closer to the truth. Parachute troops are said to have been used around Rukha, but otherwise the Soviets appear to have again proceeded according to the old scheme of "armored cars and helicopters," despite the fact these tactics as yet have not worked in any mountain valley where the partisans remained preponderantly on the defensive, attacking the Soviets in brief raids.

The fighting method of the mujahedin is as simple as it is effective. At places that are particularly difficult to take in with one's eye, they take advantage of



the momentary confusion when a vehicle has hit a mine, firing at the tires and personnel of the convoys. Those raids are said to have been staged so quickly and with such clever use of the terrain that--according to the muhajedin--losses were not great despite the enemy armor and helicopters.

This particular morning, when the first helicopters were slowly but surely approaching our mountain, the entrance to the cave was shut quickly with a few rocks. The effort turned out to be unnecessary, for the helicopters flew up the valley. After an hour, the same thing happened, except that this time we heard some explosions in the distance. This prompted one of the cave warriors to state: "I guess they are once again bombing our rocks and lizards." When the helicopter noise had stopped, we established that evidently this was exactly what had happened. Along the road, clouds of dust testified to military activity despite the fact that at the time not even a sheep had been in the vicinity.

During those few hours in the Panjshir Valley I did not see any dead or wounded, and helicopter attacks with rockets are not particularly strenuous if one is staying in a solid cave. Reportedly Soviet pilots in other valleys drove the muhajedin with nonlethal gas from their hiding places, but this is not certain, for in Afghanistan, which is 15 times the size of Switzerland and hardly has any communications any longer, it is very difficult to gather accurate information. Details are invariably only known in Peshawar, Islamabad and especially New Delhi (apparently knowledge increases proportionately to the distance from the location of the occurrence), and from there the information then also reached the Afghan citizens.

In all likelihood the Soviets used no gas, lethal or other, or napalm or phosphorous bombs in the Panjshir Valley, and yet the presence of their troops, though there aren't any at all in many of the country's villages, lies on the country like a cover of lead. One of the shepherds in the Panjshir Valley expresses this more strikingly. He fought the Russians without any ideological tinge and without hatred; rather he was guided by the simple reason that the Russians did not belong in the valley (any more than the young people of the Partshani Party, who have no qualifications that are respected here and whose party phrases were listened to by him first without prejudice and then with irritation and finally were dismissed with the words, "The talk of an official has never made a single sheep well again"). This is what the shepherd says: "Look, what can I do when I care for my sheep and they die nevertheless although I have used all the herbs and good words I know and have sought the mullahs' advice? And still there have always been sheep in this valley."

No one at this mountain post gave the impression of lacking hope, but all also realized that, while they could inflict losses on the Soviet soldiers, they could not defeat them and that they were faced with a guerrilla war that would last for years and in which not only some of them but also their wives and children would die.

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C50: 4403



## AFGHANISTAN

### SOVIET PLANES AT KANDAHAR AIRPORT REPORTED DESTROYED

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 20 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] Beijing, Oct. 19--Amidst the roar of guns coming from the Iran-Iraq border, the Kremlin summoned the Babrak Karmal of the Kabul regime and accorded him a ceremonious reception in Moscow.

Mr. Brezhnev himself greeted Karmal as a "head of state" at the airport, where they gave each other a big hug and reviewed an honour guard.

The fact is that the Soviet Union was compelled to do so because of the stiff resistance by the Afghan people. The Afghan guerillas are hitting hard and their recent surprise attack on Kandahar airport in which many Soviet aircraft were destroyed added new proof to this fact.

Recently, the Soviet Army has taken the following steps to stiffen the suppression: (1)--Tighten the control of major cities, towns, and communication lines; the Soviet troops sent out in planes and tanks to bomb and shell villages along the main roads throughout the country to create desolate "no-man areas" to deter and isolate the guerillas.

(2)--The Soviet authorities have sent home that part of its personnel and equipment unsuited to fighting in Afghanistan and brought in a large batch of gunships and a great number of mobile shock troops trained for anti-guerilla warfare and suitable to fight in mountainous regions in order to launch surprise attacks on the guerillas.

(3)--Employing Afghans to fight against Afghans and to create discord among the Afghan tribes and undermining the morale of their forces.--Xinhua

CSO: 4920

MUJAHEDIN ATTACK KABUL OFFICIALS, RULING PARTY WORKERS

Karachi DAWN in English 6 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Oct 5: According to a Press release of Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan, issued here today reports from Kandhar province said that the Mujahideen have fulfilled the following operations in Kandhar province during the last few days.

The Mujahideen entered the Bazar and captured the son of the Director of the Prison, on Sept 5.

The Mujahideen captured alive a Communist by the name of Mangul on Sept 27.

The Mujahideen killed two Khalqies, one on the road side while the other was killed in his house on Sept 28. Next day the Mujahideen killed Zalimi, a representative of the Defence Committee.

On Sept 29, the Vice-Commander by name of Dad Mahmud, that being a loyal spy to the Government was captured alive and then was executed.

Reports from Ghazni province said the Mujahideen attacked the sub-government of Armak. As a result two Khalqies were killed and the Mujahideen put on fire the Armak school, because this school was the centre of Communists and militia.

On Sept 28 a group of Mujahideen attacked another village with the result one high-ranking Khalqi, who was also the body-guard of Hafizullah Amin was killed.

The report adds that two Russian convoys — one from Kabul and the other from Wardak province. But the de-

voted Mujahideen of Hezb-i-Islami attacked both convoys on their way to Wardak province near Shindu Sayyar Pass. It was 7 p.m. at night and the fighting continued for four hours. As a result two tanks were destroyed by rocket launcher and the trucks carrying potatoes and one jeep were destroyed. Twenty-five Russian soldiers were killed and 12 were wounded seriously, including one high-ranking Russian adviser, who died after a while.

According to latest reports, Soviet tanks and armoured cars opened fire and killed over 100 Afghan Askars when they responded to Mujahideen's call and jumped out of the convoy sent to repair Asmar-Pirhot road in Kunar province. Ninety Askars who succeeded in running away from the convoy surrendered before the Mujahideen along with their arms and ammunition.

Mujahideen also destroyed two Soviet tanks.

It is also reported that most of Askars are kept under constant watch of the Afghan Government party workers as they are looking for an opportunity to defect to the Mujahideen.

Afghan Government which suspects the loyalty of troops has restricted their movement and forbidden them from writing letters even to their close relatives. Leave of all type has also been stopped. This has completely lowered the moral of Afghan troops and a state of uncertainty is prevailing all over the country. —FPI.

## AFGHANISTAN

### KABUL REPORTED TO BE HOSTILE TOWARD INDIANS

Karachi DAWN in English 9 Oct 80 p 5

[Article by Yeha Syed]

[Text] London, Oct. 8--An Indian journalist who was in Afghanistan last Friday reported in "The Times" yesterday noticeable estrangement towards the Indians visiting Kabul, because "the Afghans believe that India failed to stand by them during their hour of crisis."

Kuldip Nayar said in his report filed from Delhi, "When I was in Kabul in 1974, I was welcomed wherever I went. Shopkeepers would go out of the way to say that the Indians were their best friends. This time many shopkeepers said "bayro" (go away) when I approached."

Nayar reports that "insurgents have surrounded Kabul," from where, he says, "I have just returned, and even Government officials warn you against going more than six miles outside the capital without armed escort."

An Indian residing in Kabul took Nayar in his Mercedes to Paghman, a scenic picnic spot nine miles from Kabul last Friday; this was a holiday, and found the place deserted. On his return at 4 his car was fired upon, although no one was hurt, but "the windscreen was shattered."

Since most Mercedes belonging to Afghan citizens had been requisitioned, Nayar explained, the general belief is that travelling in them are senior officials of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul.

Two weeks ago, he said, 21 lorries carrying dry fruits and other goods were destroyed on the road between Kabul and Jalalabad, distance of 50 miles. Since then those who still use the road, Nayar said, "are forced to pay toll tax to the insurgents for safe conduct."

"This works out to be cheaper," an Afghan trader told Nayar, whose lorry was recently burnt.

The Soviet lorries leaving Kabul with supplies and mail are escorted by up to 15 tanks and even non-Russian convoys have between six and eight tanks to protect them, Nayar said.

This, he added, "indicates the extent of the insurgents' hold around Kabul." Nayar said, "In the suburbs of Shakedra, posters carrying the picture of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, the chief of Hizbe Islami, 'the most influential guerilla group,' are pasted on many walls, with a warning that no one should pull them down."

When a Parcham member ignored the warning, he was killed on the spot, Nayar said.

Deserters have reduced the Afghan army to a shadow of what it was, reported Trevor Fishlock in "The Times" for Delhi.

Before the Soviet occupation last December, the strength of the army was 80,000; now it is estimated at 35,000 only, he said.

CSO: 4920



## AFGHANISTAN

### INSURGENTS IN KABUL ENJOY 'OFFICIAL COVER'

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 7 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Oct. 6: Anti-government insurgents number nearly 20,000 in Kabul and enjoy protection from sympathisers in the Afghan Police and Army, an Indian Journalist reported today.

Kuldip Nayar of the 'Indian Express' newspaper, who spent six days in the Afghan capital, quoted guerrillas as saying, "We can disrupt life in Kabul in no time, but it is no use doing so when we cannot hold the city."

According to the guerrillas, there are about 20,000 Soviet troops in or near Kabul. The city's population, Nayar said, had risen to one million because of an influx of refugees from the provinces.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan total about 85,000 according to Western estimates.

In a despatch from Kabul, published today, Nayar said: "The guerrilla activity inside the city has increased since I was here eight

months ago. It is still limited to a few exchanges here and there at night, but the guerrillas are bolder and more determined than before."

"It appears they have their men in the Police and the Army who not only act as their informers but also give them shelter" he said.

BARRAK INVITED: Soviet-backed Afghan President Babrak Karmal will make an official friendship visit to the Soviet Union in mid-October, Tam reported last night.

Mr. Karmal accepted an invitation from the Communist Party's General Committee. The President of the Supreme Soviet and from the Soviet Government, Tam said.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan yesterday agreed to buy two Antonov commercial aircraft from the Soviet Union for its domestic carrier, Bektar al-Watana, Radio Afghanistan reported. -AFP/PA

MINISTERS OF FRONTIERS, PUBLIC WORKS KILLED IN PAKTIA

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 14 Sep 80 pp 1, 6

[Article: "Afghan Mujahidin Kill Two Ministers and 90 Guards in Paktia; Fierce Battles in Konarha, Samangan, and Balkh; Karmal Government Drafting Young Children Into Army"]

[Text] Kabul, 13 September (PPI, JASARAT Correspondent Mukhtar Hussein)--The Afghan mujahidin have killed two ministers of the Karmal government and their 90 guards in Paktia. These ministers were sent to spread anti-mujahid propaganda in that area.

Meanwhile, in (Panjsher) Valley, the Russians have suffered heavy casualties in a battle lasting several days against the mujahidin.

The mujahidin defeated the Russian army in Chakvardak, 20 miles from Kabul. The Russian army could not enter Herat city. The mujahidin killed 300 soldiers, and destroyed 6 tanks and 12 trucks carrying ammunition in (Oruzgan) district. The mujahidin killed 27 Russian soldiers while they were getting out of their helicopters in (Sharan) district.

According to news reports, Faiz Mohammad, minister of frontiers and tribes, and Nazar Mohammad, minister of public works, were visiting (Sayyed Khel) and (Monari) in Paktia. Their purpose was to use money, military power and force to get the local tribes to rise against the mujahidin. However, the mujahidin attacked under the command of Jalal al-Din, leader of Hazb-I-Islami, and, after a bloody battle, killed the two ministers and their 90 guards. Congratulating the mujahidin on their success, Mohammed Yunus Khalis said that God was on their side, and that the Kabul government would face the same fate as its ministers. The minister of frontiers and tribal affairs, Faiz Mohammad, was originally from Paktia and belonged to the Mahmood tribe. He was also a minister under Taraki and Amin.

Reports of fighting starting Monday between Russian soldiers and the mujahidin have been received from Samangan and Balkh provinces. Heavy fighting is reported in (Bainwal), Jalalabad, and the neighboring provinces of Konarha and Laghman.

According to REUTER, the combined forces of the Karmal government and Russian armies tried unsuccessfully to enter the city of Herat. The mujahidin fiercely fought them back. Following its shattering defeat in (Panjsher) Valley, the Russian army is camping in Rakha, 20 miles away. Under the leadership of Engineer

Gulbadan Hikmatyar, the mujahidin attacked the Russian army in (Argoan) district, destroyed 6 tanks and 12 trucks loaded with weapons, and killed 300 Karmal government troops. The Russian army was headed from Ghazni to (Argoan) to recover this area from the mujahidin.

The Russians are fighting the mujahidin in (Khoust) and (Ghoulang) districts. The Russians dropped soldiers from helicopters in (Shawan) district of Paktia province, but the mujahidin attacked them as soon as they landed and killed 27 Russian soldiers. One mujahidin was killed and another was wounded. In fighting lasting several days between the mujahidin and the Russian soldiers, the mujahidin destroyed seven tanks and three armored vehicles in (Ghourband) district of Parwan province. The mujahidin attacked Russian reinforcements, blocked their way to Parwan, and killed 81 Russian soldiers.

According to a report by REUTER, the Afghan army is discouraged by the forced recruitment of children below age 15. Shopkeepers are on strike in Kandahar. Due to fighting in other areas, people are flocking to Kabul, resulting in an increase in Kabul's population. The Russian army is once more patrolling Kabul. They have set up check points on all roads entering Kabul. Murder and abduction are on the increase in Kabul. In the capital, pamphlets containing threats to murder Russian soldiers are being distributed. The Karmal government has passed a new law meant to stop soldiers from deserting the army.

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CSO: 4203

## AFGHANISTAN

### BRIEFS

**GUERRILLA ACTIVITY STEPPED UP--**New Delhi, Oct 6--Anti-Government insurgents number nearly 20,000 in Kabul and enjoy protection from sympathisers in the Afghan Police and Army. Kuldip Nayar of the "Indian Express," who spent six days in the Afghan capital, quoted guerillas as saying, we can disrupt life in Kabul in no time, but it is no use doing so when we cannot hold the city. According to the guerillas, there are about 20,000 Soviet troops in or near Kabul. The city's population, Nayar said, had risen to one million because of an influx of refugees from the provinces. Soviet troops in Afghanistan total about 85,000, according to Western estimates. In a despatch from Kabul published today, Nayar said: The guerilla activity inside the city has increased since I was here eight months ago. It is still limited to a few exchanges here and there at night but the guerillas are bolder and more determined than before. It appears they have their men in the Police and the Army who not only act as their informers but also give them shelter, he said.--APP/Reuter [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 7 Oct 80 p 1]

**USSR BOMBING CLAIMS 200--**New Delhi, Oct 21--About 200 Afghans were killed when Soviet MIG fighter jets and helicopter gunships blasted Farza, a town north of Kabul, earlier this month, according to a report in the "Indian Express" newspaper. The Express said yesterday the bombing was "to punish the people for sheltering Afghan guerillas." It quoted a witness to the attack as saying that half the dwellings in Farza, a town of about 25,000 people, were destroyed in the attack. Most of the residents fled to the safety of nearby mountains. The witness told the newspaper in New Delhi that he saw a Russia MIG-21 exploding in flames near Farza. Some helicopter gunships were also hit by gunfire, he added. He claimed that fruit orchards and standing crops in the area were destroyed by the raid.--APA [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 21 Oct 80 p 10]

**RUSSIANS KILLED--**Quetta, Oct. 19--Eight Russians have been killed and four others injured in two encounters with freedom fighters in Afghanistan. Freedom fighters have also seized 12 machineguns from the Russians. Two freedom fighters have, however, received injuries in their operations against Soviet-backed Karmal regime. According to a delayed information received in Quetta from Afghanistan today, freedom fighters had their first clash with a group of Russians on Oct 11 and a second on Oct 12. Russians were fishing in Dorri River, Khoshab village close to Kandahar airport when Mujahideen attacked the group, killing eight Russians and causing injuries to four others. Two Mujahideen also sustained injuries. They captured 12 Russian machineguns. Next day Mujahideen killed another Russian near Kandahar when he was sitting on an armoured vehicle guarding his Russian friends who were shopping in main bazar. [Text] [Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 21 Oct 80 p 1]



**BABRAK KARMAL SPEECH QUOTED--**New Delhi, 8 September (PPI, DPI)--The pro-Soviet government leader, Babrak Karmal, has claimed that his army is defeating its enemy, and forcing enemy remnants to flee the country. Addressing the citizens in Kabul yesterday, the Marxist leader said, however, that the government cannot deal with the mujahidin by itself. According to Radio Kabul, he called on the people to cooperate with the government to clean the country of its enemies. He said that the people should be able to distinguish between their enemies and their friends. He added that though the situation was bad, the course of events was in his favor. He repeatedly claimed that China, Iran, Pakistan, and America were introducing trouble-makers into the country. He said that as soon as all these foreign intrusions stop, the Russian army would leave Afghanistan. He asked for volunteers to help the ruling government and the country. According to him, those who died for the country were martyrs. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 9 Sep 80 pp 3, 6]  
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**AFGHAN GENERAL KILLED--**New Delhi, Sept. 30: A Major-General of the Afghan Army was shot dead by Muslim guerillas in Kabul province on Friday, Afghan guerilla sources said yesterday. The sources said Maj.-Gen. Abdul Aziz was killed by anti-Soviet guerilla during a commando raid on the town of Murad Beg in Kabul province. Several other Afghan Army officers were killed in the attack, the sources said, adding that details of the ambush were scarce. Afghan security forces "eliminated hundreds of guerillas and seized large quantities of arms and ammunitions from their possession" in the Muqur district of Ghazni province, Kabul Radio claimed yesterday. "Our security forces, aided by party activists, eliminated hundreds guerillas and captured hundreds of weapons from their possession," the radio said in its Pushtu language news bulletin monitored here. Meanwhile, heavy fighting continued in Maidan, the centre of Wardak province, between Mujahideen and Soviet forces in which 370 Russians were killed and many injured, according to a Press release of Hezb-i-Islami, Afghanistan. Four Mujahideen were martyred and six wounded. Reports from Kandhar province say that the Russian forces attacked the centre of Mujahideen of Hezb-i-Islami in Murghan village of Cyar Bagh district. Heavy fighting took place between the two sides. Forty-five Russian soldiers, three officers and two Afghan officers were killed.--APP/PPI. [Text] [Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 1 Oct 80 p 1]

CSO: 4920

## ALGERIA

### DISCUSSION OF GOALS OF 1980-1984 PRODUCTION PROGRAM

Algiers EL DJEICH in French Sep 80 pp 32-37

[Text] Sectional imbalances in investments have certainly been the cause of malfunctions in the organization of the national economy and have continued the harmful dispute about the "unsound environment" or "bottlenecks."

The sectional imbalances were not unrelated to the development and exacerbation of interregional and intraregional disparities.

During the 1967-1978 period, public investors spent, calculated at a constant price, an amount of about 300 billion dinars, of which more than 150 was in foreign exchange.

Gross domestic production, the annual result of the utilization of invested capital and labor, only increased in constant prices, at an average rate of growth of 7.2. It has risen thus from a little bit more than 40 billion dinars in 1967 to 86.8 billion dinars in 1978.

It is clear that such growth of gross domestic production is quite low compared with the efforts made and especially with the volume of investments involved.

Hydrocarbons: a necessary replacement for the future exhaustion of our reserves. Production of hydrocarbons remained high during the period and involved a significant drop in the level of our hydrocarbon reserves without a parallel long-term energy policy, to provide a substitute after the exhaustion of our reserves, being implemented. It is far from being decided either, whether the price for the exploitation of our hydrocarbons has reached its maximum level, whether it involves liquid or gas hydrocarbons.

#### Agriculture Has Stagnated

The depression which characterizes it is not explainable either by physical or climatic conditions or by any form of management which would be unsuitable for it.

Usually well administered self-management should have released the forces of production substantially in relation to the agricultural wage earners, accordingly for self-management; it is the application which is to be examined and not the theory.

In the second place, the public sector in agriculture (self-management and the agrarian revolution sector) only accounts for 27 percent of total added value, an evaluation made in current prices. Accordingly, blaming self-management for agricultural inertia is based both on a superficial analysis and a serious disregard of specific conditions in rural life.

**Production of services: is increasing, but is inadequate:**

Transport and commerce have expanded, according to themselves, but not enough to cope with the sometimes simultaneous appearance of surplus and shortage.

In a general way, production of services have reflected the relatively excessive share in our efforts of imports of goods and their distribution.

**Industrial production:** our hydrocarbons have been insignificant in the total picture during the period. The levels reached, very short of objectives and production capacities, have slowed down the industrial and economic integration envisaged and it is not inaccurate to claim that because of that they have hindered the growth of the economy.

In fact, the deficiencies and shortages mentioned are reflected in an increasingly high level of imports, goods and services, to the point of reaching a rate practically unequalled in the world, half or more of our gross domestic production.

Reviving our production and making it conform more with our objectives of integration and satisfying the social needs of the masses will require much effort and time.

The difficulties lie especially in Algeria's population problem, which has been very acute. We are not far in this respect from beating a "world record" with a rate of 3.2 percent.

Our resident population was 12.6 million in 1967. It reached 18 million in 1978.

On the closing of the sessions of the regional seminar on planning, Mr Chadli, secretary general of the party, made an important speech in which he mentioned the "need for a rational use of existing human and material potentialities." It is necessary to recognize today

that the level of production does not equal that of consumption; this is why we cannot properly meet needs without first increasing production.

Imports must be limited to materials which we cannot produce in Algeria.

Today we have petroleum and gas which allows us to import food products. But only depending on resources is a danger for the nation and the Revolution because of the disorganization which this situation could cause in the production system. We must act in such a way that work is a reward and a badge of respect for the citizen and the cadre. We must also increase our production in all fields to meet the needs of citizens and have a healthy economy. Moreover, this is a guarantee of national independence.

#### A. - For the Development of Production Sectors

The objectives and priorities of the 1980-84 Five-Year Plan are first to rapidly cover the most important shortages. Various measures are going to be implemented and that in the three main sectors: hydraulics, agriculture and industrial development.

##### Hydraulics

Delays in development in the hydraulic sector are expressed in huge shortages in supplying consumers. Water is actually the scarcest material resource; for the needs for drinking water and industrial irrigation water are increasing at a faster rate than our economic and social development. Failure to satisfy them could be a factor in hampering the development of our economy.

It actually involves starting in the decade extensive programs for collecting surface and underground water and combining them with programs to improve and maintain existing storage capacities, as well as distribution networks. In addition, and while expanding resources, including the desalinization of salt and brackish waters, it is desirable to introduce water conservation measures in requirements.

In order to give an idea of the size of the problem, it is useful to point out that irrigated land, now about 300,000 hectares must increase to 600,000 hectares between now and the year 2000. Meeting drinking water needs, now very low, will require 700 million cubic meters in 1990. The effort to be made in this field is tremendous, when we realize that the present drinking water supply is exactly about 525 million cubic meters.



During the coming decade, more than 30 billion dinars will have to be appropriated for hydraulics, to which we must add the 12 billion dinars planned for agricultural hydraulics.

#### B) Agricultural Development

It is necessary, and this is an essential imperative, to guarantee Algeria's food supply and protect it from threats of food blackmail, which the recent past has shown can be used by some capitalist countries.

To this fundamental aim of agricultural policy, must be added that of creating obviously improved living conditions for the peasants in the coming decade.

In conformity with the aims mentioned in the national constitution, agricultural lands must not only be protected against all encroachment from any sector whatever, but they must also be extended.

The growth of agriculture means that land resources and man who lives from them will again be fully developed.

The improvement of the status of agriculture in the Algerian economy will be done in such a way that society will learn to adapt to its demands and its rhythms and this involves both the educational system, as well as the supply, distribution and finance systems in general.

In the coming decade, progress in plant production will have to involve mainly, grains, potatoes, leguminous plants, fresh vegetables, fruits and fodders.

Meat products, severe shortages of which are felt, will have to involve the whole range of products, by developing mainly the production of red meat and vigorously speeding up poultry production.

During the coming decade, it is planned to spend some 50 billion dinars for agricultural development.

**Agricultural Investment Program 1980-1984**  
(in million DA (Algerian Dinars))

Branches and/or sectors	Amount of RAR Remains to be completed at end of 79	New program (80-84)	Total of five-year plan	Authorization of expenditures	RAR beyond 1980
Plant production and crop development	2,700	3,640	6,340	5,800	1,340
Livestock production and development	1,300	4,700	6,000	5,000	1,000
Agricultural material and equipment	1,600	7,544	9,144	8,944	200
Study, research, rural infrastructures and others	400	2,016	2,416	1,056	1,360
Subtotal agriculture	6,000	17,900	23,900	20,000	3,900
Forestry projects	470	2,330	2,800	2,395	405
Equipment and forestry planning	100	740	840	640	200
Study, research, production in kind	110	250	360	265	95
Subtotal forestry	680	3,320	4,000	3,300	700
Production, processing, distribution	116.5	100	216.5	216.5	-
Soil infrastructures	38	605	643	643	-
Study, research and training	15.5	155	170.5	170.5	-
Subtotal fishing	170	860	1,030	1,030	-
Overall total	6,850	22,080	28,930	24,330	4,600

## **Industrial Development**

Characterized by concrete results of planned industrial development, the past decade has produced achievements, which, although being in themselves, a positive aspect of the period, cannot help but bring up seriously and confusingly the question of Algeria's economic future.

The imbalances and tensions which result from them, whose dislocating effect cannot be ignored, reveal a sector which, although concentrating in itself most of the country's financial, material and human resources:

Is not mastering its production apparatus;

Does not have the means for planning and implementing its investments;

Continues to appeal to a great extent for technical assistance;

Is highly concentrated in northern Algeria.

This is why, besides completing and putting into operation, under the best conditions, projects in the process of being carried out, efforts during the next plan will emphasize:

The utilization of new investments in basic support industries;

The rationalization of the use of the production machine, encouraging methods of accomplishment, development and handling of investments and training;

Strengthening the role of local organizations and the introduction and involvement of the private sector to guide it towards a meaningful contribution to the development effort.

## **Investment Operations**

The total amount of investments devoted to industry in the 1980-84 plan is about 155 billion DA of which

Seventy-eight million DA remains to be used.

Seventy-seven DA belong to the new program.

**Investment 1980-1984 (million DA)**

<b>Investment</b>	<b>Cost of Programs</b>	<b>Authorization Expenditures</b>	<b>Remains to be carried out beyond 1984</b>
General studies and projects	900	650	250
Drilling	950	850	100
Dams	9,000	7,200	1,800
Transfers and bringing forward	3,000	2,500	500
Water supply and urban sanitation	5,150	4,300	850
Urban renewal plans (AEP /expansion unknown/ plus urban sanitation)	4,700	2,900	1,800
Reclamation of irrigated areas and development, including small and average scale hydraulics	5,700	4,300	1,400
Other installations of regional infrastructures	600	300	300
<b>Totals</b>	<b>30,000</b>	<b>23,000</b>	<b>7,000</b>



### Remains to be Carried Out

Year	Hydrocarbons	Industry outside of Hydrocarbons	Total
1980	11,000	17,000	28,000
1981	8,000	14,000	22,000
1982	5,000	10,000	15,000
1983	3,000	6,000	9,000
1984	1,000	3,000	4,000
Total	28,000	50,000	78,000

### New Investments

The volume of new investments to be made during this middle term plan represents the effort to be authorized to develop the industrial sector and strengthen its support for priority sectors.

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	Total 1980-1984
Hydrocarbons	5,000	5,700	6,500	8,000	10,000	35,200
Industry outside of hydrocarbons	3,000	5,000	8,000	11,500	14,000	41,500
Total industry	8,000	10,500	14,500	19,500	24,000	76,700

### Resolutions of the Fourth Congress Regarding Production Operations

In the light of and taking into account the reports at the plenary session and the reports in committees.

Considering the long term policies for economic development [as published].

12) To develop organizations to manage and exploit large areas and irrigated areas, so as to guarantee efficient utilization of water and to insure through suitably scaled rents the maintenance and renewal of installations.

## **Agriculture**

**The Congress calls for:**

- 1) Undertaking positive action to develop material and technical bases for agriculture**
- 2) Development of land, preservation of landed capital through drainage and combating the extension of forestry resources connected with large agricultural projects, protection of the reservoir slopes of dams, protection of agricultural land, by limiting urban and industrial expansion.**
- 3) Efficient use of soils, the preservation and optimum use of agricultural areas in conformity with local ecological and soil science conditions, as well as priorities for the development of food and forage crops, fruit tree cultivation in foothill and mountain areas, as well as the crops-livestock raising-fruit tree growing combination in high plateau areas and Saharan regions.**
- 4) The expansion of irrigated areas both through the creation of new large areas as well as through the development of small scale hydraulics.**
- 5) Drawing up of agricultural production plans by the farmers on each commune level, in accordance with the short and medium term national plan priorities.**
- 6) Short term improvement of yields in the plant production field by decentralization of the sector's operation and improving organizational, supply and marketing conditions.**
- 7) Improved and increased livestock production to meet the needs for white meat and eggs, to cover the needs for milk and dairy products to maintain the present rate of supply of demand for red meat.**
- 8) Forestry development to combat desertification, erosion of reservoir slopes and to increase the productivity of forested areas by a sizeable increase in Algeria's afforestation rate.**
- 9) Increase of fish and seafood production, by expanded fishing facilities, training of oceangoing fishermen, their organization in cooperatives, making adjusted credits available to them, setting up suitable distribution organizations, elimination of bureaucratic red tape, as well as encouraging the nonoperative private sector in this field and developing all types of pisciculture.**
- 10) Improving and encouraging scientific and technical research regarding agriculture, in conformity with its priority, with the**

participation of research centers of national universities in theoretical fields and taking into account the knowledge and experience of producers.

11) Priority large scale assignment of engineers, cadres and Algerian technicians on the production and support structure level to the people, especially the CAPCS [Communal Multi-Service Agriculture Cooperative] groups and their integration in producer collectives, the need to decree measures for the compulsory assignment of agricultural engineers and technicians in the agricultural, veterinary and paraveterinary sector.

12) Increasing the value of agricultural production, in particular tomatoes and dates, by increasing decentralized units for preparation, canning and processing, taking into account at the time of their establishment, regional peculiarities.

Encourage and provide favorable conditions for the integration of emigrant brothers in agriculture.

Regarding the organization of the agricultural sector.

The Congress calls for:

13) Decentralization of research and development organizations for livestock and plant production.

14) Improving the capacities of the CAPCS to properly assure their support mission to all producers, including the small peasants.

15) Reorganization of self managed operations and cooperatives to provide them with effective management and full economic efficiency.

16) Guiding and encouraging the small peasants to organize in cooperative and precooperative production and marketing groups on the basis of voluntary membership.

17) Simplification of procedures for granting credit to all producers, effective decentralization of financial organizations, as well as organizations charged with the inspection and supervision of planned investments.

18) Reorganization of the present marketing system to assure improved movement of distribution and a better protection of the interests of producers and consumers.

Industry

The Congress calls for:

1) The implementation of an energy policy capable of harmonizing the actual and foreseeable needs of the national economy and those of future generations. In view of the limited and nonrenewable nature of the hydrocarbon resources, the development of a policy of use of substitute energy is essential, as well as an energy conservation policy.

2) The Congress declares the need for the progressively increasing participation of industry in national accumulation, calls for the mobilization of workers, elected officials and leading cadres to win the battle of production and management, to increase the effectiveness of the production apparatus and reduce the costs of production to lessen investment cost.

3) The development of a policy of national and regional industrial development capable of encouraging the participation of local collectives, meeting priority needs in industrial products and services and increasing their role in the integration of the economy.

The Congress calls for:

4) It emphasizes that the size of units and complexes must only be decided in the future on the basis of economic, technical and planning qualifications.

5) The complete development of projects and the progressive creation of specialized organizations being one of the means of providing cadres and acquiring technology, will necessarily create increasingly improved conditions for the national endowments, for study and achievement and their development.

6) The Congress urges regarding a medium and long-term industrial policy, assuring greater independence and greater economic integration, investigating the feasibility of the development of an assembly industry to satisfy the needs for consumer goods or equipment considered necessary to effectively save foreign exchange.

7) The Congress additionally advocates encouraging and developing especially on the local and private sector level, a tradesman class to service equipment and do traditional artistic handicraft.

8) To complete as soon as possible and under the best conditions projects now being carried out.

9) To undertake investments for the improvement of the existing potential to eliminate bottlenecks observed in production operations.

10) To direct new investments towards activities connected with priority sectors especially housing and city planning, agriculture and hydraulics, economic and social infrastructures, education and



training, the development of projects capable of being started in future plans, especially for the production of equipment and projects encouraging the export of goods and services.

11) The Congress recommends that the planned activities for the production of goods and services, as well as investments be carried out smoothly and that bureaucratic red tape in supplying units and carrying out projects be eliminated. For this reason, administrative procedures must develop and adjust to the requirements of effective planning at all levels.

12) The Congress demands the integration of the private sector in plans to allow it to make a positive contribution to the industrial sector's development effort. This additional investment must take place under conditions which guarantee that the private sector does not acquire an actual monopoly of operations in these situations.

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CSO: 4400

COMMENTS ON RESTORATION OF PARLIAMENTARY LIFE IN KUWAIT

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 17 Sep 80 p 13

[Article: "The Voice of Democracy Is Heard Again; The Parliamentary Ring in Kuwait Will Be Echoed in Bahrain"]

[Text] Bahrain--When Amir Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah of Kuwait issued the royal decree for the return of parliamentary life to Kuwait, the Bahrain press reported it with great interest. Most of the editorials welcomed the decree, stressing the pioneering role of Kuwait in the realm of parliamentary government.

The [Bahrain] newspaper AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ pointed out in its editorial that "democracy means a sharing of responsibility by each individual citizen." AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ continued with the following word of caution: "Democracy does not mean anarchy, dancing in the streets, and giving the opportunity to intruders to harm the country and the citizens. It does not mean serving oneself before anyone else, and it does not mean that any individual may work in the dark in order to impose what he wants [on others]. Rather, democracy means that there is a sacred place called parliament, where the voice of the individual can be expressed and heard."

The Commentary of AL-ADWA'

The weekly [Bahrain] newspaper AL-ADWA' welcomed the royal decree issued in Kuwait, emphasizing the positive role which parliamentary life can play in serving society and its cultural development. It added: "Parliamentary life can never function on an even keel, unless every citizen and opinion leader can express his views without fear for his job or means of livelihood. Representative life means securing the rights of every citizen within the framework of the laws that govern his society. It means transforming the citizen into a constructive person in every sense of the word. And it means that the individual will not be forgotten, and that he will not be surprised by pre-dawn visitors to put him behind a tall fence [under arrest].

Democracy is Everybody's Aspiration

Political observers stress the fact that when the press here takes a position on any regional political question, it gives expression to local feelings. In the meantime, the weekly [Bahrain] newspaper AL-HASIRAH is continuing to publish an open readers' debate on parliamentary life in Bahrain. In its latest editorial, 'Ali Amin, chairman of the board of the General Trade and Food Processing Company, commented:

"I do not know when parliamentary life will return [to Bahrain]. The government intended to restore parliamentary life, but the chain of events in the region, especially the disruption of security, has prevented the return of parliamentary life to Bahrain and other countries of the region. I wish that democracy could be restored now, for this is everyone's desire. The government will inevitably follow through with the restoration of parliamentary government, especially as other countries in the region are serious about restoring representative life. One example is Kuwait. Also, Saudi Arabia is earnestly studying a new system of government. If Bahrain acts, it could still be among the first few countries to bring parliamentary life to the region."

#### Women and the Parliament

Lawyer Salman Sahwan said: "The Parliament is the natural legislative authority. In its absence, the cabinet, which is basically the executive authority, undertakes the functions of the legislature. This contradicts an important legal principle--the separation of powers." Regarding his proposals for the new experiment, he said: "It is important to give women the right of full participation in the democratic experiment, since Bahraini women have reached a high degree of maturity."

#### Commitment to the Democratic Concept

Former (candidate?) 'Isa Jawdar pointed out in a word addressed to government officials: "When a representative assembly is created through direct and free elections, the government should make a total commitment to the democratic concept of majority rule, and should not harass members in any way. The government should set the stage for a true democratic environment for all individuals and factions, and should release all political prisoners, so that they may do their share in serving their country, effectively and out of conviction."

#### What About Official Reaction?

On the government level, officials have not yet expressed their point of view on the ongoing debate regarding the return of parliamentary life to Bahrain. However, observers here stress that the government is cautiously following all developments touching on this subject. Political analysts here feel that the quick one-day visit of the Bahrain minister of information, Tariq al-Mu'ayyid, to the government of Kuwait, on the day following the announcement of the royal decree to restore parliamentary government to Kuwait, reflects the interest of Bahrain officials in any new development in the field of democratic government in the region.

However, this official attention does not mean, in the opinion of observers, a desire to hasten the return of parliamentary life to Bahrain, at least not in the near future. Bahrain officials had already announced, at the beginning of the year, their desire to review the [past] parliamentary experiment in Bahrain exhaustively, in the light of what Kuwait does in its new experiment. This means that Bahrain's steps in this connection will depend on the time span required to prepare for elections and parliamentary life in Kuwait. During this period, Bahrain will be preparing for the requirements of the new experiment.

Observers see in the faint voices given expression from time to time on the pages of the Bahrain newspaper, AL-MASIRAH, an official beginning for these needed preparations. Therefore, we might say that the ring of democracy in Kuwait will be echoed in Bahrain--but after some time.

POLITICAL PARTIES LAW AMENDED

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASHMIYAH [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic No 28 13 Jul 80 pp 24-26

[Article: "Law No 144 of 1980 Amending Number of Provisions of Law No 40 of 1977 Concerning Political Parties"]

[Text] In the name of the people,

The president of the Republic,

The People's Assembly has ratified the following law and we have promulgated it:

Article One

The text of clause No 1 of paragraph No 1 of article 4, article 7, the first and second paragraphs of article 8, the last paragraph of article 12, the last paragraphs of articles 14 and 16 and the first paragraph of article 21 of law No 40 of 1977 concerning the political parties shall be replaced by the following texts:

Clause No 1 of paragraph No 1 of article 4:

The principles of the Islamic Shari'a in their capacity as the main source of legislation.

Article 7:

A written notification must be presented to the chairman of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee provided for in the following article on the formation of a party. The notification shall be signed by 50 constituent members of the party and their signatures must be authenticated officially, provided that at least one half the members is comprised of workers and farmers. All the documents concerning such a party, especially its bylaws, the names of its constituent members, a statement of the party's monies, their source and the bank in which they are deposited and the name of the party representative in the measures for founding the party, must be appended to this notification.

The notification on the formation of the party shall be presented to the committee referred to in the preceding paragraph within 15 days as of the date of the submission of the notification.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 8:

The Political Parties Committee shall be formed in the following manner:

1. The Consultative Council chairman, chairman.
2. The minister of justice, member.
3. The minister of interior, member.
4. The minister of state for the People's Assembly affairs, member.
5. Three members not affiliated with any political party. These three members shall be former chairmen, deputy chairmen or acting chairmen of judiciary councils and a decree shall be issued by the president of the republic selecting them.

When the Consultative Council chairman is absent, chairmanship of the committee shall be assumed by one of his two deputies. In case they are all absent for personal reasons or for (reasons pertaining to the Consultative Council), the president of the Republic shall issue a decree appointing a replacement for the chairman of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee.

Last paragraph of article 12:

The said agency must prepare an annual report on all the affairs and financial conditions of the party and must present these reports to the chairman of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee.

Last paragraph of article 14:

The public prosecution must notify the chairman of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee of the measures taken at the party headquarters within 48 hours of the adoption of such measures.

Article 16:

The chairman of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee shall be notified by registered letter of any decision taken by a party to change its chairman, to dissolve the party or to merge with another party and of any change in the party's bylaws within a period of 10 days as of the date of issuance of the decision.

First paragraph of article 21:

The Political Parties' Affairs Committee shall lay down the rules regulating a party's contacts with any foreign political party or organization according to the proposals submitted by this committee's chairman.



#### Article Two

The president of the Republic shall issue a decree selecting the person to replace the chairman of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee stipulated in article 8 of law No 40 of 1977 concerning the political parties until the chairman and two deputy chairmen of the Consultative Council are elected during the first annual session of this council.

#### Article Three

The members of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee already selected in implementation of clause 5 of article 9 of law No 40 of 1977 concerning the political parties shall continue to be members of this committee until a decree is issued by the president of the republic re-forming this committee after convocation of the Consultative Council.

#### Article Four

Article 19 and 20 of the aforementioned law No 30 of 1977 shall be abolished. Every provision violating the provisions of this law shall also be abolished.

#### Article Five

This law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall go into effect on the day following its publication.

This law shall be stamped with the seal of the state and shall be implemented as one of its laws.

Issued at the presidential office on 13 July 1980.

Anwar al-Sadat

84/94

CSO: 4802

## EGYPT

### LEGISLATION TO REVIVE EGYPTIAN RAILROADS OUTLINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 1 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by Ahmad 'Ismat: "Legislative Solution to Railroad Problems"]

[Text] Experts have decided that the railroads will now move forward after years of stagnation. More cars will not be imported to solve problems; instead, new legislation has been enacted. Maintenance has been poor, arrivals and departures erratic, and rail travel a torture, because of the awful state of the coaches. Maintenance facilities are in terrible shape, and technical personnel have quit due to low pay.

Antiquated government regulations and bureaucracy are leading enemies of the railroads and originators of their decline. The new legislation approved by the People's Assembly was prepared for this reason. How will this legislation improve the railroads?

#### One Hundred Engineers Quit

The main problem facing the railroads, besides bureaucracy, is the difficulty of keeping engineers on low pay. For example, authorities say that the shortage in railway and signal engineers is about 60 percent of those needed to carry on basic operations. This shortage is reflected in the [poor] quality of operations, particularly in maintenance. Presently, the number of engineers refusing railroad employment is one hundred.

Railway authorities add that they advertise for engineers, but no one responds. In contrast, during the 1940's and '50's, high grades were required of those wishing to work for the railroads.

Capable people prefer to work in public and private companies offering higher salaries. Railroad wages stand in the way of employees' advancement.

#### Backlog in Renovation of Cars, Roadbeds, Signals

Revenues have decreased due to fixed fares and worldwide increases in the cost of railroad equipment. Freight rates have remained static, in spite of inflation. Thus, the railroads have run into deficit since 1975. Freight rates have remained the same for the past 21 years, while passenger rates have increased 60 percent during the past 75 years. In 1975, the railways lost 2.7

million pounds, 14 million in 1976, 15 million in 1977, and 33 million in 1978. Poor maintenance and renovation, brought on by niggardly government appropriations, contributed to these losses.

Authorities say that there are 1,700 kilometers of roadbed that should have been renovated by 1979. This is some 38 percent of total roadbed kilometers. One hundred fifty-six bridges have been in use in excess of their estimated useful lives, including two spanning the Nile, 15 crossing canals and ditches, 67 stationary steel ones, and 72 concrete ones.

Three hundred seventeen coaches are over 30 years of age, 17 percent of the total number. Three thousand eight hundred twenty-nine freight cars are more than 40 years old, 21 percent of total freight cars. One hundred ninety-six locomotives are 20 years of age or over, or out of operation because of their rundown condition. This adds up to 23 percent of total locomotives. Most maintenance shops are between 45 and 90 years old, have deteriorated, and are incapable of meeting maintenance requirements.

#### **Lack of Safety Procedures Increases Accidents**

The poor state of the railroads is not limited to a shortage of coaches and to slow replacement and renovation, but is also reflected in the absence of modern safety procedures and resultant train wrecks. The signal system suffers from severe limitations. This has reached the point of operating most main line signals with kerosene lamps. A system for monitoring train movements, one that would permit total control over railroad traffic, keep in touch with breakdowns, change routes, and give instructions, has not been implemented.

#### **The Legislation--How Will It Work?**

Experts agree that the railroads cannot make any headway unless guaranteed a financial return in line with continuously rising operating costs. The government must, therefore, give the railroad authority the monetary difference between the fare for the service provided and its real cost. The authority must also be able to perform necessary repairs and renovation, be unhampered by government regulations, and be given a free hand to attract needed technical expertise by improving salaries and incentives. The authority should be able to choose a suitable form of administration to achieve its ends, be it by creating corporations, partnerships, or dealing with the private sector, etc.

Railroad requirements have crystalized in recent legislation designed to achieve these aims. How will this legislation improve the roads?

#### **No Local Interference With Railroad Operations**

The new law prepared by Engineer Sulayman Mitwalli, Minister of Transport, Communication, and Maritime Transport, emphasizes the national characteristic of the railroad authority's activities. This necessitates administering things centrally, since the railroads are in the forefront of national services and operate in all governates nationwide. They are not a local service, and local laws and rules do not apply to them.

Among the most important provisions of the new legislation is the right of the authority to set fares relative to costs, so that it will have the financial ability to achieve its goals. If the government does fix fares, it must now pay the difference in terms of real costs. The authority will set charges and tariffs for its various services. Its board will suggest a fare schedule, which will be announced by the minister of transport following submission to the council of ministers. The treasury will provide for differences between revenues resulting from the approved tariff and actual costs in the railroad budget for the following year.

The new legislation provides that the authority should use its money and budget in ways suited to its activities, and should modify its work to achieve its aims. This will be accomplished by having the railroads prepare their own budget according to their by-laws, without reference to national legislation governing budgets. The railroads will have their own account, into which their revenue will be deposited, and surpluses will be carried over from year to year.

#### Tax Exemption Allows Problems To Be Tackled

Since the railroads face many financial burdens as a result of high operating costs, the law exempts them from duties on imports of equipment, machinery, and technical supplies necessary for their operations. This is on condition that these items be inspected. The railroads will be required to give an affidavit that their imports are for internal operations. Customs exempt items cannot be sold within 5 years of the date of exemption, or they will be taxable. Since government contracts are usually subject to many restrictions which actually prevent their implementation, the railroads have been freed from these restrictions by special exemption from legislation governing imports and foreign exchange. The railroads can import on their own or via other channels without a license to do so. Their production requirements, raw materials, machinery, equipment, spare parts, and means of transportation can be imported according to their by-laws.

#### Creation of Railroad Corporations

The most important aspect of the new legislation grants the railroads authority to administer themselves. The railroads are allowed, given the approval of the minister of transport, to establish corporations, on their own or in cooperation with others, and to sell stock in these corporations following their establishment.

#### Board of Directors Sets Salaries

Low salaries cause technical expertise to flee. Thus the new legislation gives the railroads' board of directors the authority to draw up regulations governing appointment of railway employees, their promotions, salaries, bonuses, and all other personnel matters. The minister of transport will issue the final regulations. A workers' health and social care system can be created by the board. It can also suggest internal and external loans and set procedures governing contracts with customers, technical and financial matters, purchasing and warehousing, etc.

Can the railroads progress under this legislated reform and regain their lost reputation?

## SOLUTIONS TO HOUSING CRISIS SOUGHT IN NEW HOUSING BILL

Cairo AL-HRAM in Arabic 17, 18 Sep 80

[Article in two installments: "Relations Between Landlord and Tenant Turn New Leaf"]

[17 Sep 80 p 3]

[First Installment by 'Abd-al-Wahab Hamid]

[Text] All Concerned Parties Engage in Lengthy Debate on New Housing Law Before It Goes into Effect.

New law Realizes for Landlord:

1. A 150 Percent Rent Increase for Old Buildings After 10 Years;
2. The Right to Fix Rent After Rent Committees Are Turned into Grievance Committees;
3. Penalty for Key Money Is Civilian Not Criminal; 2 Years Advance Instead of 2 Months.

For the Tenant, the New Bill:

1. Reduces Returns on Buildings to 7 Percent;
2. Gives Right of Grievance Against Landlord's Evaluation;
3. Gives Tax Exemption for His Apartment.

What are the principal features of the proposed new housing bill before it is presented to the Council of Ministers and the People's Assembly for approval or modification?

What are the outstanding characteristics of the bill? Will it benefit landlords, tenants or both? Will it be a means for solving the housing crisis?

Many questions were being raised by average Egyptian citizens: some supported the bill and others opposed it.



Those who supported the bill said, "The new bill provides benefits to old and to future landlords. It does so by fixing rent and especially by changing the work of the rent committees and turning them into grievance committees to which the tenant would appeal. The new bill increases rent in old buildings so that the increase would amount to 150 percent after about 10 years; in new buildings it would amount to 50 percent."

The new bill also gives the tenant benefits. The most important of these is reducing returns on buildings from 10 to 7 percent. This reduces rent. The tenant is also exempted from all kinds of taxes which represent more than 50 percent.

The question now is this: What are the reasons that led officials to contemplate preparing a new housing bill at a time when the former law raised landlords' returns more than 200 percent over returns fixed by the law that was in effect before it?

What are officials saying about the features of the new law before it is approved?

Engineer Ahmad Fu'ad al-Juhari, assistant to the governor of Cairo for technical and engineering affairs says, "The outcome of our previous experiences indicates that it is necessary to have an agency that regulates the relationship between landlords and tenants instead of turning that task over to grievances committees. I believe that rent committees are more specialized in this regard than the courts. This makes the existence of rent committees as they are necessary since the courts basically depend on a report from an expert, whereas a committee's opinion is considered more comprehensive than that of one expert. Furthermore, there has been a backlog of court cases as a result of the fact that the committee's opinion was not considered final. This entailed a delay of over 5 years in settling rent cases."

#### Retention of Committees Essential for Relations Between Two Parties

Engineer Fu'ad al-Juhari is calling for "the retention of rent committees as a basis for relations between landlords and tenants. The feasibility of these committees has been established during the previous period, and their opinions have been accepted by landlords and tenants. The number of these committees must be increased, and they must be bolstered by providing them with the necessary means of transportation so that matters that are pending between landlords and tenants can be settled. Incentives for committee members must be reconsidered so that engineers who are capable of joining these committees can do so."

Regarding the proposed increase in rents [that were fixed in the past], Engineer Ahmad Fu'ad al-Juhari, assistant to the governor of Cairo for technical affairs said, "The thought of increasing rent is a constructive trend, especially since these are old buildings whose rents are low. Low rent makes a landlord refrain from carrying out the necessary refurbishing and maintenance operations for the building. I believe that the private sector can play a major role in contributing to a solution to the housing crisis. This increase [in rent] is considered one of the kinds of incentives for that. Tenants will not be hurt by paying the small proposed increase, especially since their incomes are increasing continuously.

The governor's assistant says, "Legalizing the payment of 2 years's rent in advance was also a positive trend. It will expedite the completion of buildings whose implementation is delayed at present because landlords do not have the necessary funds and because they will not go to the banks for funds because of the high interest rates."

#### The Advance Is a Contribution from the Tenant to the Landlord

Instead of having the landlord obtain the advance by illegitimate means that may endanger the relationship between him and the tenant, the legislator established a foundation that legitimized the payment of 2 years' rent in advance. The fact that this situation has been legalized protects tenants from having to pay sums of money without proof that they did so. Many tenants are now paying large sums of money as advances without any safeguards.

'Ali Hasan al-Imam, the authorized representative of the People's Council for the governorate of Cairo says that among the most important misgivings that he has about the new bill is the fact that the work of the rent committees, which is the basis for determining the relationship between the landlord and the tenant, has been changed and confined to the task of fixing rent in case a tenant has a grievance. He says that this means that thousands of cases will pile up in front of judges since it is not likely that the landlord will set the rent--and he is free to do so--that the tenant will approve of. Consequently, this will lead to many problems between landlords and tenants.

'Ali Hasan al-Imam is advocating that the rent committees be retained so that they would be the foundation between landlords and tenants for determining the rent. The committees had many advantages in the past since their appraisal was accepted by both parties. In fact, some landlords used to mention in the rent agreement the statement, "according to the committee's appraisal" without either party resorting to the courts. This strengthened relations between landlords and tenants.

Mr al-Imam says, "The subject of determining rents cannot be left to supply and demand since there is a big discrepancy in income, especially after the economic openness which led to the creation of a broad class [of people] who can purchase [goods and services] at the most expensive prices and who can afford to pay the most expensive rents because they can make up for the increase from the returns of projects. In such a case people whose incomes are limited will not be able to obtain housing at all. The matter of housing may be left to supply and demand under two conditions:

- \* When incomes are not so disparate; and
- \* When the supply of homes exceeds the demand.

#### Rents Were Very Low Before 1944

The authorized representative of the People's Council for Cairo adds, "The rents of homes that were built before the 1st of January 1944 were actually low. These rents must be increased, and the landlords must be obligated to conduct the necessary periodic repairs and maintenance."

Mahdi Judah says, "Undoubtedly, there is a small group of landlords who will determine a reasonable amount of rent [for their property]. But what guarantees [for that] does the bill provide after the work of the rent committees has been changed? What is the difference between the greedy landlord and the temperate one? The abolishment of these committees will become a sword hanging over the heads of tenants." He says, "If the purpose of abolishing the rent committees is to encourage landlords, this means that the landlord will be able to obtain more rent than the rental unit deserves. If the state does in fact want to encourage landlords, it has to offer them loans, and it has to go back to the old system of dispensing subsidized construction materials. Consequently, costs will be reduced, and this will lead to rent reduction."

Social Worker 'Abd-al-Ra'uf 'Aziz says, "If the purpose behind abolishing the rent committees or limiting their work is to curb the greed of landlords, I believe that this will never be achieved. The new housing law which has been in effect for less than 2 years had led to a rent increase in excess of 200 percent. A rental unit under the old law which was rented for 10 pounds is being rented now under Law No 49 for 1977 for more than 30 pounds. Landlords, nevertheless, are not satisfied, and they are still asking for better. This will be achieved if the committees are abolished."

He adds, "We were expecting the new bill to tighten controls on landlords who take advantage of people and who receive key money, but the bill made it clear that the penalty for accepting key money was civilian and not criminal. This would encourage landlords to continue accepting key money. I believe that this bill will not be approved by the Council of Ministers or by the People's Assembly especially since the state is now leaning towards reducing the burden that is borne by people whose incomes are limited."

Another tenant says, "The thought of limiting the work of the rent committees will backfire because we are in a society in which a greedy class has emerged. There is no better indication of that than the fact that President Anwar al-Sadat is standing firm these days against the class of merchants who are trading in the livelihoods of the people. The competition is clear: every class is trying to get more than the other. If [some people] are thinking of abolishing the committees, this can be done with regard to luxurious housing only; implementation of that is to be confined to the choice locations, which are the tourist areas."

A tenant says, "If rents for old homes were fixed on the basis of the prices that were in effect these buildings were built and in accordance to the actual cost of these buildings, how then can the rent be increased by a rate that varies from 5 to 15 percent over a period of 10 years? By the end of that period rent will have increased by approximately 50 or 150 percent. This is a major increase that could affect a large class of people [living on] limited incomes. Those people had established for themselves a lifestyle that is suitable to the rent [they have been paying]. In other words, the annual increase in rent will exceed the periodic increase in pay which an employee receives." This tenant is asking that this article of the new bill be reconsidered before it is approved since the bill does favor the landlord.



## Landlords Calling for Retention of Rent Committees

Landlord Ahmad al-Disuqi is calling for the retention of the rent committees. He says, "If the relationship between landlords and tenants deteriorated under the rent committees even though the rent committees established what may be a fair foundation for a relationship between them, I cannot at all imagine that there will be a relationship between landlord and tenant if the committees are abolished. As is its custom the human spirit is not satisfied and asks for more. I believe that all tenants may file suits against landlords to determine [their] rents. This will lead to numerous problems as a result of the poor relationship between landlords and tenants and the lack of confidence with them. This will lead to a backlog of thousands of court cases waiting for their turn in a long line of thousands." Mr al-Disuqi supports the increases in old rents.

Ahmad Muhammad Khalaf, the director general of disbursements in the governorate of Cairo and a member of the rent committee says, "The proposed new housing bill is undoubtedly advantageous to both landlord and tenant. Some of its articles, however, must be reconsidered, especially regarding letting the landlord estimate the amount of the rent and confining the task of the committee to making an appraisal after the landlord [sic] files a grievance. I believe that the committees will be confronted with grievances from tenants because it is unlikely that the landlord and the tenant will agree on a reasonable rent."

On the proposed increase in the rent of old homes Ahmad Khalaf says that such an increase is necessary in homes built before 1944 since returns from those buildings are low. "Low returns may cause the landlord to neglect maintenance of the buildings, and that could [ultimately] cause the building to be torn down. But the proposed increase for the other groups [of buildings] must be reconsidered because these buildings were built at a time when prices had risen somewhat. The most important positive aspect of that increase is the reduction of the returns of buildings from 10 to 7 percent, and this will lead to a reduction in rents that will be in the interests of the tenant.

Attorney Kamal Ibrahim, undersecretary of the Ministry of Reconstruction and Housing says, "The new housing bill, which is still being considered, has tried to establish a balance between the landlord and the tenant. This is due to the legislator's conviction that the private sector plays a major role in contributing towards a solution to the housing crisis. Among the most important advantages to the tenant that the bill has determined are [the following]:

"\* The bill limited returns from buildings to 7 percent instead of the 10 percent limitation in the current law. The 7 percent return is the basis for determining rents. This will help reduce rents by about 30 percent. In order to avoid damages to the landlord from this reduction, the state will bear some of the burdens: the revenues landlords receive from buildings will not be included in the public revenue coffers.

"\* The new bill exempts the tenant from all taxes which represent over 51 percent [of his income] if the rent [he pays] for one room exceeds 10 pounds.

"\* The unjustified delay in completing buildings: rent in this case will be determined in accordance with the prices that were in effect when the building should have been completed, so that the tenant would not be hurt by the price increases when the rent is set.

"\* Ten percent of the profits earned by public sector companies are to be earmarked to finance housing units for their employees."

Attorney Kamal Ibrahim, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Reconstruction says, "The bill did not give a landlord [the prerogative to] set rent without [any] controls. The bill rather stipulated that the returns from a building ~~be~~ not to exceed seven percent of the cost of the land and the building. If returns [and accordingly rents] exceeded that percentage, the tenant may appeal to the rent committee so it can correct the situation."

He says, "The rent committees will stay as they are. No one is thinking of abolishing them. But there is an inclination to give landlords the freedom to come to an agreement with tenants over the amount of rent. If they do not agree, the landlord may file a grievance."

"Likewise, when the legislator proposed that the advance be 2 years' [rent], his intention was to have that advance secured instead of what is happening now, which is the payment of an advance that may not be acknowledged."

#### Balance Between Landlord and Tenant in Interests of Both Parties

Attorney Kamal Ibrahim says, "The purpose of the proposed increase, which is between 15 and 5 percent, over a 10-year period is to compensate the landlords whose rents are low, especially [for buildings that were built] before 1944. This increase will not be taken by the landlord only: one-third will be for the landlord; one-third will be for refurbishing and maintenance; and the last third will be for popular housing. This increase is still under consideration."

Engineer Taha 'Abd-al-Qadir, technical office manager for the governor's assistant for technical affairs says, "I believe that the thought of making the rent committees settle tenants' grievances against the appraisals of landlords will increase investments in the field of housing. This will encourage landlords to turn their savings into investments in this area. Returns from buildings will be proportionate to the prevailing interest rate in banks. Thus supply and demand will be balanced, and matters will return to normal after a period that may come to 3 years."

Engineer Taha 'Abd-al-Qadir adds, "Rent committees have not settled relations between landlords and tenants throughout the past period. The evidence of this lies in the thousands of court cases that are now pending in the courts awaiting settlement on matters pertaining to problems between landlords and tenants."

He says, "At present the work of the committees is advantageous to tenants at the expense of landlords. This is because the state is incapable of enabling the tenant to pay the landlord the real rent, and this is the result of the current wages policy and the discrepancy in incomes. If the state does in fact wish to help the tenant, it may build suitable housing for tenants instead of helping them at the cost of preventing landlords from obtaining suitable rents for their housing units."



[18 Sep 80 p 3]

[Second Installment by Muhammad Ahmad Hanmam]

[Text] Why Are There 28,000 Vacant Apartments? 71 Percent of Urban Housing Lacks Sewage; 52 Percent Is Without Running Water; 38 Percent Without Electricity; We Need 1.8 Million Housing Units So We Can Look Forward to Future with Confidence and Reassurance.

If the proposed new housing bill which is now under consideration and under study is the beginning of a new chapter in relations between landlords and tenants and if we are really determined to overcome this crisis, what is called for is for us to reveal the magnitude of the crisis and its real features in figures to all the experts who are looking into that bill.

It has become evident that we have about 28,000 vacant homes whose owners for one reason or another do not want to have them occupied.

It has also become evident that 71 percent of the homes in the cities have no sewage; that 52 percent have no running water; and that 38 percent have no electricity.

It has also become evident that we need 1.8 million housing units so we can look forward to the future with confidence and reassurance.

At any rate the dialogue which was begun yesterday by "AL-AHRAM Investigations" to discuss the new housing bill continues.

The question with which officials are now preoccupied is that of the housing problem and finding radical solutions to it. Announcing the organization of a national housing agency was merely an announcement that the real battle for confronting that problem and for finding suitable solutions to it had begun. The recent ministerial decision to amend the ratio of the loans which are granted to cooperative housing and to individuals was part of the attempts [that are being made] to find a solution. The government is making an effort towards that end at this stage of [the effort to] build and to forge the foundations of the new society.

But the question is this: what is the magnitude [of the problem] that officials have to confront?

This question indicates that there is a need to explain and to present the real picture of the aspects of this crisis since it is not enough that citizens are complaining of the fact that houses are not available.

In fact, the real magnitude of the problem is much greater than that. The importance of this problem lies in the fact that it is forcing some people to look seriously into the aspects and the symptoms of the problem so as to come up with a diagnosis and a remedy that would be suitable to the disease. People should not be surprised by this expression because the housing crisis in Egypt is in reality a social disease and a defect in that social structure. How [can we make such a statement]?

[We can make such a statement because] official data that are available from the last census of the population and housing in Egypt, which was conducted in 1976, indicate that the number of existing buildings is 1,580,000 buildings and that these buildings contain 3,587,000 housing units. Dwellings that are used as private residences represent 94.5 percent of that total; units occupied by business represent 1.7 percent of that total. It is curious that we note a significant matter here: there are about 128,000 vacant dwellings. This [figure] represents 3.4 percent of total dwellings in urban areas. This phenomenon can only be explained by one self-evident fact: the landlords' desire to await suitable opportunities to realize the highest profit from these dwellings despite the devastating crisis that citizens are experiencing!

But it is certain that the recent bill which regulates the relationship between the landlord and the tenant and which will restrict ownership to one housing unit will increase the number of these vacant units, and the question then will become the need to regulate the distribution of these units to the citizens who need them.

#### Housing and the Crisis of Utilities

The fact is that the existing population figures have another meaning. This residential stock is divided into apartments and separate rooms.

These separate rooms which are mentioned in the census signify a shanty, a cabin, a garage and a hut.

This means that these separate rooms have been used as homes because the supply of housing cannot meet the needs of citizens within the limits of their economic standards. Consequently, these rooms are not suitable for housing nor even for human habitation. Without bathrooms, kitchens or running water they are merely shelters. The number of these rooms amounts to 677,000 units. That is 20 percent of the total housing units designated for private housing and business. Cairo's share of that ratio comes to 43 percent.

But are the basic utilities available to all these units?

Unfortunately, 52 percent of the buildings in cities have no water; 38 percent have no electricity; and 71 percent have no sewage. The real significance of this situation, according to Dr Mahya 'Ali Zaytun, assistant professor of economics at the College of Commerce of the Girls' Branch of al-Azhar University, is the fact that a non-negligible part of the buildings in cities are considered inaccessible to the principal utilities which are indispensable to a dwelling. What is even more serious than that--and of crucial importance--is the fact that 31 percent of the families that were available at the time of the census do not have running water in their buildings and that 23 percent do not have electricity. Similarly, the decline in the number of families that do not have utilities compared with the ratio of dwellings is due to the fact that the buildings which have utilities are designated for poor people. Consequently, they are made up of rooms or a limited number of housing units. This makes the number of families living in every building less than the number of families living in the buildings that have utilities. Most of these buildings consist of a number of floors that is not inconsiderable or a larger number of housing units.

In her study of housing in Egypt Dr Mahya Zaytun says, "There are no data about the ages of buildings even though a large ratio of these buildings are considered old. It has been estimated that the number of condemned buildings in Cairo and Alexandria in 1970 was about 140,000 buildings. In the other cities it was estimated at about 60,000 buildings or about 700,000 housing units."

If we were to turn to rural areas, we will discover the deterioration of the housing condition there. Available data indicate that 36 percent of rural families do not have any source of pure water and 81 percent do not have electricity as a source of light.

The sum total of this picture is that the condition of housing in the traditionally popular areas, which are usually old areas, is deteriorating. This is the case in Bulaq, Misr al-Qadimah and al-Sharabiyyah. As a result of residential encroachment, areas that were originally villages are now within city limits. These were usually centers where migrants from rural areas lived, as is the case in Shubra al-Khaymah and 'Ayn Shams in Cairo. In fact, the pictures include the distorted housing as is the case with those who live in cemeteries, huts and tin structures. It is estimated that the number of people who are living in cemeteries in Cairo alone is over 100,000 families. On the other hand research indicates that the decline in the income of families that are living in popular housing areas is due to the fact that a large percentage of them is trying to utilize their homes in some economic activities.

#### Towards a New Understanding of the Problem

If this is a diminutive picture of the aspects of the housing crisis in Egypt as it appears through the census information that is available and the social surveys [that may be found] at research centers, the question that is being raised now is not that of searching for a solution because the solution is known: it is meeting the needs of citizens. But the question is rather that of the magnitude or the extent of [meeting] those needs in an urgent fashion and that of their magnitude in the future.

Dr Mahya Zaytun points out the need for defining to officials some notions of the philosophy of housing in Egypt so we can determine the magnitude of the requirements.

Our interest must be focused on housing needs and not on the demand for housing. The demand for housing means the desire to acquire a residence, provided that this desire is accompanied by a purchasing power so that this demand can be realized in the marketplace. Housing needs, however, signify the necessity of providing housing to anyone who does not have shelter and to anyone whose dwelling does not meet a suitable standard of essential, sanitary and social conditions. It is this latter notion that the National Housing Authority must adopt because such a notion does imply the welfare of our society. Regarding current housing needs in urban areas, some people estimate those to be approximately 1.8 million units. These units will replace dwellings that are unsuitable and dwellings that have been condemned, and they will reduce the competition for existing dwellings.

Officials have to make their estimates of future housing needs until the year 2000 now. These estimates are to be based on the expected increase in the population until the year 2000 or on the increase in the rates of urbanization until the same year. In addition, officials are to consider the structural condition of the residential stock according to which will be determined the replacement housing that will be necessary for the future.

All this [must be done] so we can overcome the problem, avoid its future dangers and establish a sound society that would offer its citizens the best of good things as well as security.

8592

CSO: 4802

SYRIAN AMBASSADOR LAUDS REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 18 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] PARS NEWS AGENCY—The Syrian Ambassador to Tehran, Ibrahim al-Yunis, expressed in an interview his viewpoints about the Syria-Libya unification. Concerning the merger he said, "We consider it a fundamental factor because unity is the prerequisite of our political, economic and cultural life."

Regarding the Syrian-Libyan merger, Ibrahim al-Yunis said, "It aims at becoming self-sufficient symbiotically. Division is a heritage of colonialism still lingering on in our countries. Therefore, our struggle continues. As Hafez Assad has put it, Syria has not stipulated any condition for our union except that the union should be achieved for the sake of our deprived people. We consider unity a basic factor because it is a requisite of our political, economic and cultural life. We want to build a civilization of Arab unity."

The Ambassador was asked, "You said that this unity is a nationalistic one, whereas we see that the Algerian Minister of Religious Affairs says that Arab nationalism was tried to no avail. We should rely on Islam. If this is so, should the Syria-Libya unity not be an Islamic unity?"

Ibrahim al-Yunis replied, "The terms used in Iran differ from those used in other countries but the meanings are the same. Nationality does not conflict with Islam in any way. It is the usage of terms that differ in this area. As you see we attend most of the Islamic conferences."

The Ambassador was reminded that the call to unification was first made by Col Qadhdhafi and since it was promptly acceded to by Syria it seems that Syria had completely felt the necessity of this merger. The Syrian Ambassador to Tehran said, "A big conspiracy against the Palestinian nation has been hatched in the Camp David Accord. For this reason, any unity that takes shape against imperialism which is actually antagonistic to nations, it will win our supports."

"The unity of Syria and Egypt against the regime occupying Jerusalem was a commendable unity but the Camp David Agreement gave birth to a second Israel and killed the previous unity."

The Syrian Ambassador was asked, "Considering the sterile unity attempted on numerous occasions previously, how much hope do you attach to this latest unity?"



The Ambassador replied, "This unity is imperative and it is our duty to attempt it tens of times until we arrive at a unity that serves our interests."

The Ambassador was reminded that the geographical distance between Syria and Libya would create problems. He was then asked whether this matter had been studied carefully.

The Syrian Ambassador answered, "As our leaders have said the very fact of our unity is a revolutionary concept. A revolutionary thing does not abort itself by the anticipated consequences. As the colonialism and imperialism of the regime occupying Jerusalem have not sprung from the love of Prophet Moses, but have been pursuing other goals, we should continue our struggle."

Asked what role Islam played in this unity, the Ambassador said, "We are Moslems and respect Islam. Islamic religious teachings even run through our state laws. If we run into any problems we revert to the Islamic theology and if the Islamic theology provides no precedent we deduct our solution by giving away to justice and truth." Concerning the official view of Syria on the coup d'etat in Turkey, the Ambassador said, "Our government has not yet adopted an official position vis-a-vis this matter. We do not want to be dragged into secondary issues at the cost of losing sight of our principal objectives."

Asked about the impact of the role of Imam Khomeyni and the Islamic revolution of Iran on the people of the region, the Ambassador said, "We are of the same opinion as the Islamic revolution of Iran concerning the liberation of the occupied lands. Imam Khomeyni has such power that any time he wills he can put an end to unjust relationships in the world."

9695

CSO: 4906

# KERMANSHAH TRIBESMEN JOIN MILITARY MANEUVERS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 7 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Kermanshah, KEYHAN's Despatched Reporter--Some 2,000 tribesmen of Kermanshah staged a military and guerrilla warfare maneuver with their own weapons and ammunitions and displayed their combativeness and individual dexterity in Mahidasht Plain.

Yesterday about 2,000 members of Kalhor, Kakavand, Jalalvand, Osmanvand, Balavand, Zardalan, Halilan, Sanjabi and a number of other tribes performed their intensive drills and staged a spectacular military maneuver in Mahidasht Plain before Pirhoseyni, the Presidential Aid, Ayatollah Kermani, the Imam's Representative in the Western region of the country and the deputy of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles), the Governor-General of Kermanshah, Hojjatoleslam Majd, the Supervisor of the Iranian Mass Mobilization Organization, and hundreds of eager compatriots onlooking. The exercise was carried out without the smallest financial assistance from the government agencies or revolutionary institutions.

Before the military maneuver started, Pirhoseyni, the Presidential Aide, spoke at length about the unity and solidarity of the tribes and the impressive results thereof in uplifting Islam and creating security in the country and in the region. After him, a representative of the tribes and also Hojjatoleslam Majd spoke about the tribal problems and the arming of the tribesmen who were decent and devoted to the Revolution, respectively.

At this point, a number of the members of the Kermanshah Mass Mobilization Organization marched past, followed by the tribesmen. In this process they performed two military operations. The armed horsemen, too, went into a series of offensive operations and started shooting. Started sharp at 12 noon with the reading of some verses from the Holy Koran, the exercise lasted until 5 p.m.

Major Mo'azzen, who had taught the tribesmen military art during the past 10 days reported: "These valiant and courageous tribesmen, with their faith and power, can progress to the heart of Iraq to make their prayer at the holy shrine of Imam'Ali, Peace Be Unto Him."

Before the maneuver, the Governor-General of Kermanshah talked to the tribesmen and said, "After purging the rural areas and identifying the devoted persons, we shall issue weapons licenses to the devout who own weapons and give arms to those devout who do not have them. This is so they can preserve the security of the

region effectively and to protect their homes and abodes against the possible dangers posed by the counterrevolutionaries. The tribesmen who took part in the maneuver used their own weapons and ammunitions and many of them were reluctant to leave the field even after the end of the maneuver and the beginning of the ceasefire.

The KEYHAN reporter adds in his report that despite the border skirmishes, Kermanshahan is in peace and the armed forces are completely in control of the situation.

Also with the unity of the tribes around Kermanshah and other parts of the province which was exemplified by their 5-hour military and guerrilla maneuvers, larger devoted and prepared forces shall be at the service of the people in the future in order to preserve the security of the region and to keep the aliens and the counterrevolutionaries at bay. Of course, despite the excellent morale and the extra-ordinary power of these zealous tribesmen who participated in the maneuvers with such a great enthusiasm, a great number of them must necessarily receive training because sometime later when some of the tribesmen have to take their animals migrating to the border areas or to the nearby regions they will face the enemies of Iran and will have to be equipped well in addition to their courage and zeal so that their significance to the preservation of the security of this land will be clear and so that they may be more successful against injustice and evil."

9695

CSO: 4906

# DIRECTOR OUTLINES ACTIVITIES OF RED CRESCENT SOCIETY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 7 Sep 80 p 15

[Text] The new Director of the Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr Ali Asghar Behzadnia, in a radio and television interview spoke about the plans and programs for reconstructing the Society and interfacing the operations of the Red Crescent Society with the goals of the revolution and of the Islamic Republic. He said that the Red Crescent Society would try to help the coreligionist, Third World and, generally speaking, the oppressed countries of the world--defined by the Koran--in the time of peace.

Concerning the creation of coordination between the Red Crescent Society and the Ministry of Health and Welfare in the field of medical treatment, the Director of the Red Crescent Society said that the former Red Lion and Sun Society and now the Red Crescent Society had medical treatment centers all over the country. As testified by all the persons who had benefited from their services, these centers rendered valuable services. He added, "In the rural areas, perhaps the most orderly buildings which are habitable and usable belong to the Red Crescent Society. But, unfortunately, all the hospitals and clinics of the Society were turned over to the Ministry of Health and Welfare in a hurry. Of course, the said Ministry also belongs to this nation, but this transfer caused their efficiency and managerial ability to suffer and their effectiveness to drop, whereas this Society reaches the rural heartland with its hospitals and clinics and has been rendering service as a medical treatment network. Where the hospitals and clinics could not reach, the relief workers of the Society reached with their service. It should now be rightly admitted that in this medicine shortage crisis the Red Crescent Society helps the entire country with its resources. Thanks to its relationships with the relief and medical treatment organizations of the world, the Red Crescent Society can easily get what cannot be obtained through the governmental commercial and other means."

Dr Behzadnia went on to say, "Fortunately, with the understanding that prevails and with the devout and committed officials that we personally know in the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the solution of this problem is very easy. Therefore, the aim is not to have this Organization under this roof or under this management. The aim is to cooperate and to help the Iranians and the human beings. We have actually one goal but are cooperating in two departments. However, it is unfortunate that in the atmosphere that was created after the revolution, each organization or group acted in its own name. This duplicity and multiplicity and flip-flop is not only impermissible when it comes to ensure the health and safety

of people, but is a great sin. We believe that medical treatment services should be handled by an organized management."

Regarding the manner of the operations and management of the Red Crescent Society, Dr Behzadnia said that the Red Crescent Society "is the only organization that can be managed under a five-member board." According to "our new plan, we replaced the management with five experienced managers who are devoted to the revolution and to the Islamic ideological principles. With the approval of these five persons who constitute an executive board, any decision can be implemented."

With respect to the task forces of the Red Crescent Society, the Director of the Society said, "Part of our reorganization plan in the Society is to strengthen and expand the task forces. We have discussed this with our colleagues, the doctors and relief workers, and we decided to strengthen these groups. Each group comprises a surgeon, a general doctor, an internal diseases physician, and even specializing surgeon and pharmacutists and relief workers. They are volunteers. So far we have formed three to four task groups. We hope to send them to the war zones and to the non-war zones. We plan to have a "mother" hospital to serve as the hub of the task project where task groups will be prepared for being dispatched to designated places to give services." He added, "One unfortunate thing that I have to say is that unfortunately as a result of the medical treatment plans and thoughts put forth after the revolution which were products of haste or, God forbid, negligence, medical treatment in this country has been plagued with incoordination and stagnation so that many of the experts have left and many more do not set their hearts on the work. As envisioned in our plan, we hope to attract the specializing forces, whether in the country or from abroad, who are devoted to the revolution and who have managerial skill and experience, as the Imam put it. I am sure we shall succeed."

Behzadnia said, "If I solve the financial problems for the experts and if I am not attacked and villified for it from all sides, obviously any physician desires to take one week off in every six months or devote one month a year so that he may serve his fellow men in the various parts of the country."

Touching on the importance of restructuring the Youths and Volunteers Department of the Society, Dr Behzadnia said, "The Red Crescent Society was really people-oriented. Apart from the higher echelons of the Society who were affiliated with the previous regime, the workers of the Society in the provinces and in the Capital were mostly people-oriented and praiseworthy, so much so that when the principal managers of the Society were dismissed, there would not be so much need for further purging. As it was reported then, apparently there were no more than 12 to 14 persons who had been connected with the SAVAK and the former regime. But the bulk of the personnel of the Society or, so to speak, those who served, are people-oriented and their work is laudable. There is no doubt that this Society has been successful in its social and populist activities, excepting one department of it, viz. its Youths Department. My study shows that its plannings did not have the contents which is useful to the Islamic Republic of today. In this particular department, the idea is to prepare the youths for the goals of the Islamic Republic so that they are trained to be workers, scouts and helpers of the community, specially in the Ideological Section." The Society Director then spoke about the unwarranted take-over of the Youths Houses of the Society by the revolutionary institutions and the need to reopen these houses. He said, "This



Society has 24 to 25 houses across the country. Each of these has branches which, put together, cover a great expanse of the country. Yesterday we appointed as the deputy chief of this Section Dr Ali Afrouz, a specialist, a Moslem, efficient and active brother, so that a new page is turned by his putting a person in charge of each of these houses in order that educational, ideological, relief worker training and local re-educational programs are implemented to benefit the youths.

In another part of his interview, Dr Behzadnia spoke about the necessity of preclusion of catastrophes. He said, "Instead of sitting idle and waiting for catastrophes to occur, we should try to preclude these. To achieve this with the knowledge that we have of the geographical and natural features of our country, we have set up a special section in the Society and it has been already manned, too. Its personnel are to forecast the services required in the form of the supply of tents, blankets, medicines and the basic needs. They are also supposed to study the local conditions. For instance, our farmers sow their fields for dry-farming and they build their houses next to their farms. The conditions the rural-folks opt for are vulnerable, because the same thawing snow that waters and ripens their farms can ruin their lives if unharnessed. Therefore, by proper planning we can build healthy and safe houses for these farmers farther from their farms with the help of the Ministry of Housing and other responsible organizations so that their houses are not in danger while their farms are prosperous. It is at this juncture that the issue of experts comes up again and a discussion with the Workers Program should be arranged. We hope that this atmosphere of chastising and slandering the experts and the devouts currently permeating the community may be dispelled and an atmosphere of understanding and inspiring devotion in the people may take its place.

9695

CSO: 4906

## CHRISTIANS CONTINUE TO LEAVE COUNTRY

PARIS LE MONDE in French 12 Aug 80 p 6

[Article by special correspondent J.P. Patoncel-Hugoz]

[Text] Baghdad--One of the tallest monuments in the Iraqi capital is an Armenian church. In Baghdad, some 50 Christian sanctuaries, including 40 Catholic churches, stand side by side with the green or blue domes of the Persian-style mosques. In Mossoul the church spires are inseparable from the scenery of the large northern city. One of the most prominent members of the government and of the Revolutionary Council is a Christian, Mr Tariq Aziz.

This, the least known among Christians communities in the Arab world, has lived through many tragedies\* but has been more fortunate than the Iraqi Jews--practically all of whom have had to leave the country. Under the current Baasist regime, which chooses to remain secular, it [the Christian community] is becoming more and more involved in the life of the city. "Since the 1958 revolution, never have we breathed so freely," we were told by a priest, whose statement was echoed by a mother and by a Christian working in hotel management.

Still, in spite of administrative obstacles, the exodus of Mesopotamia's Christians, which began half a century ago in the village of Telkef, near Mossoul, is continuing, chiefly to the United States and Australia. After using the Lebanese and then the Greek exit routes--25,000 Iraqis, most of them Christians, are said to have traveled through Athens in 1979 in order to obtain U.S. visas--now a route through Eastern countries or through Egypt is chosen by the emigrants arriving from the country between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. They may be poor people from the Bataouiyine neighborhood in Baghdad just as likely as residents of modern villas bordering the river, or else northern villagers.

### A Divided Christendom

Like Egypt with its Copts, Lebanon with its Maronites, or Syria with its Greek Orthodox, Iraq has its "national" church. That church, designated as "Assyrian" in reference to remote pagan ancestors, is not devoid of the divisions and subdivisions that plague Eastern Christendom.

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\* We'll only mention the massacres of Assyrians by the Kurds in 1843 and 1845 and those committed in 1933 by some members of the Royal Iraqi Army, followed by the deportation of the Nestorian patriarch to Nicosia.

Thus the Assyrians are divided into the "Chaldean" Catholic Church (another remnant of ancient times), including some 70 percent of Iraqi Christians, and the Nestorian Assyrian Church. Although all other Christians living on Arab soil have long been Arabianized, linguistically speaking (except for the Armenians, who in fact are not indigenous to the country), their [the Assyrians'] liturgical language as well as their mother tongue\* is Syriac, the latest stage in the evolution of Aramaic, the language spoken by Christ.\*\* However, Arabic is of course the working language of Christians in Iraq.

From the time of the Ephesus Ecumenical Council in 431, which condemned Nestorius, patriarch of Constantinople, for distinguishing two separate persons in Jesus Christ, until 1552, when a large number of Assyrians (since then designated as Chaldeans) united with Rome, Iraqi Christians have formed a single community. Today Catholics are under the authority of the Patriarch of Babylon, residing in Baghdad, while the Nestorians' spiritual headquarters are in Chicago, in the United States.

In addition to these indigenous Christians, there are in Iraq followers of the Catholic Armenian or Gregorian (Orthodox Church, of the Latin Church\*\*\* and the Syrian Catholic or Orthodox Church--all Iraqi nationals. The "Syrian" Church, which also uses Aramaic (or Syriac) as its liturgical language, is intellectually very active, especially its Catholic section, which for the past 16 years in Mossoul, has been publishing AL-FIKR, AL-MASIHI [Christian Thought], one of the best Arabic-language Christian publications, with a monthly circulation of 3,500.

The number of Christian faithful is a state secret in Iraq, as it is everywhere in the Near East. Still, until recently, their total number was generally estimated at 600,000. However, according to foreign experts, the first reliable general census, conducted in the country 2 years ago, showed 1 million Christians faced with 12 million Moslems, the latter divided into Shi'ite Arabs, Sunnite Arabs, and Sunnite Kurds, not to mention some other small minorities, such as the 60,000 to 100,000 Yezidi peasants who profess some sort of restored worship of Ibbis (Satan)--and who are, therefore, with some exaggeration dubbed "devil worshippers"--or the 20 to 3,000 Shebans, a syncretistic sect from the Mesopotamian marshes.

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\* Soureth, the contemporary Aramaic (or Syriac) spoken in Iraq, is almost as different from liturgical Aramaic (or Syriac) as French is from Latin.

\*\* Aramaic is also spoken in a few Christian villages in Syria.

\*\*\* The Latin Church, which originated during the Crusades, has always been linked to Rome. In addition to Arabic speakers (some of whom come from India, as far as Iraq is concerned), in the East it serves the needs of Roman Catholics traveling through the country. In Iraq Latins have an archbishop (the current one is French born), whose fictitious seat is in Babylon, as is that of the Chaldean patriarch.

## A Poem

Even though inequalities subsist, for instance the fact that a Christian has no right to marry a Moslem women, Baas, which has been in power in Iraq since 1968, follows a policy aiming to abolish religious discrimination. Baas has also taken a great many steps to calm the fears of a community that has traditionally been suspicious and withdrawn. The ambassador of the Holy See became dean of the diplomatic corps. Christian pupils were excused from studying an Islamic textbook containing some uncomplimentary references to their religion. With great ceremony, President Saddam Usayn received some of his Christian compatriots who had become Americans, and he had gifts of money delivered to them for the purpose of building churches in the United States. He sent several donations to the Iraqi clergy and in 1979 paid a surprise visit to a Baghdad church while mass was being celebrated.

"We are appreciative of all this, but we still intend to emigrate in order to raise our children as we please," we were told in confidence by the head of a family, referring to the nationalization of all religious schools in Iraq, which took place 5 years ago. That step was directed mostly at the Iranian Shi'ites, but the Christians were not spared. He was also referring to the "Baasization" of the minds that goes on from kindergarten to university. Many Christians, however, state that they have joined Baas, a pan-Arabic, non-sectarian nationalistic party founded in 1939 by Michel Afiak, a Syrian Christian. They join it "out of conviction" or "to strengthen a regime that has outgrown the literal interpretation of Islamic law."

The Chaldean Church, quietly ruled since 1958 by Patriarch Paul II Cheikho, around 75 years old at this time, has neither the political clout of the Lebanese churches, nor the spiritual renewal of the Egyptian Copts, which might perhaps enable it to slow down the exodus of one of the East's oldest Christian communities. On the other hand, through the friendships that it has cultivated within Moslem society, the Chaldean Church could serve as a model to many other Eastern communities. What an incredible sight, in that same Middle East where the fires of the Iranian revolution have, nearly everywhere, kindled the move to reintroduce religion as a factor in social relationships, what an incredible sight indeed to see Sheik Jalal Hanafi, renowned Baghdad preacher, honor the patriarch of Babylon on his 50 years of priesthood by reciting a poem on "the virtues shared by Christians and Moslems!"

11936

CSO: 4800



# DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC ARCHITECTURE REVIEWED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 16 Sep 80 p 8

[Article by Yousef El-maleh: "The Foundation of Islamic Architecture in Medina"]

## [Text]

Of all the arts, Arabic architecture has proved the most enduring, its trends having shaped the face of the Arab world. Patterns and edifices in the cities from which various schools emerged were all united by the distinctive characteristics of Arab Islam.

Islamic architecture was first modelled on the Prophet Muhammad's house in Medina, built by himself and his companions soon after the "hijra," his departure from Mecca to Medina.

The Prophet's house was used as the first "masjid" mosque for Muslims. It was a square enclosure surrounded by walls of brick and stone; part of it, probably the northern portion where the Prophet led the prayers, was roofed.

The congregation knelt facing north, the direction of the city of Jerusalem, and this direction or "qibla" was marked in some way. In 624, ("hijra 3") the objective for prayer was changed from Jerusalem to Mecca. "Al-Haram al-Nubawi al-Sharief" in Medina, as the first mosque is usually called, has been undergoing extension and renovation for fourteen centuries.

With the spread of Islam, mosques and Muslim houses were built in the new land.

With the shifting of the Islamic Caliphate from Medina to Damascus during the Umayyads, Islamic architecture began to develop further, embracing palaces, forts, tombs and lavish mosques.

Perhaps the most noted of the early mosques is "Masjid al-Sakehrah," the "Dome of the Rock" Mosque. It was first begun in Jerusalem in 643 near the simple mosque which Caliph Umar Ibn al-Khatib had erected four years earlier. The mosque was built around the rock believed by Muslims to be the place from which the Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven.

Reconditioned more than once, the mosque is a building of impressive size and monumental character, gorgeously decorated. A concentric annular structure, it consists of wooden dome with 16 windows. The lower-half was originally panelled with marble and the upper portion with glass mosaic on a beautiful golden background.

Internally all the arcades were likewise decorated with mosaic, and the walls with quartered marble panelling; each slab was cut in half and opened like a book, so that the veining ran towards the joint.

Al-Walid (705-715), the architect Caliph of Damascus, not only began the reconditioning of the silver-domed "al-Aqsa" mosque near the site of the Dome of the Rock, but also ordered the building of the Great Mosque in Damascus, this was considered one of the wonders of the world at that time, and the mosque was used as a model by many Muslim architects.

An outstanding example of architecture, the Umayyad Mosque is one of the most beautiful Islamic sites in the world. It is a masterpiece of art with its magnificent construction and gold engraved decorations.

The building, which was erected over the ruins of a temple of Jupiter and a Byzantine church, was completed in the early 8th century. The 145-yard long prayer-hall of the mosque is surrounded by beautiful arcades and walls decorated with finely-made mosaics. The shrine of St. John the Baptist, is found in the prayer hall of the mosque.

Gradually, as the people embraced Islam, isolated towns and small cities began to progress toward a framework of national unity. These three mosques were used by early Muslim architects as models for mosques which became landmarks of every Islamic center, houses of worship and notable monuments.

### Style of mosques

Mosques gave Muslim cities their characteristic shape and personality. They still represent the Islamic style of architecture, and crystalize its features.

Mosques generally varied to some extent in plan and style but always retained the same basic features. One of the main reasons for this standardization of form is found in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

The structural plan of a mosque took the shape of a rectangular open court enclosed on the four sides by vaulted halls or cloisters, surrounded by a wall with gates. The site is open to the courtyard or "sahn," usually covered with woven mats or rugs.

On the side of the main gate, which is arched and exquisitely decorated, there are plumbing systems sometimes in the form of beautiful fountains. These are mainly to provide water for performing the "wudu" (ablution) which is a necessary preliminary to the prayers.

Mosques, as sacred houses, must be constructed in a way that enables the believers to face "Qiblah," the ordained direction for worshipping the Lord. The direction of Mecca or more precisely the Kaaba, symbol of spiritual power, is indicated by a niche ("mihrab") in the appropriate wall.

The wall is generally covered with mosaics, and the frame of the niche is almost invariably adorned with Quranic verses. Next to the niche in the wall stands a stepped pulpit or "mimbar" which takes the form of a throne. From here the Imam delivers his sermon.

The external characteristics of the mosque feature minarets ("mazzanah") and domes ("guba"). The minaret is a tall, pencil-shaped tower usually built over the doorway. The interior space is taken up by a spiral staircase leading up to a landing. Some minarets contain more than one landing. They are fine pieces of architecture believed to be pointing to heaven and God, and are used for giving out the call to prayer ("adhan").

Domes were adopted and became one of the most remarkable features of Islamic architecture. Usually there is a central dome with smaller domes tapering at the top in harmony with the minarets. Most domes are covered with dazzling glazed tiles and a sub-structure of glass mosaic, incorporating

arched windows of coloured glass. The domes are awe-inspiring, designed to lift the Muslim's eyes to heaven, 'the seat of God.'

Arab domes, which gave Muslim cities a mood of poetic reverie, influenced the design of the City of the Sun, a Utopian city conceived by Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) an Italian Renaissance philosopher and poet. Some Islamic cities are covered with massive domes and lofty minarets rising above the flat-roofed towns.

A few of the minor arts also contributed in one way or another to the architecture of the mosque: stucco, glazed tiles, metal and wood for instance were employed to create geometric and epigraphic designs of great intricacy, delicacy and charm.

Muslim interest in mathematics shows in the use of complicated geometrical patterns to cover walls that would otherwise remain bare. This style, termed "arabesque," influenced European designs from the end of the Middle Ages.

The Arabic language, the language of the revelation of the Quran, was also used in the form of calligraphy to decorate Islamic architecture. Inscriptions were written at important places such as the entrance gates, around the 'mihrab' niche and below the dome.

Not only verses from the Quran were used: Arabic characters often also expressed the purposes of the building through prose or verse, sometimes adding the name of the ruler, the date and the architect.

The craftsmen of medieval Europe flatteringly imitated Arab calligraphy and so came unwittingly to adorn the coin of a European king and even the cross, undoubtedly not for its Islamic message but for the sake of decoration.

The building of mosques is credited to the divine guidance of Islamic architects and their skills. These architects worked as mathematicians, astronomers, craftsmen, calligraphers, illuminators and instructors, their genius always in harmony with the faith and needs of rich princes.

The mosque, spiritual center of early Muslim cities, crystalizes the Islamic style architecture, while its primary function remains that of a place where man prostrates himself before God.

## IDF INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ANALYZES MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR (Weekly Supplement) in Hebrew 10 Sep 80 pp 8-9, 16

[Interview with Major General Yehoshua Sagi, chief of the IDF Intelligence Branch, by Alex Fishman]

[Text] The central tier of the State of Israel's intelligence community has been Military Intelligence. By virtue of his position, the chief of the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff is responsible for warnings and political estimates. The Yom Kippur War did not significantly change the military arm's status in the intelligence community. Its head holds a power which has few parallels in the western world. The opinion of the chief of the Intelligence Branch has at times a decisive influence on the determination of policy.

The current chief of the Intelligence Branch, Major General Yehoshua Sagi, 47, belongs to the generation of officers who began their military service in the IDF after the War of Liberation. He has spent most of his service, beginning from his induction in 1951, in the Intelligence Corps and primarily in field intelligence positions, as an officer in an armored brigade and from 1960 as a command intelligence officer. During the Six Day War he served as the intelligence officer of the Sharon Division. In 1974 he was transferred to the General Staff and served as assistant chief of the Intelligence Branch for Research. In February 1979 he was appointed chief of the Intelligence Branch.

[Question] The IDF has recently expanded its operations in southern Lebanon. It seems that we are at the height of an offensive. In this counter-terror campaign, men are being killed in action, and political problems are developing. What are the objectives and achievements of this war?

[Answer] I believe that the question stems from an erroneous point of view. There is no solution, at least I recognize none, to the problem of terror, especially in the unique conditions of our region. In actuality, we have no severe substantial problem of internal terror. The terror being conducted along our borders or our coast is the dominant one. The terrorist base along our borders, primarily in Lebanon, Syria, and even Jordan, is very firmly established. If we tried to bring matters to the absurd and assume that the terrorist base along the borders will disappear, I do not think that there will be internal terror in the Land of Israel. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no military solution to the problem. It can only be solved by political means. The light which you are seeking at the end of the tunnel, that is that one day after 1,001 operations there will no longer be any

terror, is not compatible with our situation. We are trying to reduce the attacks within the country and along its borders and coast to a minimum by strikes which are aimed directly at targets where actual terror is being prepared against us.

[Question] If I understand you correctly, the military activity is designed to give the political level a kind of breathing space.

[Answer] It is not a matter of breathing space. I maintain that we will be unable to solve the problem of terror by military action alone or that a very large military action will change the regional order. The objective is actually to prevent, albeit for a limited time, attacks against us.

How is this possible? The alternatives are very limited. Actually we have two possibilities: one defensive, that is defend your borders to the best of your ability; the second possibility is offensive. That is to say do not wait till they come to you and penetrate and then destroy the teams which are attacking you but rather try to strike them in their bases. The State of Israel does not have many alternatives. For a country of 3 million people, struggling with problems of reserves and economy, the significance of a defensive guarding of its borders is that half of the people will be mobilized all the time. In the light of constantly decreasing funds and constantly expanding terror, things are not working out using defensive means alone. The cheaper and more effective method is to attack the bases themselves.

For 2 or 3 months now we have undoubtedly had an increase in the wave of terror. The reasons are well known, they are not military but political. Al-Assad is occupied at home, and while the Syrian army and the Syrian regime are fighting for their lives, there has been a weakening of the restraint of the Palestinians who are completely supported by the Syrians. There are internal disputes within the Palestinian factions. We have stood up to the Palestinian Council where there has been a rise of the military faction and a decline of the political faction within the PLO. In regard to the problem of Jerusalem, the Palestinians feel now that their strength is increasing in the international community. The PLO is beginning to become an accepted institution in the European Community and in the institutions of the United Nations. You know what? I will also add the Egyptian issue. The suspension of the talks at the present time has raised the hope in the Palestinian sector that al-Sadat will change his policy, and perhaps it is only necessary to give him a little push so that he will return to what is called "the Arab road." All of these factors together require the Palestinians to emphasize their presence. It reduces to one rule: You act, that means you are alive. So we have an increase in the wave of terror...

In the fight against terror, there is no 80 percent success. There is either 100 percent or nothing. When 10 penetrations have failed and one operation on the coastal road has succeeded--a failure is 100 percent. In recent months we have prevented about 10 actions, each of which was designed to be an action of killing and bargaining.

[Question] Does "we prevent it" mean from the other side of the border?

[Answer] Both from the other side and along the border, however primarily from the other side. The course of action which we are taking is that the moment when



we have intelligence about teams on their way and the bases of departure, the cheapest and safest course of action is to try to prevent the departure and to cause the terrorists to reconsider or learn a lesson--and we gain time. Time provides room for flexibility for the political means. We are involved today in the midst of some very substantive discussions about our future: will there be or will there not be autonomy? What kind of autonomy? Ultimately, this is the solution to the terror. With military means you can destroy. How much can you destroy? You can not eliminate all the terrorists. That is absurd.

There is also the very serious problem of how we attack. We cannot permit ourselves a situation in which the innocent and the guilty die together. That is to say, our attacks are very precisely directed, almost surgical in nature.

[Question] This is not true for the air force bombings...

[Answer] This is not true for the bombings...in part. For the air force's bombings of known terrorist bases or a certain house where you can be sure that there will be no civilian casualties in the vicinity or an ark on a team under a tree, it is true. It is not true for massive bombings of an area. However I do not remember that we have ever launched massive bombings. It is not true for artillery shellings or almost not true because in those cases, the pinpoint striking of a target is very difficult.

We are up against a group which learned its lessons and tried to respond in the best form, in conditions available to it, to our sophistication. For example, they have learned that their entry into camps and their residing within a purely civilian environment prevents us from taking massive actions. We have not yet reached a situation where the terrorists would be evicted from the civilian settlements. This could have been a solution, however the terrorists are doing precisely the opposite. They take a house in a refugee camp or a house in Beirut, for example, and establish a base there. We do not attack Beirut in spite of the fact that it is an infested area. Most of the terrorist headquarters and most of the logistics are located there. We know where they are, the problem is how to attack so that the innocent do not die with the guilty. In the last operation, I can say conservatively that about 40 terrorists were killed. This was a large operation. Not one civilian was killed, not one! I think that this speaks for itself.

In your question you mentioned the word offensive. IDF action is an escalated response to an escalation which has already begun in the number of penetrations. Check the statistics. How many penetration attempts have there been in the last 2 months? You will see that the terror is increasing. A number of the teams do not succeed at all. UNIFIL stopped 20 or 30 teams in the last 2 or 3 months. But then, UNIFIL acts against the teams which have been caught in its own way even though we are not happy with it.

So we are not responsible for the escalation. There has also been an increase in internal terror. If in the past the terrorists have succeeded in striking once out of five times, today they are making 25 attempts in order to succeed once.

[Question] Are the recommendations of the Agron Commission regarding pluralism in intelligence estimates being implemented? There was talk of two more centers, besides the Intelligence Branch, which would be involved in intelligence estimates.



How is this system functioning? Can it be correctly stated that the chief of the Intelligence Branch still is the intelligence officer of the people of Israel as was the case before 1973?

[Answer] You are simply not correct. There is an enormous difference between the situation then and today. The difference is not in the change of the status of the chief of the Intelligence Branch. The chief of the Intelligence Branch, in my opinion, is in charge of or responsible for warnings and political estimates (as derived from the delineation of the responsibility of his position). This responsibility of mine has not been divided between others and me. That is to say, with the establishment of research institutions both in the ministry of foreign affairs and in the intelligence institution, the responsibility of the chief of the Intelligence Branch has not been divided. In a word, a national security council has not been established. The chief of the Intelligence Branch is responsible for national estimates and warnings. This is actually the substance of the entire matter.

[Question] You would agree with me that the Agranat Commission wanted to divide the responsibility...

[Answer] Look, in de facto terms, we are still in a war. The response to the military issue, in warnings, is in the military area. One of the mistakes on Yom Kippur eve was that we attempted to analyze the political level and did not thoroughly examine the facts in the military area. If we had at that time separated the two subjects and asked ourselves the question: In the current situation as it now exists, in military terms, are there or are there not preparations for war here? The response should have been short and clear.

In the military area, the intelligence branch remains exclusive. Even after 1973, this area was not divided between others and ourselves. In the estimate of a military situation, you require the [military] arms. It is a joint product of Intelligence Branch research, air intelligence, and naval intelligence. In order to create duplicators for the Intelligence Branch, you must actually produce double studies in terms of the scope, both in the [specific military] arm and in the quantitative sense. For example, you receive intelligence from the analysis of radio signals. If you do not have an air arm (let's say in the air sector) which would interpret, study, and give you the final product of the estimate on this subject, it is as if you have done nothing. I can pass the information to the ministry of foreign affairs or to the Mossad, however there is no one there who will analyze it. Therefore, these institutions concentrate in the political-strategic area.

[Question] Political-strategic research which you also provide to it...

[Answer] I do not provide that to it. I am responsible for it.

[Question] That is to say nothing has changed since the Agranat Commission?

[Answer] That is precisely what I have not said. Before 1973 the chief of the Intelligence Branch was an institution who was obeyed implicitly. He had no competitor in the arena. After 1973, the chief of the Intelligence Branch must answer questions, and difficult questions. The leader who must decide receives an estimate parallel to ours, from a sister institution which at times takes an opposite view. When such a situation is created, I, for example, do not permit my professional

people to read the situation estimates of the sister institution so that a condition of national consensus or national conception will not be created. I prefer to see two or three opinions, call together all the parties, and endeavor to formulate the balanced estimate.

[Question] Are you the one who decides if there is a confrontation?

[Answer] No. The same different estimate from a sister institution which I receive is also received by the prime minister and the minister of defense. When an estimate of the national situation is being considered, one must first collect the facts. Facts and statistics are not a mathematical thing but a process of reaction and briefing.

The chief of the Intelligence Branch reads an average of 6 hours worth of raw material. He asks questions about some of this information. The assistant chief of the Intelligence Branch for research does the same thing. The same applies to the chief of the areas of research, air, and sea. In this way, the questions become "notations of vital information," which are fed back into the collection system and subsequently receive reactions. This is a continuous and repetitive process of question, answer, and reaction. You cannot get up one morning and say: The time has come to prepare a national situation estimate, and you as chief of the National Security Council begin to consider the facts. You must live the facts, you must collect the instruments. Therefore, if you would establish a national security council, you would have to do one of two things: either give it the position of the chief of the Intelligence Branch and the sister research institutions and then matters would be summarized in a forum similar to that of the chief of the Intelligence Branch, or as happens in other countries which have a national security council, the council would receive three working papers, different situation estimates, and in order to check to see that they are not contradictory, it would be assisted by an apparatus which would provide the facts. This is the basis. The question is if in a country of 3 million people, when you are struggling over the quantity of research material for one institution and certainly for 2 or 3, you can permit yourself this luxury.

[Question] In regard to the autonomy, to what extent do you feel that the Intelligence Branch has contributed its part? Have you as chief of the Intelligence Branch had an influence on the processes which have occurred?

[Answer] I will describe it in a different way, I believe that I have had the full opportunity to express my opinion.

[Question] Are you satisfied with the extent of the influence which the chief of the Intelligence Branch has had on this issue?

[Answer] You will not find a chief of the Intelligence Branch who would be completely satisfied. When you are the prime minister or the foreign minister and you have another matter in which you are involved and on which all your thoughts are concentrated, you naturally drop or defer matters which appear to you to be secondary and marginal and which can be viewed by the chief of the Intelligence Branch as no less important. Thus the chief of the Intelligence Branch will not be satisfied. This is a subjective matter. I am satisfied the moment that I can enter a forum, express, fight for, and explain my view. Whether my opinion is accepted

or not is irrelevant. For this there are parliamentary and political institutions which will choose from the alternatives which I present to them.

[Question] Didn't the National Planning Branch take over some of your functions in the autonomy issue?

[Answer] No. For both the National Planning Branch and the Planning Branch of the IDF, the basis for developing the strategic picture is the intelligence basis. This we provide. There is no substitute for this.

[Question] However the estimates and advice on the autonomy issue were accepted by the leaders from the National Planning Branch and not from the Intelligence Branch...

[Answer] This is legitimate. The leader listens to me and to him, and he eventually decides to accept his opinion. This is the leader's right. Period. It is my obligation and my right to express my opinion.

[Question] Do you believe this is the normal situation?

[Answer] You are continuing in the wrong direction. An organization works in accordance with the way its chief has built it. If the leader thinks that this is the way he wants it to work, then this is fine. It is his right, and you cannot prevent him from doing so. The chief of the Intelligence Branch does not dictate policy. Under no circumstances should this happen.

[Question] What are the positions of the chief of the Intelligence Branch regarding the normalization with Egypt and the autonomy?

[Answer] We expected difficulties. The difficulties are now occurring. It was the view of the chief of the Intelligence Branch that peace with Egypt must pass the test of time. Peace is not a condition where you can say: A peace agreement has been signed, and from that moment, hostility has ended, the danger that Egypt will take part in some Arab alignment in the future has been eliminated, and actually what happens is not important, we are advancing along the road of peace. We expected difficulties also in the autonomy issue because we saw that at the very beginning there were actually opposing views. The Egyptian view is not ours, the American view is not ours. Let's say that in the view of the autonomy, the Americans are closer to the Egyptians. It was difficult for us to see how things would eventually develop, and therefore, we expressed them in concrete terms.

[Question] After the Six Day War, the then Chief of Staff, Mordechai Gur, said that we would no longer base our reaction on an estimate of intentions. When there were concentrations, unusual movements, or unusual phenomena, immediate action would have to be taken. Is this policy still in effect?

[Answer] Yes. It is different than the past. I will give you an example of a situation in which I differed with Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur. In 1975, a state of readiness was declared as a result of unusual movements in Syria. The chief of the Intelligence Branch did not detect the intentions, and his opinion was not to take action. The chief of staff decided otherwise. In this case, the chief of the Intelligence Branch was ultimately proven right. However, in my view, the general staff took the correct action in spite of the fact that my opinion was not accepted.

[Question] This is a revolutionary policy in that in the past there was concern about taking the initiative because of political considerations.... Can one say that today these inhibitions do not exist?

[Answer] It is impossible to be free of these obstacles. This is a human function. However, as long as I am chief of the Intelligence Branch I will adopt this policy. I will also explain the reason. Al-Sadat can talk about two democracies, Israel and Egypt. Anyone who has visited Egypt knows that when one speaks about Arab democracy, one is actually speaking about a totalitarian regime of one form or another. If you need proof, look at the isolation of Sadat in Santa Katherina or in Ima'iliyah before his trip to Jerusalem. In the Arab world matters are decided by one man or a very small group of men. We are living constantly in three circles of deception in the intelligence area. One circle of deception is that of the ruler and his subjects. That is to say that the ruler makes a decision and does not want his subjects to know about it. The second circle of deception is that of the ruler and his fellow rulers. Al-Assad tries to deceive Hussein, Sarkis, and Saddam Hussein. The third circle of deception involves us--it is very difficult to say that you know the intentions because you are speaking about one man who makes a decision and the intentions change. Today he can decide one way and tomorrow another, we have already witnessed this. Therefore, I say knowledge of the intentions will not dictate to me on a subject so vital to my security, that which is called warning, but rather the actions which would be taken. The facts in an area will dictate the picture to me. Had this been the policy before the Yom Kippur War, I think we would have not encountered what we did.

[Question] What is the significance of the tightening of the military ties between Egypt and the United States on two levels: the supply of sophisticated weapons systems and strategic cooperation?

[Answer] These things stem from the new regional arrangement which has been created. Iran has fallen; there has been Afghanistan with or without the American reaction. I think that the Americans have finally accepted what we have maintained for a number of years. The Russians have made a change in their targets. Europe is no longer in first place. The Soviet spearhead is now aimed, in a long-range plan, at two points. The first is energy and the second is Africa. If you want raw material, take the map of Africa today and compare it to the map of Africa of 5 years ago. Take a look at the Soviet achievements. Take a map of the Middle East and look at the achievements... Actually they have suffered one failure--Egypt.

[Question] Perhaps Iraq in the future?

[Answer] No. Iraq represents a prospect for the United States. I believe there is a joint American-Iraqi interest. In spite of the fact that the Americans are trying to find the connection to Iraq, the Iraqis have not yet moved down this road toward the Americans. In such a strategic situation, the United States is seeking to create footholds in the region in order to block Soviet expansion, a process which represents a direct threat to the Gulf nations. The image which has been created for the United States after Iran has led to a situation in which the nations of the Gulf, who can protect their regimes with difficulty, are trying to seek immediately an alternative by a compromise with the hostile environment. This is also the case with Saudi Arabia's turning to Iraq in spite of the fact that they are at two opposite poles. The Iraqis are pushing for a defense pact among the



Gulf nations under Iraqi hegemony. They need the United States in order to achieve this. Here is where there is a joint American-Iraqi interest. Such a pact is aimed against Khomeinism and Soviet expansion. I do not assume that regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq will be able to live side by side for a long time. In the American world view, Egypt is the first place on which it can depend. Egypt also has importance as Egypt--as one who has led the Arab world in the past. There is an American desire to restore it to a position of hegemony in the Arab world. The United States would emerge actually as a beneficiary.

[Question] However, Egypt has a tradition of expelling foreigners. That is to say that the Americans are taking a risk.

[Answer] Yes. It means that they are taking a risk. An American-Egyptian strategic pact has been created. Al-Sadat is developing these relations. Actually, he began to develop them even before he went to Camp David. In his world view, the United States is the main support. Therefore, in spite of the fact that perhaps the main and only ally of the United States in the region is Israel, a closer tie has paradoxically been created with Egypt. This pact between Egypt and the United States can have long-range implications and can also have very disappointing developments. American bases in Egypt is an idea which is compatible with the strategic view of the United States. There are two at the time: in Qina and Ra's Banat. These bases are on the periphery and they do not disturb the Egyptian administration. The dangers to us are those of preference and limitation.

[Question] Has this already been manifested?

[Answer] I do not think that we can feel this in the military area, however we already feel it in the political area, and in the future we will feel it much more. Egyptian willingness has an importance to the Americans beyond that which it actually has, whether it is or is not compatible with the American view.

The equipping of the Egyptians with modern weapons is secondary in importance at this time. On the other hand, I have already said that I cannot ignore Egypt as a potential confrontation state until proven otherwise through the years. There are several key dates which we must pass through in order to be shown that Egypt is indeed moving in consonance with the peace agreements. For example, the evacuation of the Sinai in 1982. What is beyond that? Why does the Egyptian Defense Minister Badawi maintain that the first target of the Egyptian forces is still Israel? Why have the Egyptians deployed five divisions along the Canal whereas on the Libyan border where the Egyptian problem is concentrated there is only a small segment? The questions are difficult ones. An Egyptian army equipped with American weapons will be a completely different army, a much better one. There is no need for there to be doubts on this issue. I do not say that Egypt does not have peaceful intentions. I think that al-Sadat's intention is for peace. The question is what will happen after al-Sadat. What will happen in the upheavals in the Arab world during the course of time, which for me are the years 1983, 1984, and 1985, 2 or 3 years after the withdrawal to the international border. Then we will be able to really determine the Egyptian intentions.

[Question] What is the extent of the effect on us of the diminishing image of the United States which is our major ally?



[Answer] In our microcosmos, it is not much different today. First of all, we are in a no-alternative situation. We cannot say: Let's leave this ally and go over to the Soviet Union. Secondly, things balance out because of the upheavals in the Arab world, and the targets of the Soviet Union are farther than our region. The Soviet Union is basing itself in Afghanistan, in my opinion, as a bridgehead to Iran. It is only a question of time. It will do this before it will apply pressure or aim for a flareup in our region. The United States is using the time to attempt to create an anti-Soviet front based on its spearhead--Egypt. If the United States becomes firmly established in Egypt and succeeds in creating the Egyptian bridge to the Gulf countries, a bridge which actually existed in the past, then in this circle it will succeed in creating an anti-Soviet bloc. As Israelis, we have a problem with this. We will pay part of the price of the American action.

[Question] You spoke about the internal situation in Syria. I have a specific question on this subject. If the internal situation deteriorates, to what extent will we find the Russians in Syria?

[Answer] This is a possible development. The Soviet Union has no alternative to al-Assad today. The processes today in Syria are moving in an anti-Soviet direction. In order for al-Assad to continue to stay in power, he is likely to come to a situation in which he will ask the Soviets to enter Syria. I think that the Soviets have found, for example, in Afghanistan, that their intervention in foreign countries has not encountered an appropriate American reaction.

[Question] Do you see Afghanistan as a precedent for many things which are likely to happen to us?

[Answer] Correct. The main precedent is that until the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had not intervened directly in places other than its satellites. According to the reaction which this intervention encountered, the Soviet Union can permit itself to do the same thing a second and third time in other places.

In conclusion, I would like to add a few words about the people of the Intelligence Branch. I think that today, 7 years after the Yom Kippur War, one can praise the people of the Intelligence Branch, in all its sectors, both in the collection sector, about which there were no complaints in the war, and the evaluation sector, about which there were complaints. The praise is not only mine. Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin specifically cited the intelligence after the attack on Entebbe, and the chief of the general staff cited the intelligence after the last operation in the north. Those who are performing in intelligence work are being praised, and it is important that the people know that they are doing good and important work. The strength of the Intelligence Branch is in its reservoir of manpower. It has no other strength. If you take the people away from the Intelligence Branch and compensate it with equipment, you have not increased its strength. It has a tradition of sacrifice and dedication to profession, duty, responsibility, and mission assigned to the people. This dedication, which wears out the people, is one of the things which surprise me. When I try to compare the motivations even of a low-ranking officer in any Intelligence Branch occupation, they are completely different than those of an officer in other places. The weight of the responsibility here is emphasized much more, from the lowest ranks to the top.

## BRIEFS

MIRAGE MAINTENANCE IN COLOMBIA--Bogota (AFP)--Maintenance and repair of French Mirage fighter planes, sold to Colombia in 1970, will be entrusted to an Israeli company. The disclosure was made in Bogota on Wednesday, 6 August by General [words missing], the defense minister of Colombia. The Company, Israeli Air Industries, or IAI, was in competition with the French firm Dassault-Breguet, builder of the aircraft, and with a Spanish firm for maintenance and repair of the 16 Mirages based in Central Colombia. IAI won the contract, having made the lowest bid and allowing Colombia an \$8 million saving (around 32 million francs), as the minister also noted. In addition, IAI pledged to provide the Colombian Air Force with the necessary industrial and military substructures to effect partial repairs on the aircraft locally. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Aug 80 p 7] 11936

CSO: 4800

## NEW RAPPORT WITH INDIA REPORTED

London 8 DAYS in English 27 Sep 80 p 25

[Text]

*The visit by a Kuwaiti delegation to India in September opened a promising new chapter in industrial, economic and commercial cooperation between the two.*

KUWAIT'S DECISION to make substantial investments in India and enable India to participate in its own industrial development has left Indian industrialists with much homework to do. Trade between the two countries has been stagnant in the last three years and Indian officials admit that no serious market surveys have been attempted in order to assess Kuwait's capacity to absorb Indian industrial products.

A promising new chapter in the countries' bilateral cooperation in the economic, industrial and commercial fields began following a visit to India from 9-11 September by a Kuwaiti delegation headed by the ruler, Sheikh Jaber al Ahmed al Sabah — his first official stay. After talks and an unprecedented lunch for the Emir and his ministers at Prime Minister Gandhi's house, it was announced that Kuwait will make sizeable investments in selected Indian projects and cooperate with India in sponsoring joint ventures in third countries.

The choice of projects to receive Kuwaiti petrodollar backing has yet to be made. It is likely that a Kuwaiti delegation under the auspices of the Gulf Corporation will visit India in the next month or so to discuss concrete proposals. In the matter of joint ventures, the two countries' industry ministers — Kuwait's Abdul Wahab al Nefisi and Dr Charanjit Chhanna of India — agreed that no time should be lost.

From New Delhi's point of view one sombre fact which emerged was that the Indian government as well as private industrialists have done practically nothing to establish greater rapport with Kuwaiti officials and industrialists. The Kuwaiti industries minister stressed frankly the need for special Indian efforts to bridge the information gap by organising trade fairs and exhibitions.

The major items of Indian export to Kuwait include spices, iron and steel, machinery, meat, rice, vegetables, coffee and tea, wood manufactures, fruit and clothing. India's imports from Kuwait include petroleum products, urea, ammonia, copper waste and sulphur. Chhanna was told by Nefisi that Indian assistance would be particularly welcome in setting up petrochemical and machine tool industries in Kuwait.

The talks covered a wide area. It is understood that the Emir agreed in principle to Prime Minister Gandhi's suggestion that there should be a world oil conference specifically to discuss the problems of the developing countries in the face of galloping oil prices. Mrs Gandhi made a forceful plea that the present categorisation of countries by the strategic committee of Opec is very unfavourable to India and that New Delhi is entitled to concessional treatment by virtue of her per capita income and oil consumption. According to an Indian official, this view, which has been accepted by both Indonesia (see page 48) and Iran, appeared to have made more than a marginal impact on the Emir and his advisers.

Without naming Afghanistan, the joint communique issued by the Emir and Mrs Gandhi at the end of the visit expressed strong opposition to the use of force in the

settlement of disputes, which it stated should only be resolved peacefully bilaterally and in accordance with the charter of the United Nations and within its framework'. The two leaders said that the presence of foreign troops contributed to instability and heightened tensions, and voiced their grave concern over the growing escalation of great power rivalries in the region. They called upon the concerned states to convert the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and to keep the Gulf free from superpower military rivalry.

On the Middle East, the Emir and Mrs Gandhi were more specific and forthright. They emphasised the urgency of finding a just and durable solution based on the complete withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and endorsed the inalienable right of the Palestinian people

under the auspices of the Palestine Liberation Organisation to return to their homeland and establish an independent state of Palestine.

It is understood that the visiting Kuwaiti ministers and officials extensively briefed the Indians on their country's problems with Iran. According to Arab sources in New Delhi, Indian leaders and officials agreed with the Kuwaiti stand strongly deploring Ayatollah Khomeini's repeated calls for Iran-type uprisings in Arab countries.

The visiting Kuwaiti officials also explained to the Indians why Arab countries had endorsed Saudi Arabia's proposals to set up a Pan-Arab institute for Arab studies in Riyadh which will, among other things, lead to the establishment of an 'Arab Interpol' to tackle insurgency problems.

## KUWAIT

### CENTRAL BANK REPORTS ON YEAR'S DEVELOPMENTS, FUTURE PLANS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 21 Jul 80 p 12

[Article: "Annual Report of Central Bank of Kuwait"]

[Text] The annual economic report issued by the Central Bank of Kuwait yesterday says that the bank approved at the end of last year a new and important plan to streamline and regulate the banking credit system through gradual transformation from the system of open account credit facilities to the system of programmed and set-term loans.

In its report, the bank reviews the measures that it took to strengthen the liquidity of the banks last year, the oil developments that have led to raising oil prices and the international economic situation.

The report says that the total local production amounted to 6,430,500,000 dinars in 1979, of which 4,650,300,000 dinars came from the oil sector whose relative contribution to the total production rose from 60.7 percent in 1978 to 72.3 percent in 1979.

The report points out that Kuwait held fourth place [not further specified] among the OPEC and Middle East countries in 1979, third place in OPEC behind Saudi Arabia and Iraq and sixth, instead of seventh place in the world [presumably meaning in oil production].

The rise in crude oil production in 1979 was accompanied by a rise of nearly 20 percent in the volume of oil exports, by an increase of nearly 17 percent in natural gas production and by a growth of nearly 38 percent in the use of natural gas in comparison to 1978. One of the prominent features of the development of the oil sector in Kuwait in 1979 was the putting into operation of the new gas liquefaction plant at the outset of that year. This plant has added nearly 3.3 million tons to Kuwait's total annual liquid gas production.

Regarding oil prices, prices rose by the end of 1979 to almost double their level at the end of 1978.

The report also points out that the year's general revenues in the 1979-80 budget have been estimated at 3,863,000,000 dinars, that the oil share of these revenues has been estimated at 3.12 billion dinars and that the government spending has been estimated at 2,453,000,000 dinars.



## Currency Expansion

The economic report also says that the currency expansion--reflected in the percent increase in the local liquidity--continued to decline for the third consecutive year.

The report attributes the main reason for the decline in the currency expansion rate to the transfer of a large part of the local liquidity to the outside world, either in the form of current remittances to pay for imports or in the form of capital outflow seeking the investment opportunities available abroad, especially as a result of the high international interest rates.

The report adds that even though some of the factors which had contributed to the outflow of local liquidity to the outside world disappeared or lost their intensity at the end of 1979--such as the temporary halt in the trend toward sharply rising international interest rates, suspending the creation of new Gulf companies and suspending the issuance of new bonds recorded in dinars--the liquidity of the local banks in dinars continued to experience rising pressures which motivated the Central Bank to strengthen the liquidity of these banks by supplying them with money at a relatively low cost through the discount window whose operations amounted to a total of 195 million dinars by the end of the year and through the system of the exchange of currency for a set term. The total value of this type of operations amounted to 202 million dinars.

## Strengthening Liquidity

The report also notes that in addition to the Central Bank's continued support for the liquidity of the commercial banks, it started for the first time in 1979 issuing its bonds which can be considered a nucleus for the operations of the future open market. The bank also approved at the end of 1979 a new and important plan seeking to streamline and regulate the banking credit facilities policy through gradual transformation from the system of open drawing credit facilities to the system of programmed loans for set terms and purposes.

The economic report also says that the Kuwaiti paper money market experienced in 1979 a number of developments including the issuance base and a number of regulatory measures in the Kuwaiti stocks and bonds market.

The issuance base has expanded by 15.7 percent as a result of the issuance of 58.5 million shares in the form of free grant shares and shares to increase capital offered to subscribers with an issuance allowance.

The stock market activity in 1979 resulted in an increase of nearly 20 percent in the prices [of shares] and with the appearance of long periods of recession.

The report notes that the record figure for wholesale prices rose from 164.5 percent in 1978 to 175.6 percent in 1979, with 1972 as the base year. The record cost of living figure rose from 166.4 percent in 1978 to 175 percent in 1979, with an increase rate of 5.2 percent.

## Rise in Trade

The report also says that Kuwait's foreign trade in 1979 experienced a tangible increase in both exports and imports and in the balance of trade in comparison to the preceding year.

The total surplus in the 1979 Kuwaiti balance of payments amounted to nearly 3.1 billion dinars, i.e. it rose by nearly 364 percent over 1978, as a result of an increase in the current surplus amounting to nearly 115 percent on the one hand and the inward shift in the net movement of foreign capital belonging to the commercial banks on the other hand.

## International Economy

The report also notes that there were successive developments in many countries of the world in the past year as a result of the high inflation rates and as a result of the turmoil in the oil market in the first half of the year and the tendency of the oil prices toward rising in the second half of the year. However, the major OPEC countries were able to realize a high surplus in their 1979 current account whereas in 1978 this surplus had reached its lowest point since 1974. By the end of 1978, a number of the major powers had taken joint measures to bolster the dollar exchange rate. Those measures did not prove effective beyond the first half of 1979 when the dollar began to face some pressures.

## Gulf Currencies

The European currency system which was initiated in March 1979 reflects further interest in the exchange rate. This system has been established as an advanced phase of the serpentine system [nizam al-thu'ban] with the aim of stabilizing the exchange rate among the currencies of this system in order to reach the phase of currency unity. In fact, the first European Currency Unit (E.C.U.) has already been issued.

The developments have shown that the currencies of this system, led by the Deutschemark, have realized an improved position vis-a-vis the dollar, with the exception of the Danish crown which has deteriorated somewhat. As for the Gulf currencies, they have been characterized by stability in the face of the dollar, with the exception of some slight fluctuations.

One of the most prominent international economic events in 1979 was the evident rise in gold prices in the last part of 1979 and the beginning of 1980.

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## BRIEFS

**MALAYSIAN INVESTMENT**--South East Asia provides good investment opportunities for Kuwait, Kuwaiti Finance Minister Abdul Rahman Salem Al Ateeqi said last week. The Minister, who was a member in the delegation accompanying the Ruler of Kuwait to six nations in Asia said that region would also provide means for diversifying Kuwait's foreign investments. Kuwait's Asian investments will be based on a clear vision and previous experience, the Minister said, adding, "we simply cannot be absent on that platform." Commenting on the Emir's tour which ended last week, the Chief of Kuwait's Real Estate Consultative Group said South East Asia is a 300 million man market. Ahmad Al Duwailij, who supervised the formation of Kuwaiti-Malaysian Investment Company said that Kuwait was not seeking special concessions in moving towards the Asian market. Al Duwailij ruled out allegations that investments in Asia would involve risks. Industrialised countries who are focusing on the South East Asian market are not doing that for humanitarian purposes, he said. Developed countries are seeking to serve their own ends and to realise profits, Al Duwailij added. Investment in South East Asia, contrary to that in industrialised nations will be highly profiting, the chief of the consultative group said. Kuwait's investments in South East Asia will start with projects aiming towards constructional development, Al Duwailij said. This would be followed by industrial projects. We are at present studying the investment laws of those countries but we are confident the investment potential is big and wide, Al Duwailij added. Kuwait-Malaysia Investment Company is a Mal. Dir. 250 million (\$120 million) joint venture in which Kuwait holds 48 percent. The Kuwait stock in the venture is held by the Ministry of Finance, the Real Estate Consultative Group, and Kuwait's Social Security Organisation. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 27 Sep 80 pp 12, 13]

**NEW POWER, WATER PLANT**--The site for a new power station and water distillation plan was discussed last week at a meeting between officials of the Ministry of Electricity and Water and the Municipality. The new plant will be located at Julaa, on the Southern coast of Kuwait. Some chalets at the proposed site will be demolished. No decisions were reached at last week's meeting and another meeting will be held this week. An official said that the Ministry had succeeded in overcoming the consequences of the fire at south Shuaiba Power Station and that the supply position was now satisfactory. The fourth unit at South Shuaiba will start operating within a few days and this will increase the electricity supply load and provide a good margin against any sudden demand. He added that consumption is expected to fall as the weather becomes cooler. The remaining two units affected by the Shuaiba fire will become operational during the winter. The Electricity Ministry expects the maximum load to reach 2,725 megawatts in 1981, 3,150 megawatts in 1982, 3,600 megawatt in 1983 and 4,075 megawatts in 1984. The forecast for 1990 is the consumption of 7,450 megawatts. The Ministry is taking steps to meet the expected future demands. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 27 Sep 80 p 13]

## FORMER PREMIER AL-SULH INTERVIEWED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 1-7 Sep 80 pp 10-12

[Interview with former Premier Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh by Talal Haydar, in Beirut; date not given]

[Text] He picked up the morning newspapers, leafed through them, expressed resentment over a weekly paper's report that he has proposed formation of an ordinary government headed by al-Husse. He read a telegram received from the Jordanian king. We reviewed the background of the Lebanese war, and he said: "The Lebanese war has ended, but it appears that other wars are still raging in Lebanon."

[Question] The story of your appointment as premier-designate and your subsequent stepping down is so far still more important than the formation of a new government. What provocative and surprising situations did you discover during the contacts you made with the various factions, in order to form the government of political activists? And what were the basic obstacles which impeded formation of this government?

[Answer] Some 19 days passed between commissioning, and calling off the formation of the new government. There constituted an extraordinary transition period in the Lebanese situation, because many issues crystallized, even though they are not yet apparent to the public.

First, the contacts were tantamount to an initiative to stop the war. We did stop the war between the Lebanese. Discussions had been under way to transfer the Lebanese issue to Paris, as was done with the Vietnamese question, because of the difficulty of conducting [at home] a direct dialogue between the parties to the dispute. Then, all of a sudden, the Lebanese factions agreed to meet around the same table in the premier's office at the presidential palace.

I discovered that there was a group of positive factors. I sensed a sincere concern for Lebanon, for Lebanon's unity and for its moral values.

All the factions wanted to finally end the war and begin a stage of positive construction. They did not want "to call it quits" in just any old way. It was clear that they did not want a truce, after which the war would return, as some feared. On the contrary, I sensed that all parties loved Lebanon and were concerned about its unity. Each faction knew that it has a stake in Lebanon.



[Question] The discussion was not about the past or future of Lebanon?

[Answer] The discussion was about one Lebanon. We did not want Lebanon as it was. We wanted to introduce the necessary, contemporary developments, and to modernize all institutions. Past shortcomings were clear to the parties in conflict, but positive views were a common denominator.

Both the extreme right and the extreme left appreciated the values of Lebanon, such as its democracy, and all were anxious to maintain these values.

I felt that all parties had a strong desire to participate in achieving Lebanese unity, which has always been composed of various sects and religions working for the development of a united nation and state.

Lebanon appears to the world as a radiant democracy representing a higher culture and a civilized partnership, progressive and liberal, setting a high standard of coexistence to every society which suffers from sectarian, religious, or ideological incompatibilities.

The Lebanese formula must be maintained in the interest of the Palestinian cause and to confront Israeli racism through coexistence among the various religions.

When the delegation of American blacks (Jackson) arrived, we met with him at the "Islamic Coalition" center. I told him that, in my opinion, the war began when the Arabs in general, and the Palestinians in particular, offered the world a rational and advanced picture of the type of state contemplated [for Palestine]. The model was the Lebanese formula where everyone, Moslem and Christian, lived in a democratic climate. Lebanon was the model which stirred up Israeli racist fears and unmasked Israel before Western public opinion generally. This was the biggest political arrow to hit Israel in the heart. The Israeli response was war and the "destruction" of the Lebanese formula.

This was the cause of the Lebanese war. Today, the conflict in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon, can be summarized in two ways:

Either Palestine will be in Lebanon's image, or Lebanon will be in Israel's image.

We say that Palestine must be like Lebanon. All the factions that accepted the idea of a government of activists shared this view.

[Question] During your discussions with Christian and Moslem leaders, did you feel that the Christians were still afraid of the Moslems and uneasy about their loyalty to Lebanon, and that the Moslems lacked confidence in the Christians and did not truly desire national partnership and unity?

[Answer] The Christians' feelings of fear were matched by the Moslem's feelings of being wronged.

I felt, during my efforts to form a government, that the two factions understood that fighting would not solve the problem. On the contrary, war would aggravate the problem even more, and has aggravated it quite enough already.



I also sensed that the two sides believe in the need to resort to dialogue to solve this problem, that is, to abolish war.

In 1943, the year of true independence (not of the lip-service independence of 1922 and later years), the difficulty of Christian fears was present, but the solution was found in the national charter.

Lebanon has been trying to solve these two problems since it obtained its true independence, because the two sides were convinced of the presence of fear [by the Christians] and of a sense of being wronged [by the Moslems]. Each side began to try to solve the problem of the other side. The Moslem was trying to solve the problem of fear which the Christian had and the Christian, for his part, was trying to solve the sense of feeling cheated which the Moslem had. However, big mistakes were made during the more than 30 years that have passed, because Lebanon did not find a satisfactory remedy for these two difficulties.

These mistakes have helped to cause the war and to open the way for the plot hatched by Israel and those who back Israel.

The Moslem and Christian leaders now agree on the need to cure Lebanon of this chronic disease.

#### The Political Activists Would End the War

[Question] If the government of political activists had been formed, would reconciliation have been achieved, or would the war have been moved from the street to the palace, which would have been more serious?

[Answer] The possibility of mutual incompatibility and conflict are always present, but in the case of a government of activists, the conflict would have switched from a contest of weapons to a contest of dialogue and resolutions.

We are now in a phase of possibility of war. And I tell you, very simply, that we would have been moving toward the possibility of abolishing war. The activists were not responding to a call to war by agreeing to participate in the new government. On the contrary, the desire to end the war was inherent in everyone.

[Question] Why was it no longer possible for you to continue your commission and consultations? What was it that caused you, after 19 days of trying, to stop your efforts and submit a letter of resignation?

[Answer] The path we were following was very difficult. Moreover, we found obstacles we could not quickly overcome. Preparations could have taken longer than the citizens could endure. Mistakes were made by the government and by me personally. However, everything that happened must be reconsidered and reviewed.

Self-criticism is very necessary at this stage, not just to look at the past, but rather, at the future as well, because the initiative continues. The initiative to end the war has not ceased, even if the formation of a new cabinet has stopped.

It must be followed up by all parties. As for the mistakes, they can be remedied in due course. There is no substitute for the principle of a government of activists itself. There can be no backing away from it. The period of preparing for it might have been insufficient; therefore, we have not abandoned the idea. Rather, we have stopped naming the ministers. Whether it is myself or someone else [who would form the government], I reiterate the need to continue this effort, the effort of ending the war, because it affects national destiny.

On the day I was commissioned, and on the day I declined the commission, I sensed positive relations. I felt as if our hopes had landed on difficulties, not on despair.

#### A Way In For a Government of Activists

[Question] If the object of trying to save the country is noble and valuable to this degree, why did it not merit further patience and efforts on your part? Or, did you arrive at a point where patient efforts were no longer of any use, so that you stopped trying?

[Answer] Not exactly, I now feel a need to change the approach I followed in this round, as well as the way to prepare for the future. A transitional government, as the next government might very well be, could be a suitable prelude to the inevitable next phase, which is a government of political activists.

I wish we would have a government of activists right now. But I firmly believe that it would face the same difficulties and obstacles [I ran into]. Still, there is no substitute for a government of activists, since there is no way to end the war, except through a dialogue between the combatants and a resolution to abolish the method of arguing with weapons, especially among citizens of the same country.

In our efforts and discussions, we felt that the war between the Lebanese had ended, because there was a sincere desire to end it. However, it is obvious that there are several wars within Lebanon. During the visit I made to the Arab kings and presidents, I said to those in conflict with Syria: "We asked you to end our war, but we suddenly realized that we had to end a war between the Arabs."

We were waiting for an end to the Lebanese-Lebanese war, when we discovered that we were called upon to end an Arab-Arab war. This is an example of some of the obstacles that stood in my way. In any event, an end to the war between the Arabs is not just in Lebanon's interest. Rather, it is chiefly in the interest of the Arabs themselves, especially following the fierce Israeli onslaught and the disgraceful American ineptitude.

What will history say about us? It will say that in the days of such and such [government leaders], Jerusalem was lost, and in the days of such and such leaders, the south [of Lebanon] was lost.

History has immortalized King Faisal's famous words, "I shall pray again in Jerusalem," even though he died as a martyr without doing that. History will not forget those who lose Jerusalem, so let them make a choice. The Arabs might have an excuse that Israeli know-how is superior, or that international support [for Israel] is stronger, or that Israel's weaponry is more advanced. However, they have no excuse for their disputes, because mutual agreement is within their own reach. It is their only weapon, so why don't they use it?

This weapon would solve the problem of Lebanon and Palestine as well. The picture of a fragmented, partitioned Lebanon is the picture of war. The importance of Lebanon is that it is a mirror, a pulpit and a voice. This is the source of the grandeur of this small country, and we expect it to rise again. If Lebanon were sound and healthy, there would be no Camp David accord. Lebanon's return to good health would be the greatest blow to that agreement.

From Jumblatt to al-Jumayyil

[Question] Let us return to the Lebanese scene. The failure to overcome the obstacles in the way of a government of activists makes a "transition" government necessary. Why didn't Premier Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh form a caretaker government?

[Answer] I believe that to give the greatest possible thrust and impetus to the idea of a government of activists, we should insist on it and abandon any other course. To emphasize the strength and importance of this idea, I tried to make it look as if it were the subject of a referendum.

It might be preferable for someone other than myself, to form a caretaker government, because he would not be tied to the issue as I am. If I agreed to form a caretaker government, I fear that it would put an end to the concept or objective [of a government of activists]. It is no longer my property; it has become the property of every Lebanese, including Walid Jumblatt, Amin al-Jumayyil, and the silent majority. It would not be proper to deal with this idea as if we were dealing with an ordinary matter.

Obstacles to the formation of government only increase the people's desire for it. These obstacles are the current fragmentation. Once that is gone, the formation of any government becomes easy, because this will open the way for a new, healthy Lebanon. The need is to form "the government," not "a government," because there is a government now, so why change?

Our generation has had its day, but the new Lebanon can only be rebuilt by the new generation of activist forces.

[Question] Walid Jumblatt, Ibrahim Qulaylat, and Amin al-Jumayyel all concurred about this government which....

[Here Premier al-Sulh interrupted, and said:] They concurred.

This is the important accomplishment. The government was not formed, but the activists concurred. There has been a meeting of minds. This accomplishment is very important. This is what the Lebanese people applauded when the formula was broached. It became a specific goal this is the road we shall take.

My Presence Is Evidence of Their Accord

[Question] Any government formed now, by any other method, would not be "the government," according to your view. When will the time come for "the government?"

[Answer] The time depends on the effort of those doing it, on their intelligence and devotion, and on the way they work to establish "the government," which is the government of activists.

I say that we have made mistakes. Certain parties have not yet been convinced, and not all difficulties have been overcome. But this does not prevent us from pursuing efforts and reconsidering the matter, in order to extricate the country from this worsening situation.

The difficulty of any head of a coalition government—such as a government of activists—is that his presence is evidence of disagreement of the various factions. I want my presence to be evidence of unity. [End of answer].

(It is well-known in Beirut streets that when al-Sulh was asked when the crisis would be over, he replied: "When you see that I have formed the cabinet.")

[Question] If a government were formed this week, but the situation worsened and became explosive, leading to the government's resignation, would it be possible to form a government of the same type, no matter what the obstacles or difficulties?

[Answer] This would not happen. From now on, we must not lose the slightest opportunity to form a government of activists. Taqi al-Din al-Sulh will not fail to do everything possible to help any premier-designate implement this concept.

[Question] There are many voices calling on President Sarkis to assume responsibility for everything going on. Did you cooperate with him at the crucial stage, and what is your view regarding everything being said?

[Answer] President Sarkis believes in the need for a government of activists. He is sincere and earnest in his untiring, silent efforts to extricate the country from its ordeal.

Sarkis and I Believe

[Question] If the formation of any new government will not change the situation, did President Sarkis err in accepting Prime Minister al-Huss' resignation and appointing you as premier-designate?

[Answer] I think that if President Sarkis had not believed in the possibility of forming a government of activists, he would not have pursued this effort. And if it were not for my belief in the idea, I would not have accepted the commission. It is certain that it was and still is possible [to form such a government]. There was some gain in what has happened. Credit has to be given to all those who tried to help.

The crisis, in itself, transformed a potential idea into near reality. This was a big accomplishment for Lebanon, whether a new government was formed or not. President Sarkis adopted a clear position regarding the idea. This is a very important matter.

[Question] When you agreed to form a government of activists means, did you believe that they could also be political leaders? And was it this belief that led to your stepping down?



[Answer] There is no doubt that they possess the military power that no one else has. In addition to that, they have their major political role. The proof is that they were called upon to undertake a major political task. This does not prevent senior politicians from joining them in the mission. A government of activists would not be limited to them. (I myself am not a soldier). Influential personalities include military/political leaders as well as pure politicians.

Walid Jumblatt and Amin al-Jumayyil, for example, both have political influence, with or without weapons. Armed as well as unarmed political leaders are willing to talk to one another, and acknowledge the importance of each other.

Under war conditions, each side rejects the other. But today, all Lebanese accept one another. This gives a true picture of the unity of the country. All of them want to come together, from the pulpit and from behind the barricades.

[Question] Will the obstacles which blocked the way of a prime minister of activists, also block the way of a president of national reconciliation in 1982?

[Answer] People are afraid of that, but, God willing, the matter will not be like that. I believe that there are activists who believe in the preservation of the legitimate political machinery, and who would prevent a constitutional vacuum from developing. I am one of those who believe that a vacuum will absolutely not occur, and that the idea of a government of activists will materialize in due course and prevail until that time [when a new president is due to be elected].

#### Arab Disunion

[Question] What do you suggest the Arabs should do to confront two dangerous situations: the judaization of Jerusalem and the effort to judaize the south [of Lebanon]?

[Answer] Why do the Arabs find the judaization of Jerusalem strange? Israel was created to do that, and judaized Palestine before Jerusalem.

There is terrible Arab disunity. The proof is to be seen in the peripheral, regional conflicts. In the opinion of every Arab citizen, the issues involved in these conflicts are completely insignificant when compared to the idea of the establishment of Israel.

I have never seen such a shameful, disgraceful, most impotent resolution as the "Jerusalem Committee's" resolution to boycott the nations that move their embassies from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This resolution will be cursed by future generations.

The Arabs have disregarded the reality of what is happening. Two years ago, I said in the Chamber of Deputies: "All Arab League nations have paid a price for independence. Some of them paid with 10,000 martyrs, and some with 100,000. Then came Algeria which paid the price of a million martyrs, not a million pounds, or a million protests, or a million statements."

Palestine has a price. When the Arabs decide to pay it Palestine will return to them.

As for judaization of the south [of Lebanon], it is a part of Palestine's judaization. A quick look at the history of Israel and the nature of Zionism shows us that they have expansionist ambitions. We should have prepared for that a long time ago. The Palestinian weapon is a legal weapon, because it is the way conducive to the payment of the price.

The Arabs did not only lose Palestine. They also lost Egypt, and are losing the south.

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## CURRENT UNREST IN TRIPOLI ANALYZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUNALI in Arabic 1-7 Sep 80 pp 13-14

[Article: "Fighting in Tripoli: Is It the Turn of the North After the South?"]

[Text] Fighting has broken out unexpected'y in the streets of Tripoli. It is true that the atmosphere of the northern capital was charged, but incidents occurred as if they were timed to match the general political climate.

Last week, President Sarkis met with one of his senior security officials, who is considered among the most prominent candidates to form a new government. They reviewed together the various phases of the effort to form a new government, and the difficulties still in the way of forming a government of minimal effectiveness. This follows the failure to form a government of maximum effectiveness, that is, a government of political activists, or a government of reconciliation and high aspirations.

The two men reviewed the political positions. Then, President Sarkis expressed his fears that security breakdowns might recur in certain sensitive areas, blocking all attempts to extricate the country from its present crisis.

The president's fears were justified. Last week was marked by security incidents extending from the south, where the matter has become the norm; to Jabal Lubnan, where explosive conditions have returned; to the north, where fighting has erupted in Tripoli this time, accompanied by direct clashes with "the deterrent forces." Perhaps the common denominator of the scattered disturbances throughout Lebanon, was the falling of many dead and wounded, the destruction of property, the escalation of the wave of terror, and the emergence of new obstacles in the path of [pacification] moves by several Lebanese who have become involved in current developments without their knowing it.

### War of City Districts

Perhaps the thing that disturbed officials most last week was the bloody clashes in Tripoli. These took place between the districts of Ba'l Muhsn al-'Ali, al-Tabbanih, al-Qubbi, Ba'l al-Saraqbi and al-Mankub. These clashes were almost sectarian in character, especially as migrations [separating the sects] have registered a noticeable increase.

The clashes shut down all parts of the city of Tripoli, which was already experiencing a severe food crisis. Bakeries were closed down, and vegetables and fruit were unsaleable, because the markets were closed. Electricity was cut off in the city, and terror stalked its streets, to the sound of bullets and explosions. The local heroes of "popular resistance" in the various districts regained the roles, for which they had been waiting for a long time. Many districts have been closed to strangers.

The dangerous direction in the course of events in Tripoli became more and more manifest when Syrian forces operating as deterrent forces, were exposed to sniper and militia fire resulting in a number of casualties. This was regarded as a serious development.

Severe fighting broke out continuously over a 3 day period, during which there were more than 25 killed and scores wounded. All attempts to stop the firing failed. The chief of intelligence of the Syrian forces operating in Lebanon, Col Muhammad Ghanim, and "Abu al-Hul," member of Fatah's central committee, went to Tripoli, and together attempted for 2 consecutive days to arrange a cease-fire, the withdrawal of militias, and the removal of barricades. Finally, they were able to achieve an uneasy calm in most of the city's districts--with the exception of al-Qubbi and al-Tabbani and their environs--in exchange for a fresh deployment of deterrent troops, a better definition of their role, and certain "guarantees" requested by the militias in the districts.

#### A Power Struggle

In spite of the relative calm obtaining in the city in the days that followed this agreement, Lebanese security authorities still fear that it is the calm before the storm, because the causes of the recent fighting have not been dealt with in depth. The mistake, as security authorities themselves say, was to view the incidents as "individual disputes" or as the result of "behavior of undisciplined elements." These authorities believe that it is the behavior of certain leadership elements, created by the war, which caused the problems, created estrangement, and induced the Tripolitans to demand that the army be deployed to separate the belligerents. A delegation was even sent to visit former Premier Rashid Karami, at his summer resort, to ask him to see to it that the army is deployed.

A report received by Lebanese security indicates that a struggle for power between two factions is behind the Tripoli incidents. Both of them want to monopolize the support of the Tripolitans who, apparently, want their leadership to be in the hands of residents of the city and its leaders.

The report notes that the cease-fire was arranged only after an understanding was reached between the Syrian command and the Palestinian Resistance, which sent "Abu al-Hul" to settle the matter. The report acknowledges that the situation in Tripoli is very complicated. There are groups which support political parties. Others favor other types of organizations, which causes some difficulty in determining each faction's loyalty.

During the negotiations conducted to establish the cease-fire between the parties' militias, the Syrian side emphasized that "deterrence" applied to all, and that the Syrian force did not enter Tripoli years ago in order to side with one faction

against another. On the contrary, its mission is to maintain the city's security, and it will not allow anyone to try to use it, so as to undertake activities which do not serve security and stability.

Observers fear that the Tripoli incidents will be a fore-runner of continuous tension in the north. However, there are those who believe that the Tripolitarians' desire to overcome these incidents remains strong, and that contacts are under way to end the tension, eliminate the consequences of the disputes, do away with those who have caused the alienation and take another look at the activity of the security system in the city, so as to make it more effective.

It remains to be said that officials fear that security disruptions in the north may become chronic. If tension does not originate in Batrun and its environs, or in the heights of Jubayl, it is likely to develop in Tripoli and its suburbs. And if these two fronts simmer down, incidents are likely to break out in 'Akkar.

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## ANTI-QADHDHAFI STUDENTS IN U.S. ISSUE STATEMENT

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 10 Sep 80 p 6

[Article: "Important Statement by Libyan Students in United States; Leaflets Circulated Against al-Qadhdhafi, 'the New Mussolini of Libya'"]

[Text] The Federation of Libyan Students in the United States has circulated an important statement against Col al-Qadhdhafi, the dictator, or "the new Mussolini of Libya," as the students call him. The students reveal in the statement the policy of repression, terrorism and assassinations which he has been following against the forces of the national opposition. The statement says the following about the Libyan students' movement:

"The Libyan Students' Movement in the United States of America has decided through its organizational committee to carry out a protest demonstration against the nest of crime--which used to be called Libyan Embassy--in the United States. When the students carry out this demonstration and when they sit in front of the embassy building, they will be expressing their dissatisfaction with the conduct of al-Qadhdhafi's regime. The purpose of our demonstration is to reject the policy of 'Libya's new Mussolini.' This is the policy revealed by al-Qadhdhafi's recent conduct. It became evident in the bargains he tried to strike with the students and with the forces of the national opposition as well as in his promises, threats, intimidations and inducements.

"On the basis of our faith in God, in our homeland, in the fight and in the struggle of our people, and because of our awareness of our responsibility towards the questions that are of interest to our people, we proclaim the following:

"First, we strongly reject the chaotic, terrorist regime and its repressive measures, and we join those who struggle for and champion the cause of freedom everywhere in the world in asking that they boycott Libya's illegitimate regime. We call upon all nationalist forces to work for the overthrow of this regime.

"Second, we ask for the release of all political prisoners and detainees, who are currently being subjected to the worst forms of torture, subjugation and mistreatment in al-Qadhdhafi's prisons and detention camps.

"Third, we affirm our solidarity with our people in Libya and abroad, and we pledge to God and to the homeland that the day when we will be united is near.

"Fourth, the students, through their organizational committee, reject all the bargains which the Libyan regime is trying to offer. They see these bargains as nothing but attempts by the Libyan regime to gain time.

"We express in this statement our regrets, our sympathies and our condolences to the families of the fighters who have sacrificed their lives for God and for the homeland, and we remind them of what God Almighty said: 'You must not think that those who were slain in the cause of Allah are dead. They are alive, and well provided for by their Lord.'"

In a previous statement, the Federation of Libyan Students had warned the students against the assassination attempts and the liquidations being carried out by al-Qadhdhafi's teams. The security instructions were [as follows]:

1. Every student residing in the United States has the right to own a personal weapon to defend himself. He may keep that weapon in his home or in his private car, and he has the right to use it, provided he observes the laws of every state.
2. Packages or parcels containing explosives may be used against the students. Accordingly, it is advisable to take security measures with regard to the sender of these packages or parcels, and to check with the police department in the city or the state when there is doubt.

The union distributed leaflets and posters against al-Qadhdhafi in New York, Washington and other state capitals. The bulletins carried al-Qadhdhafi's picture, and stated that he was wanted for murder and for kidnapping.

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## TWO LIBYAN DISSIDENTS FLEE TO EGYPT, ASSAIL QADHDHAFI'S REGIME

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 16 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Ahmad al-Jundi: "Two Young Men from Libya Escape to Egypt"]

[Text] It is the hope of any person anywhere to live and to die in his homeland. When a person thinks of escaping from his country, this simply means that life in his country is tantamount to death. Free people at all times and in every place consider death a lesser evil than life in fear, terror and resentment.

Two young Libyan men escaped from al-Qadhdhafi's purgatory, and sought refuge in Egypt. They broke through the armed blockade on the Libyan borders. After a harrowing adventure with the colonel's reconnaissance troops, they disappeared in the desert for three nights. They traveled 1,950 kilometers without water and without food until they reached the Egyptian borders.

The two escapees, Hamad Salih Zayd, a university student, and Muhammad 'Ali Nasr, a driver, announced that they took these risks, because life in Libya was like death. They said that al-Qadhdhafi's opponents were everywhere in Libya, even in the revolutionary committees which are dear to the colonel. They said that there were 82 prisons in Libya, 14 underground detention camps, 10,000 prisoners and a day for revenge.

They said, "Don't believe Libya's broadcasts. The Libyans use devices to amplify the sounds of cheers." They said that al-Qadhdhafi claimed to be austere, but that he owned a yacht that cost 70 million dollars; that his airplane cost 150 million dollars; and that he had spent 2 million dollars for his son's circumcision. Members of al-Qadhdhafi's family are now among the wealthiest people in Libya; they had been among its poorest tribes.

They said that the Libyan citizen was living in a purgatory, and that he was being subjected to terrorism and tyranny everywhere and at all times.

They affirmed that the Libyan people had grievances against the regime of al-Qadhdhafi, and that they were getting ready to attack it sooner or later. No one [in Libya] has any sense of his human nature. Every citizen feels that his home, his children, his livelihood and his life are being threatened. The Libyan has lost his dignity, his sense of security and his honor, and his fate is now subject to the mood of the members of the popular committees which include the rabble, the unemployed, the illiterate and the ignorant.

### Resentment Towards al-Sadat

They said that al-Qadhdhafi harbored [a feeling of] resentment against Egypt, and against al-Sadat in particular, because al-Sadat had broken al-Qadhdhafi's insane ambition to lead the Arab nation. Al-Qadhdhafi's insanity had led him to believe that he would have been capable of realizing this ambition with the funds of the Libyan people.

They said that al-Qadhdhafi was not a suitable ruler, because he was afflicted with schizophrenia, megalomania and hate. The Libyan people know that. Despite the violence and the terror they will not surrender; this regime will be overthrown, and al-Qadhdhafi will meet his inevitable destiny.

### Details of the Adventure

Libyan student Hamad Salih Zayd narrated the details of the escape adventure.

He said, "We knew it would be risky. Al-Qadhdhafi knows that any Libyan citizen would like to escape from Libya to Egypt, because it is the only country where a foreigner can feel safe and immune from vengeance. We thought of escaping to Greece, Italy, London or Germany, but we changed our minds after al-Qadhdhafi's agents went to these countries and murdered those who opposed his regime. We decided to escape to Egypt.

### The Risk or Death

"As I said, we knew it would be a risk that may end in death. Al-Qadhdhafi had placed an armed blockade along the desert and the Libyan-Egyptian borders to prevent any attempt by any Libyan citizen to escape. We also knew that reconnaissance patrols patrolled the area regularly around the clock. We had to observe their movements and their schedules, and we were helped in this by a member of the popular committee in Benghazi. They gave us accurate information about the areas where the patrols pass; they gave us their schedules and they also gave us a simple map which we committed to memory lest it fall into the hands of any patrol.

"It was risky even if we supposed that we would not be captured by the reconnaissance patrols. We had to travel in the desert, without a map, on a sandy road that had no signs to show direction for a distance of 1,950 kilometers. Every day many travelers who travel on a similar desert road that is only 250 kilometers long from Benghazi to al-Jalu lose their lives [during the journey]. We were facing the possibility of death, but we did not hesitate because the risk meant deliverance from humiliation, degradation and threats of death at every instant, but the risk meant the hope of escape, of arriving in Egypt and of being rid of the evil of this insane al-Qadhdhafi and his aides."

The Libyan student who escaped from al-Qadhdhafi went on relating the details of the adventure.



## With the Assistance of the Revolutionary Committees

"We prepared everything 3 months before the zero hour which was 1 a.m. on 5 August 1980. We had concealed this matter even from our closest relatives; only two members of the popular committee in Benghazi knew of our plan. Muhammad and I had planned to drive the car he operates, which is a Toyota Landrover that can be driven in the desert and on sandy roads. The problem, however, was to provide the gas that was necessary for this long distance. Al-Qadhdhafi's orders were that no one was to be given a permit [to purchase] more than 60 liters of gas so that he could ensure the failure of any attempt to escape by car. The distance between the area of al-Kafrah in south Libya and the Egyptian borders requires at least 1,000 liters of gas. We contacted a friend who was a member of one of the revolutionary committees--we knew he was one of those who detested the regime despite the fact that he showed support for it. He promised that he would do what he could to give us a few permits. Muhammad contacted another member of the revolutionary committee in Benghazi whose acquaintance he had made previously during a trip in the car he was driving. He had discovered that that person hated al-Qadhdhafi but that he had felt compelled to join the people's committee so he can have the privileges that its members have. Muhammad succeeded in persuading that man to give him a few permits to purchase gas. We were thus able to provide the quantity that was necessary.

## In the Direction of the Sun

"On the night of the escape each one of us told the members of his family that we were going to Benghazi to purchase clothing, and the adventure began. We turned towards the east. We had only one canteen of water and food for two meals only. We did not want anyone to suspect that we were going on a longer journey. After 3 hours we saw one of the reconnaissance patrols at some distance so we turned off our headlights and we waited until dawn. We began to move towards the sun just as the member of the revolutionary council had advised us. We traveled about 400 kilometers and suddenly we saw another patrol. We hid quickly beside one of the sand dunes and we were about half a kilometer from the patrol. We thought that we had been discovered, and there were moments of unlimited terror. Muhammad told me, 'If they come close to us, we will have to commit suicide. Death is a lesser evil than being arrested. Our fate will be the same if they capture us, except that if they do, we will die after being mercilessly tortured.'

"We recited the opening verses of the Koran and the Moslem creed and we waited. God preserved us; no one had seen us; and the patrol disappeared. We resumed the adventure until night fell and then we waited until dawn so we would not lose our way.

## A Day Without Problems

"The following day went by without any problems. We had traveled a long distance in the desert. We began to feel exhausted after we ran out of food and water, but every kilometer that we traveled brought us closer to life. We continued our journey with the dawn of the third day, and we began to sense danger. We were approaching the borders which were regularly monitored by airplane reconnaissance patrols. But, fortunately, not a single airplane went by, and we approached the borders and gave ourselves up to the Egyptian police authorities. We thanked God that we had arrived in Egypt, the safe refuge for every Arab."



### A Hypocrite and an Atheist

The Libyan student went on to say, "No one understands the conduct of this mad man al-Qadhdhafi. But he is a hypocrite, an atheist, a liar and a wicked, malicious swindler. All the people know this about him. He pretends in front of the people that he is indifferent to worldly goods and that he only wants to live in a tent, but the people know that he spent 2 million dollars to marry the Tunisian Jew Mishka Hasanayn. The people know that al-Qadhdhafi has two palaces on the island of Corfu in Italy and that he owns two yachts, one of them is the al-Mahrusah which cost 70 million dollars. Everything that the colonel touches in that yacht is made of gold.

"Al-Qadhdhafi's Boeing airplane cost more than 150 million dollars of the people's money. The people are now suffering from need. No one in Libya now owns more than 100 dinars."

### Everything Is Out of Commission

"People in Libya now are suffering from the lack of production everywhere. The farms are managed by the state, and this has led to diminishing harvests. We are now importing everything from abroad. About 300,000 Libyans immigrated from Libya in 1977, and restrictions, therefore, were placed on immigration. But by then all the producers had actually immigrated, and there were no more new projects. Everything has come to a standstill.

"There are now 82 prisons in Libya; these were built by al-Qadhdhafi after the revolution. Before then there were only two prisons in Libya. Libya has 14 underground detention camps. There are more than 10,000 prisoners in the prisons and the detention camps. Every day hundreds of innocent people are arrested simply because they did not march in the support demonstrations or because they stayed away from the celebrations that al-Qadhdhafi holds so he can deliver his speeches and explain his theories which no one understands."

### A Day for Revenge

The Libyan student asked, "Have you ever heard of a ruler, no matter how insane or unjust he was, who sets a day for revenge? Al-Qadhdhafi did that. He declared the 7th of April of every year to be liquidation day or revenge day, so he can get rid of his opponents, those whose loyalty is suspect, those who disobey his instructions and those who have renounced the Green Theory.

"All values and principles are being violated in al-Qadhdhafi's administration. These violations are almost sacrilegious. Homes and wedding parties are attacked, and women's jewelry confiscated. Girls' revolutionary committees have the right to enter any home or any public place and confiscate all the money and jewelry that women and girls have.

"One cannot find a gloomier picture of life anywhere in the world that is worse than the picture one finds in Libya now.

"The Libyan people feel they are oppressed. It is the sense of oppression that creates revolutions. Therefore, there is much hope that the people will rebel against this insane oppressor."

## Strong Opposition

The second young Libyan man, Muhammad 'Ali Nasr, spoke and added the following to what his colleague had said:

"There is a strong opposition in Libya, but it is under the surface. Al-Qadhdhafi's opposition can be found even in the revolutionary committees in Benghazi, in Tripoli and everywhere.

"Libya's voices abroad are heard everywhere. There are those who hear those voices, sympathize with them and support them. The feeling that there is a strong opposition abroad strengthens the will of the opposition in Libya and encourages them to prepare themselves to get rid of al-Qadhdhafi.

"Do not believe what is broadcast by the Libyan media. Sound amplifiers are used in any broadcast of al-Qadhdhafi's conferences to amplify the limited cheers that are made by his followers who are members of the revolutionary committees and the workers who are rounded up from the factories so that the cheers would sound tremendous and resounding. Do not believe this: there is a resistance in Libya and an opposition; they are growing continuously, and they are making plans to confront al-Qadhdhafi."

Muhammad 'Ali Nasr went on to say: "Al-Qadhdhafi's tribe is now called in Libya the al-Damm tribe [the tribe of blood]. Sayyid, Hasan and Ahmad al-Qadhdhafi as well as Khalifah Hasanayn and other tribesmen will do anything to obtain a fortune.

"Al-Qadhdhafi's tribe was one of the poorest tribes in Libya, but it is now one of the wealthiest. Meanwhile, the ordinary Libyan citizen is denied the right to own his own home.

"On the day he left London Sayyid al-Qadhdhafi spent 2 million dollars for his farewell party."

## Reasons for Unity

"Is there a rational ruler who would pay billions of dollars for a unity between two countries, one of them is in the east and the other is in the west of the Arab homeland? Is not this madness and stupidity? But al-Asad knows al-Qadhdhafi's nature, and he wants to take from him as many dinars as he can in return for a paper unity. However, al-Qadhdhafi, imagines that he can get rid of the officers and soldiers who oppose him. He would send all those who oppose him into exile from Libya to Syria under the slogan of unity; the reverse of that is also true.

"Libya's funds are being spend on Uganda, Lebanon and Syria while the people have no money to pave the al-Kafrah Road in Benghazi where hundreds of travelers die every day.

"The fact that the people are aware of all this will ultimately lead to a revolution against oppression, terror and insanity."

### Do You Have an Explanation?

I asked the two young escapees from Libya, "Do you have an explanation for a personality that combines all these characteristics: insanity, resentment, falsehood, hypocrisy, bloodthirstiness, oppression, injustice and a notion that he is the first, the most rational and the most deserving of rulers to lead the Arab nation?"

"Do you have an explanation for the conduct of a man who opened his country to the experts, weapons, agents and bases of communists even though his attack on communism was the most violent attack to which a theory was subjected?"

"Do you have an explanation for the conduct of a man who claimed that the bases of his regime were the foundation of the Islamic religion, but who had the audacity to infringe upon the prophet who brought the message of this religion?"

"Do you have an explanation for the conduct of a man who squanders the funds of his people in hunting down those who oppose him and appeasing those who praise him?"

"We do not understand the conduct of a personality with these components, a personality in which all these defects, complexes and contradictions come together. Have you in Libya found a persuasive explanation for the conduct of this al-Qadhdhafi?"

The Libyan university student responded to my question: "No. We too in Libya have not yet found an explanation. Al-Qadhdhafi is a sick man, and he needs psychotherapy. It is certain that all psychologists would find it extremely difficult to remedy such a bestial disposition. The disease has taken so much hold of him, therapy may be very difficult."

### Truthful Testimony

The conversation with the two young men who escaped al-Qadhdhafi's purgatory went on and on, but we eventually ran out of time.

There was one statement that the two young men wanted to make: "It is being rumored in Libya that all those who come to Egypt are persecuted and treated in the worst possible fashion. But the truth must be said, and we want everyone in Libya to hear it. We found nothing in Egypt but affection, security and peace. We found life without fear and without terror. We asked for political asylum in Egypt, and the authorities granted us our request. They offered us every possible assistance so we can live like any Egyptian citizen living in his homeland."

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MINISTER NOTES GOVERNMENT'S AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS, POLICIES

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 26, 27-28 Sep 80

[Interview with Mohamed Ould Amar, minister of rural development; date and place not given]

[26 Sep 80, p 3]

[Text] At its October 1979 meeting, the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) resolved, within the framework of the priority granted to the rural sector, to set up an agricultural loan fund and establish an organization in charge of putting the institution into operation.

The government, which was in charge of the study and resolution of these questions, has just examined and adopted a communication presented by the Ministry of Rural Development concerning a report on agricultural credit and the organization of the marketing of farm products.

We therefore met with Mohamed Ould Amar, minister of rural development, who defined the meaning and scope of that important decision for us.

[Question] At its latest meeting, the Council of Ministers approved a report on agricultural credit and the organization of the marketing of farm products. Can you tell us the main lines of that report?

[Answer] The Council of Ministers examined and adopted a communication presented by my ministry on 13 September 1980.

That communication dealt with the conclusions and recommendations of the report on agricultural credit drafted by a group of experts organized under the aegis of the Ministry of Rural Development in application of a decision made by the Military Committee for National Salvation at its October 1979 meeting.

Within the framework of the priority granted to the rural sector as proclaimed by the CMSN at that same session, the establishment of an agricultural credit fund and an organization in charge of putting that institution in operation was decided upon.



The government was in charge of the study and resolution of these questions, as elements in a national strategy to promote rural activities whose essential objectives had been defined. In the long run, those objectives are: self-sufficiency in food, the return to and settlement of the people in their native regions, and finally, the rehabilitation and protection of the natural environment.

These objectives are obviously important and ambitious.

It is in fact necessary for our country to be able to meet its needs for food as soon as possible. During the period of the drought and throughout the difficulties we have faced, friendly countries and organizations have lent us their aid in a generous and useful fashion.

But equally urgent needs exist elsewhere in the world and it could happen that in the eyes of the donors, food crises in Asia or other regions of Africa, for example, might be considered to have priority over the Sahel countries. One can easily imagine what the consequences would be under the present circumstances.

This is a possibility that the government wishes to bear in mind.

This gives their full meaning to the basic option (priority to the rural sector) and to accompanying measures taken or being drafted in order to translate this option into fact.

I would point here to an immediate measure being taken by the government: the establishment of a reserve or emergency supply of grain that would ward off the grave, widespread scarcities of food products. These stocks should be backed by others whose role would be to ensure regulation of the market in the case of limited regional scarcities.

Nevertheless, stimulation of national production remains the cornerstone of the government's action in this field.

Naturally, agricultural water projects that are to be launched before the end of the year (Gorgol Noi, Aftout, 30 small village perimeters) will help increase production, as will dams in the interior of the country (some 30 dams a year during the Fourth Plan) and the deep wells drilled (30 a year during the 5 years of the plan).

But it is the expected improvements in yield of the so-called traditional crops (rain crops and flood crops) that will make it possible to limit the grain deficit in the coming years.

One of the factors limiting the development of production has to date been precisely the absence of production incentives because of the failure to provide access to farm loans for seasonal expenses or the purchase of production equipment, the lack of marketing structures for surpluses and the absence of guaranteed farm prices.

These are the elements that the experts took up. They recommended the following to the government: 1) the establishment of a farm loan institution; 2) the promotion of professional structures; 3) the adaptation of specialized organizations to the task of supplying consumable expenditures and the necessary production



factors for the development of rural production; 4) the reorganization of collection and the processing of farm products; and 5) the establishment of mechanisms for the setting and guaranteeing of farm prices and the marketing of production.

The resources of the farm credit fund have been defined, along with terms for their use. In this connection, particular emphasis has been placed on the solvency of loan applicants and on the security they offer, solvency linked to an appropriate environment that must be created and promoted through the reactivation of agricultural cooperation and the dissemination of improved farming techniques.

The farm credit fund must cover seasonal (short-term) credits and medium-term investment operations. Credit for development operations is not planned until a later phase.

The weakness of the current cooperative system requires that a specialized organization play the role of central purchaser in order to ensure supplies to farmers and livestock breeders. The nature and volume of such operations will be determined together with professional structures.

This organization, which could be the OMC [Mauritanian Grain Office] or a structure having the same vocation, must assume the task of collecting debts from recipient cooperatives and act as intermediary between the FND [National Development Fund] and the cooperatives.

Initially, two or three regions with high agricultural development potential will serve as test zones.

The recruiting of farmers and livestock breeders will be more dense there in order to take the projected operations into account. It will be done by a multidisciplinary team at the level of agricultural sectors and livestock inspectorates.

At the central level, it is recommended that a full extension service oriented toward production be set up.

The role of the services in the rural sector is defined in the phase of implementation of agricultural credit, along with accompanying measures such as the supplying of production elements and equipment, the collection and marketing of farm surpluses, control and technical support.

Finally, a schedule for the startup of operations is planned.

[Question] Mr Minister, can you tell us how the farmers will be able to take advantage of the farm credit? Will they do so through the National Development Fund?

[Answer] The farm credit fund's role is to aid farmers and livestock breeders in their production efforts. But their lack of organization, scattering and low technical level constitute a definite handicap that we are forced to take into consideration in the drafting of principles and terms for the farm credit fund. This fund, whose resources are limited, aims to help the largest possible number of our nationals.

For these reasons, the precooperative groupings and the cooperatives will be the privileged beneficiaries of the fund. The reorganized professional farm organizations which the government would like to encourage will be totally different from those that existed before and that mainly enabled their leaders to justify government demands.

From now on, the cooperatives must have statutes and conform to them. They must work with government officials in drafting activity programs whose execution will be supervised, at least with respect to those receiving financial aid from the government.

Private parties who have demonstrated that they are involved in continuing agricultural production activities and that they have made significant personal financial efforts will also be able to receive credit.

The agricultural credit fund is a branch of the National Development Fund which also includes a branch of activity for the development of small and medium-size enterprises and a third branch for exclusively social housing.

[Question] Among the problems facing those who would like to get involved in agriculture is the lack of means and absence of technical assistance. Mr Minister, do you believe that with the establishment of this agricultural credit fund, these problems will be solved?

[Answer] The agricultural credit fund will definitely make it possible to help nationals truly desirous of getting involved in agricultural production or livestock raising. The credit to which they will have access will enable them to meet expenses and purchase the machinery they need for their activities.

However, one must not expect that all Mauriticians will have their finance problems settled immediately.

As I said, the government intends to give certain privileges to cooperatives, along with serious, disciplined, motivated farmers who see government aid as an accompaniment to their personal efforts.

[27-28 Sep 80, p 3]

[Text] In the first part of the exclusive interview which he granted us, Minister of Rural Development Ahmed Ould Amar defined the context within which, at its most recent meeting, the Council of Ministers adopted the report on agricultural credit and the organization of the marketing of farm products.

After citing the main suggestions made by experts within the framework of that report, the minister described the major advantages which farmers may derive from agricultural credit.

The problem of financing projects, which constitutes a serious obstacle to rural development, the dispute involving SONADER [National Rural Development Company] and landowners over the question of land and the launching of projects in Aftout Es-Saheli: These are the main questions taken up by the minister in the last part of the interview.

## Problem of Financing: Obstacle to Rural Development

[Question] One of the most serious obstacles facing major agricultural projects is the lack of financing. In your opinion, how is this problem going to be solved?

[Answer] The problem of financing the projects is definitely a major obstacle to rural development. Like many Third World countries, our nation is experiencing difficulties due to the absence or insufficiency of equipment and operating credits. But the financial factor is nevertheless not decisive in the development process.

We know of countries with considerable financial resources and which are not developed. The absorption of financing faces other countries in terms of their human, institutional and administrative deficiencies.

Mauritania is trying to make up for a lack of resources by the quality of its personnel, by its search for the most economical solutions and above all, by the mobilization of national production forces. Finally, it is seeking to improve the effectiveness of its administration.

We can count on the aid of our Arab brothers and friendly countries and organizations for the completion of major projects and for the acquisition of equipment and infrastructure necessary to the development of our economy.

But we can and must make internal efforts, using our own resources. The institution of a regional development fund starting this year and of an agricultural production campaign constitute important steps on this path.

## Land Problems

[Question] For some time, SONADER has faced certain difficulties due to the demands of land owners. Mr Minister, have we succeeded in solving the land problem at that level?

[Answer] I would point out that SONADER is having no difficulties due to the situation in the pilot Gorgol perimeter. SONADER ensured recruiting at the request of the government. It is now up to the government to clarify things and to make farm owners and operators aware of its intentions.

It was the right of the people involved to spell out their real desires. Instead of that, both sides have continued to duck the essential problems, which are the appropriation of land, the method of developing the land and mutual obligations. They were trying to gain time. Politics became involved and the search for reasonable solutions was complicated.

The current situation helps no one. The landowners believe they have suffered injury and the government, which invested very large sums in the operation, received neither the anticipated political nor social advantages.

The experience of the Gorgol pilot area revealed the urgent need for a suitable legal framework for government intervention in development operations in which public development funds are to be invested.

A committee of experts is now working under the aegis of the ministry on an overall proposal for the settlement of land problems throughout the national territory.

[Question] What measures have been taken to guarantee the marketing of agricultural products? Will this task be entrusted to an establishment?

[Answer] The marketing of agricultural products will determine the success of the entire policy in the rural sector.

It is marketing that will provide the farmers and livestock breeders with profits, encouraging them to remain on their land and undertake production activities.

It constitutes the guaranteed reimbursement of loans granted by the agricultural credit fund.

In our plan, the OMC and the operator to be set up in the area of livestock raising must buy agricultural and livestock surpluses and ensure their marketing in regions where there are shortages.

Rice will be bought by SONIMEX [expansion unknown]. Purchase prices to the producer will be set by the government for every agricultural season.

Professional organizations of farmers and livestock breeders will also be able to sell their production freely, except for the portion reserved to cover the reimbursement of possible loans to the agricultural credit fund.

Aftout Es-Saheli

[Question] For some time, there has been talk of agricultural projects in the Aftout Es-Saheli region, at Tamourjt Naaj, R'Kiz, and so on. What has happened so far?

[Answer] The situation is as follows:

Aftout Es-Saheli

The plan for the first portion of the project, to wit, the intake, channels, the four closing dikes and the experimental farm, is now ready.

The prefeasibility study has been completed for the development of an area measuring 10,000 to 14,000 hectares and for the Nouakchott-Afout water supply.

Our Iraqi brothers did agree to finance the first portion of the project for an amount of 2 billion UM [Mauritanian ouguiya] at the time of the official visit of the president of the CMSN and chief of state to that country.

My departments are now working with Iraqi experts on terms for implementation of the project, which they hope will begin early in 1981.

Lake R'Kiz

The study for the development has been completed. It presents several options, including one providing for 5,200 hectares of crops irrigated by means of gravity



and grazing areas irrigated by floods ranging from 1,650 hectares (for Diama alone) to 2,950 hectares (if both Diama and Manantali are in service).

Financing of this project, whose cost is 1.2 billion UM, is being sought from Saudi Arabia and France.

Tamourt Enaj

This project includes two main phases: the development of 10 irrigated areas by drilling deep wells, totaling 80 hectares. Eight of the 10 wells have already been completed.

Financing for this portion is being obtained from France (CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation]).

The second phase includes the development of an irrigated area of 1,000 hectares. An additional 800 hectares will be prepared for flood crops. The schedule is ready.

Financing is being sought from the Federal Republic of Germany within the framework of the overall development project for Tagant.

[Question] Mr Minister, have you any appeal to make during this rainy season?

[Answer] Quite simply, I should like to tell my fellow countrymen who are farmers and livestock breeders that the CMSN and the government are making major efforts in their behalf in order to improve their living and working conditions. These efforts are certainly not enough, but they are truly meritorious given the current situation of our economy, our public finances and the other sectors of national activity.

Our livestock breeders and farmers must continue to deserve the attention of the government because of their serious efforts and work.

During the current rainy season, all fields must be cultivated. The pasture land we have this year must be protected from brush fires. Trees must be protected from abusive cutting which has disastrous consequences for our environment and that of our children.

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## MAURITANIA

### EEC AID FOR DAM RESERVOIR AT FOUM GLEITA

London WEST AFRICA in English 20 Oct 80 pp 2092, 2093

[Text]

The EEC is to provide 9.5m. ECU to help to build and develop a dam reservoir at Fom Gleita in Mauritania. The total cost of the scheme which also includes developing a surrounding area of 3,600 ha, is estimated at 68m. ECU. Aid is also expected from the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Abu Dhabi Fund and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

The Fom Gleita dam will be built in the Gorgol Noir Valley, a tributary of the Senegal river. Agriculture in the area suffers from infrequent and irregular rainfall, and the development of irrigation in the country is seen as the only means of reducing its substantial dependence on external aid for national food requirements.

Development of the area should allow for the production of 26,800 tonnes of cereals, and 2,400 tonnes of vegetables. Rice will be the main crop grown in the area, with an output of 21,900 tonnes of paddy, 10,200 tonnes of which will be processed and marketed. This is equal to one-third of the amount of imported rice at the moment. The

project will also mean an output of 2,800 tonnes of maize and 2,100 tonnes of sorghum. This will mean that the region, with a population of 162,000, will be self-supporting as regards foodstuffs and any surplus can therefore be marketed in other regions of Mauritania.

Work on the dam is expected to be completed in about thirty months.

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## BRIEFS

DEFICIENT RAINFALL--Aioun (AMP)--The agricultural situation in Hodh El Gharbi is generally unsatisfactory because of the irregular rainfall and its poor distribution throughout the region. This announcement was made by the head of the agricultural sector in Aioun and picked up by the regional AMP correspondent. Two departments: Kobenni and Tintane, have had satisfactory rainfall, the official said, indicating that the amount received in the two areas is 135.5 and 208.5 millimeters respectively, compared with 300 last year. The Department of Aioun received only 70.07 compared with 250 in 1979 and in Tamchakett, the situation is even worse, as only 28.1 millimeters of rain have fallen. Although rain crops are developing normally in Kobenni and Tintane, the same is not true in the rest of the region, the agricultural official noted. [Text] [Nouakchott CHAAB in French 26 Sep 80 p 8] 11,464

CSO: 4400

## VISIT OF SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSED

## Anticipated Results of Visit

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 13 Oct 80 pp 1, 3

[Article by Mohamed Tamri: "To Strengthen the Cooperation Between Rabat and Madrid on Healthy and Solid Foundations"]

[Text] The arrival in Morocco of Perez Llorca, the Spanish Foreign Affairs minister, cannot fail to revive the Spanish-Moroccan cooperation. The visit comes at a time when our country, in the opinion of all neutral observers, is in control of the military situation in the Sahara, at a time when the Spanish government is showing that it is firmly opposed to all pressure and all blackmail aimed at forcing it to recognize the POLISARIO mercenaries or their ghostly republic. It also comes at a time when the growing interest aroused in both governments by the plan to build a permanent link through the Straits of Gibraltar leads us to expect greater rapprochement between Morocco and Spain. Finally, the visit of the head of Spanish diplomacy is directly connected to the prospects for improving bilateral cooperation, especially in the field of fishing.

Until recently there was talk of the psychological barrier that underlay the many misunderstandings between Morocco and Spain, and of the paucity of human contacts between the leaders of the two countries. In fact many mistakes were made on both sides. In our opinion the first mistake stems directly from the refusal of certain Spanish leaders to assume their responsibilities and fulfill their commitments. The first big mistake was recorded shortly after the signing of the tripartite Madrid accord, according to whose terms the Spanish government cedes the Sahara back to Morocco. When the accord was signed we heard three highly-placed Spanish leaders say that "they are washing their hands of us, we have transferred the administration but we have not transferred the sovereignty." A bad-faith, self-satisfied answer, for it is obvious that Spain has given that sovereignty to someone, and also, the tripartite Madrid accord makes no distinction between the two ideas.

Happily for both our countries, we are not guided by bad faith in taking our respective positions. Proof of this is the firm attitude of the Spanish government and its entire political class in the face of the Algerian mercenaries' blackmail. Madrid's reaction to the kidnapping and sequestration of Spanish citizens by the Algerian government's henchmen is exemplary and logical, far removed from any weakness and completely natural in the face of the extortions committed in the name of the people's pseudo-rights.

All of these elements may form the basic framework of a new Maghribian policy on the part of Spain, one more in conformity with its interests and taking into account the historic and legitimate rights of the Moroccan people and the dangers of general explosion brought upon North Africa by the policy of domination and expansion followed by Algeria and Libya.

#### New Orientation Foreseen

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 14 Oct 80 pp 1, 4

[Article by Abdelkrim El Andaloussi: "An 'Open Attitude' That Will Yield Neither to Pressure nor Blackmail"]

[Text] The first official visit of the Spanish Foreign Affairs minister, Jose Pedro Perez-Llorca, to a foreign country was made to Morocco. The head of Spanish diplomacy, since his appointment last 8 September has visited the United Nations headquarters in New York and the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. His visit to Morocco illustrates the Spanish government's interest in improving Spanish-Moroccan relations and strengthening bilateral cooperation.

In Morocco we published his first official statement on 9 September, when he opened in Madrid the preparatory phase of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, in which he stressed the necessity of seeking peace in freedom and cooperation. "We do not want," he said, "peace of any kind, peace at any price, we want only peace in freedom and freedom through cooperation."

His statement before the 35th General Assembly of the United Nations also revealed that he has a negotiator's mind with which to find--"with an open attitude"--solutions to the problems threatening peace in the world, and the desire to seek new formulas for cooperation with the Third World countries, the Mediterranean countries and especially the Maghrib countries.

"The Spanish government," Mr Perez-Llorca emphasized, "is attentively following the evolution of the situation in the Maghrib, with which it feels united by virtue of geographic proximity and profound historic, cultural and human ties, and we wish to preserve and develop close relations of friendship with all the Maghribian countries."

This desire, manifested by the new head of Spanish diplomacy does not surprise us, knowing that Mr Perez-Llorca is a career diplomat who is sincere and clever, and that for him only the facts count.

Who better than this young Andalusian diplomat--he was born in Cadiz in November 1940--who carries Spanish-Arab blood in his veins, can understand the justice of the cause defended by Morocco and act upon it?

"The Silver Fox," as his compatriots like to call him, who until now has avoided making statements to the press, has announced his desire to continue the policy followed by his predecessor, Marcelino Oreja, but with "an open attitude," and without yielding to external pressure or blackmail.

With regard to the Northwest African conflict that pits Algeria against Morocco and threatens Spanish interests in the region, Mr Perez-Llorca's position is clear:

"Spain has ended its presence in the territory (formerly the Spanish Sahara) and the minimal administration it exercised there until 26 February 1976.

"Spain," Mr Perez-Llorca continued, "seeks no advantages, either for itself or for anyone else," but it wants "to contribute to peace" on the basis of an "absolute impartiality" and "firm principles."

"Neither flattery nor pressure, whatever form they may take, are going to succeed in turning us away from the unaltered and consistent line we have followed," he said.

Speaking of pressure, the head of Spanish diplomacy added, "However, I must formulate my vigorous protest at the violence which, against every international standard, and regardless of human rights, is being perpetrated at this moment against innocent citizens of my country who are being used as hostages."

It is not difficult to interpret this as a clear condemnation of acts of piracy by the so-called "Polisario," which has abducted several Spanish fishermen and is holding them hostage.

According to several signs Mr Perez-Llorca seems to want to give a new orientation to Spanish policy in the Maghrib. The condemnation of the "barbarous acts" committed by the mercenaries against the Spanish fishermen, expressed by the president of the government, by the minister of Foreign Affairs and by national public opinion is very significant. Spain has suffered too much from its passivity, exploited excessively by mercenary bands armed by an Algeria that calls itself friendly. The time has come to put an end to the attacks against the prestige and interests of Spain. It can depend with every assurance on Morocco's support. We have always said that Spain must be firm in its Maghribian policy.

#### Commentary on Visit

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 16 Oct 80 p 1

[Editorial by "Al Bayane:" "Diplomatic Formalism?"]

[Text] "The mountain labored and brought forth a mouse."

This is pretty much what one would be tempted to think after the lightning 28-hour visit to our country by the Spanish minister of Foreign Affairs, Jose Pedro Perez-Llorca.

In fact, save for the signing of a cultural cooperation agreement, which is to replace the 1957 accord, we do not have the impression that the meeting of the Moroccan and Spanish diplomatic staffs produced any concrete progress in the settlement of the important points that arise in bilateral debates.

It will be noted, for example, that on the subject of fishing Mr Perez-Llorca was careful not to be precise, preferring to leave it to the opinions of the experts.

Better yet, everything leads one to believe that the status quo--which is profoundly prejudicial to Morocco's fishing interests--will be renewed as a result of the contracts between the two parties, which are to begin officially next 28 October.



As for the rest, these are just pious vows and vague declarations, as much where the plan for a permanent link between Morocco and Spain is concerned as for the potential axes for a marked strengthening of bilateral cooperation.

It is believable that the touchy pending dossiers were not mentioned, or that their resolution was not advanced an inch. We are thinking particularly of the shipping of citrus fruits for the EEC by way of Spanish territory, and the problem of what legal and social guarantees are to be granted our workers who have emigrated beyond the Straits.

Was this visit, then, simply to make contact? To get acquainted?

That being the case, that would confirm that what separates Spain from Morocco is not just an arm of the sea.

For we have to notice the discretion--more than diplomacy--with which the Spanish minister of Foreign Affairs brought up the burning--for Spain--question of the Polisario's fishermen-hostages, who are prisoners in Algeria.

The head of Madrid diplomacy--at least publicly and for the press--contented himself with a declaration of principle "condemning all violations of and attacks on human rights."

He absolutely did not connect that affair with the artificial tension that prevails in the Maghrib, any more than he seemed to react to the "discreet appeal" by our minister of Foreign Affairs, who said he was "persuaded that Madrid shares our concern for preserving our region from a conflict prejudicial to all."

So there is a Spanish reserve and sense of moderation that will not go unnoticed in East Oujda, where this visit has surely been followed with a great deal of attention.

Of course there is nothing to prevent us from believing that these muffled words and the fact that the visit is being "banalized"--a desire that seems clear on both sides--are being inserted into the framework of delicate diplomatic maneuvers aimed at contributing qualitative and positive changes to the Maghribian political climate.

Nevertheless, in policy one can only count on certainties.

And consequently it is not improper to show a certain disappointment when appraising the results of Mr Llorca's visit to our country. We are not likely to be contradicted by the announcement of the establishing of a precise schedule "for the most important questions."

The general situation of the relations between the two countries and the present political context called for results that would be otherwise more concrete, since it is true that formalism has never accomplished miracles.

INSTALLATION CEREMONY FOR NEW SECURITY HEADS DESCRIBED

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 9 Oct 80 p 7

[Article by M. Benhida]

[Text] The general movement toward change that the National Security has been going through recently has affected several leaders and chief of services of the Regional Security in Marrakech. In that connection a glittering ceremony recently took place at the province seat to install Ali Benkacem, the controller general, who was appointed chief of the Marrakech Regional Security, replacing Mohamed Karim Sayagh, who was transferred to Tetuan.

On the same occasion the new chiefs of the regional services of the Regional Security were also installed, among them Yousfi Kaddour, chief of the Regional Service of the Criminal Investigation Department; Mohamed Chawad, the central commissioner; and Mohamed Sebti, chief of the Regional Service of General Information, who replaced, respectively, Abderrahman Tazi, transferred to Meknes; Maati Khattabi, appointed chief of the Regional Security in Ouarzazate; and Moulay Abdellah Alaoui, transferred to Agadir.

In the course of this glittering reception, Mustapha Tarik, His Majesty's governor in the province of Marrakech, gave a speech in which he eulogized Mohamed Karim Sayagh, the former chief of the Regional Security in Marrakech, emphasizing his success in his mission in the capital of the South.

"Although we are all sorry to see him go," said Mustapha Tarik, "we must wish him every success in his new residence where, I am persuaded, his actions will be crowned with success. On behalf of all of you," he added, "permit me to thank him for all he has accomplished in this province, as well as his close associates, Abderrahman Tazi, Moulay Abdellah Alaoui and Maati Khattabi; I wish all of them every success in their new offices."

The governor then welcomed Ali Benkacem, the new chief of the Regional Security in Marrakech, and congratulated him on the confidence placed in him by appointing him to this office. Ali Benkacem's appointment at the head of the Security in Marrakech is evidence of the board's continuing interest in providing peace and tranquillity for the citizens of this province, he said.

After bringing out Ali Benkacem's biography, the governor of the province stated, "I am convinced that the new chief of the Regional Security will have no trouble succeeding in his new mission. This is a delicate task that requires considerable effort and untiring work, which Mr Benkacem is used to; he has the experience to occupy this post and accomplish his administrative duty under the best conditions, for the new chief of the Regional Security has always occupied very important positions since 1958."

The governor then said he hoped the new leaders of the Regional Security will continue the activities begun by their predecessors--activities whose goal is the peace and security of the inhabitants. Those two points form the basis of prosperity, progress and economic and social development.

Before concluding his speech the governor welcomed Mohamed Sebti, Kaddour Yousfi and Mohamed Chawad.

The glittering reception was attended by Mahjoub El Akkad, the governor's caliph in the city; Hassan Moulihi, acting secretary general; His Majesty Prince Sidi Mohamed El Hafidi; Haj Larbi Majboud, first presiding judge of the Court of Appeals; Haj Ahmed Lakhdar, King's prosecutor; Ahmed Chouhaidi, presiding judge of the District Court; Dr Naim Brini, vice chairman of the Provincial Assembly; M'hamed Khalifa, chairman of the Municipal Council; Deputies Abdessamad Al Istiqsa; Lhousseine Boulasri; Haj Mohamed Boukdir and Abderrafi Basri; Col Hammou Hajoui, regional commander of the Royal Gendarmerie; Col El Mouch, second in command of the BEFKA [expansion unknown]; Col Cheloli, second in command of the FAR [Royal Armed Forces] Parade Ground the regional directors and provincial delegates and heads of technical and administrative services; the circle heads; the heads of the urban arrondissements; Regional Security staff members; as well as several important persons, notables and members of the elected body.

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# SUGAR CANE PRODUCTION AT GHARB, SUCRAFOR DISCUSSED

## Gharb Refinery

Rabat L'OPINION in French 9 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] Azeddine Guessous, the minister of Commerce, Industry, Merchant Marine and Maritime Fishing, presided in his department headquarters over the third session of the board of directors of the Gharb Cane Sugar Refinery.

This plant, whose anticipated processing capacity is 3,500 tons of cane per day, is the 11th sugar production unit and the second specializing in processing cane into sugar. Currently being assembled, its startup will occur on 1 May 1981 with the processing during the first season of 250,000 tons of cane and a production of 25,000 tons of refined sugar in 2-kilogram packages and 50-kilogram bags. By its third season, in 1983, it will reach its cruising capacity with the processing of 420,000 tons of cane and a production of 43,000 tons of sugar.

However, taking into account the development of sugar cane around Gharb, the production will exceed the capacity of installations in Mechra Bel Ksiri (SUNACAS [expansion unknown]) and Dar Gueddari (SURAC [expansion unknown]) and will necessitate the starting up of a third sugar cane plant in Gharb in 1983. There is good reason to note that studies on the subject of launching the third sugar cane refinery in Gharb are at present in the process of being realized.

During the meeting a detailed examination of the company's activities was conducted, as well as of the various assembly projects currently in progress with a view to starting up the sugar refinery for the 1981 season.

## SUCRAFOR's Production

Rabat L'OPINION in French 9 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] MAP--The minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, during a tour in Nador Province, last Friday visited the Oriental Sugar Refinery (SUCRAFOR), a unit that became operational in 1972.

This plant, which is located in Zaio in Nador Province, is--as its technical director, Saddiq Ahmed, indicated--unique of its kind in that it provides a dual function. It processes both beets and sugar cane.

After it was built in 1971 and became operational in 1972, SUCRAFOR undertook the processing of beets, before expanding its activities in 1974 to sugar cane.

Beets and sugar cane, cultivation of which is practised in the irrigated outskirts of Moulouya, cover respectively 5,150 and 750 hectares. SUCRAFOR processes 3,000 tons of beets per day and 1,000 tons of sugar cane per day.

However, the plant is only operational during the seasons, which begin in January and May and last about three months. Between seasons the permanent workers are responsible for maintaining and cleaning the machines.

It should be emphasized, on the other hand, that SUCRAFOR fills 60 percent of the sugar needs of the eastern region. Cultivation of beets is practised on both banks of the Moulouya, while cane is cultivated only on the left bank (Nador region). The annual production of granulated sugar, to which SUCRAFOR's mission is limited, is 25,000 tons. Its capacity, however, is 35,000 tons.

The crop program for the Garet outskirts, which is being equipped, anticipates reserving an area of 300 hectares for the cultivation of beets and sugar cane, which will alleviate the shortage of raw materials and will increase the plant's production capacity. The number of farmers who provide the plant with raw material is 3,340 for beets and 701 for cane.

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## TUNISIA

### PROCEEDINGS OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' MEETING REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 17 Oct 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] President Bourguiba's proposal for aid to El Asnam reconstruction; chief of state concerned with assuring the success of Administrative Reform; to enable the National Labor Union Commission to assume its mission under better conditions; a measure to reintegrate unemployed workers shortly after 26 January.

Yesterday morning, Thursday 16 October 1980, the Council of Ministers held its weekly meeting in the Government Palace in the Casbah, under the chairmanship of Mohamed Mzali, the prime minister.

In the beginning of the session the Council brought up the severe trial which the brother Algerian people have been subjected to following the earthquake that struck the El Asnam region.

The prime minister presented a report on the recent visit to Algeria of Mme Wassila Bourguiba, who was sent by the Supreme Combatant, President Habib Bourguiba, at the head of a Tunisian delegation, to express personally to the Algerian leaders and people the feelings of affliction and solidarity on the part of the president, the government and the people of Tunisia following the tragedy that has struck a portion of the territory of a brother country.

President Chadli Bendjedid hastened to emphasize to the wife of the Supreme Combatant how much he appreciated the prompt and spontaneous solidarity manifested by Tunisia toward Algeria and made concrete by the telephone message that President Habib Bourguiba was the first chief of state to put through.

For his part, the minister of Public Health reported on the visit he has just made to Algeria on this occasion. He recalled that less than 24 hours after the disaster Algeria showed its support for Algeria by putting at its disposal three medical teams, which went into action as soon as they arrived in the disaster-stricken areas. Tunisia also sent sanitary equipment and medications, to help our Algerian brothers cope with the situation.

The prime minister expressed the Council's satisfaction with the burst of solidarity shown by Tunisian organizations at the official and popular levels, thus conferring a national character on our fraternal support of Algeria. In particular he brought out the efforts of medical and paramedical personnel, both civilian and military, of officials of the Public Health Ministry and Civil Defense, the Organization of the National Social Solidarity Committee and the Tunisian Red Cross.

The prime minister announced that the Supreme Combatant has decided to submit to Algeria a proposal to make available to it Tunisian teams of engineers and architects to take part in studies on reconstructing the city of El Asnam.

The Council then examined what steps have been taken in preparation for the next UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor]. It expressed its pleasure at the recent creation of the National Commission in charge of preparing the sessions and expressed the hope that it would result in the congress of the Labor Union Group being held in a free, democratic and healthy climate, which would be likely to enable the UGTT to fully play its role as a social partner contributing to the strengthening of the country's social and economic development.

In that connection the prime minister stressed the need to give the commission all the help it needs, to enable it to assume its mission under better conditions, within the policy of dialog established between the government and the various social partners.

The Council also decided to form an interministerial committee, to be charged with studying the situation of the agents and workers from the public and private sectors, who lost their employment shortly after the events of January 1978, with a view to their re-entering the work force.

The ministerial delegate to the prime minister in charge of civil service and administrative reform presented a report in which he took stock of the actions conducted in the Administrative Reform, especially those having to do with defining assignments before they are permanently delegated to the regional administrations, with the goal of bringing the administration closer to the citizens, and enabling the regional services to accomplish their administrative, financial and technical tasks efficiently and easily. At the end of the report the ministers of Agriculture, Equipment and Housing, of Public Health and of National Education presented a group of regulatory texts on delegation of assignments in their departments, for the benefit of their regional boards.

The prime minister reaffirmed the chief of state's concern for assuring the success of Administrative Reform by decentralization, trimming formalities and simplifying the administrative channels. However, the decentralizing action is to be conducted in rationally studied stages so as not to engender new burdens to strain the state's budget.

The prime minister conveyed to the Council the instructions of the Supreme Combatant concerning the need to appoint competent and enthusiastic staff members, an indispensable condition for the success of the decentralization, and to create effective control structures at the regional level.

The realization of decentralization is to develop (eventually from continuing negotiation with the [words omitted] possible.

Before closing its sessions the Council approved a number of legislative bills to be submitted to the National Assembly. These texts concern:

Ratification of the financial cooperation agreement concluded between the Tunisian government and the FRG.

Ratification of the loan agreement concluded between the World Bank and the National Bank of Tunisia relative to financing agricultural credit.

Ratification of the bill authorizing the state to participate in the Arab Fund for the Activities and Institutions of Youth and Sports.

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## TUNISIA

### UGTT'S SUBORDINATION TO NATION'S INTERESTS DISCUSSED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 13 Oct 80 p 31

[Article by Shlh Sghiri: "The Fatherland Above any Other Consideration"]

[Text] So in spite of everything, finally reason and the nation's higher interests prevail. Progressing in the direction of responsibility, the UGTT's [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] crisis seems today, after regrettable vicissitudes, to be experiencing a devotion which will not fail to strengthen the ranks and cement the general cohesiveness. Emanating from the National Labor Union Commission, which was created on 3 October 1980, the communique published last week set the tone for all the means currently in place for resolving--within the framework of the democratic institutions--the crisis of that organization created by the late Farhat Hached which, having arrived at its true purpose, "is the extension of the genuine union movement launched by Mohamed Ali El Hammi." A purpose that must above any other consideration call for "heroism, militantism and the spirit of sacrifice." A mission and values that today more than ever must prevail at all levels. The state having made all the adequate provisions likely to make confidence reign and do away with misunderstandings. Liberation of all union members and the decision to accept as valuable interlocutors genuine representatives, freely elected, of the laboring classes: two great gestures of appeasement from which every Tunisian now expects the best fallout. It is incumbent upon true militants to translate into deeds any bypassed personal problem, any vague impulse killed off--sectarian or refractory. For the good of a people to whom and for whose cause the best of its children, in the decisive hour, gave the best of themselves.

The makeup of the National Labor Union Commission augurs well. The very fact of its having been put in place is an important step taken, apart from any membership. Provided it serves and acts solely and exclusively in such a way as to "unify the ranks of the workers" and "eliminate all the after-effects of the crisis" and finally--and this is basic--"preserve and strengthen the assets of the laboring masses insofar as those assets constitute a motive of pride for the whole Tunisian people." The Tunisian people: a transcendental idea to be cultivated, protected and defended independently of anything else, of all the remainder, which arises out of economic conditions. Although the basic reason for forming the National Labor Union Commission is still the preparation for the extraordinary congress, it is also incumbent upon it, as the declaration says, "to restore confidence and peace of mind for all workers and take all legal measures to revive the union and social climate." An exhilarating historic role that could not be accommodated to any objectives other than those commanded by objectivity and attachment to collective aspirations. One could not emphasize enough the foundations of this heavy task except by recalling

the basic principles of unionism in Tunisia, as they were desired by Bourguiba and Hached.

In this decisive phase in the history of union organization, the principles must prevail today. To justify and inspire all acts, all decisions and choices. In other words, it is important above all to go beyond "marginal conflicts," for "time is precious and it is important to begin to heal the wounds, to envision the future and put the interest of the UGTT and the fatherland above every other consideration." A single interest that rules out any partial calculation or maneuver that might imperil the work of development on which Tunisia, everyone included, has decided to center all its potentialities. In this chorus of harmony the UGTT must, today and tomorrow, see to it that its primary objectives coincide in the best symbiosis, in the combination of efforts, well-considered and sincere timeliness, pragmatism. First and above all for the promotion of the Tunisian, the reign of social peace in equity and equilibrium, such as defined by our institutions. Correctly, Legally. Democratically. For the sole good of Tunisia.

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TUNISIA

MEASURES TO INCREASE CROP PRODUCTION REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 15 Oct 80 p 5

[Article: "Easy Terms for Acquisition of Agricultural Equipment Directly From the Supplier"]

[Text] Mohamed Ghedira, a member of the Political Bureau and president of the National Farmers Union (UNA), yesterday chaired a meeting which included the members of the National Unskilled Workers Federations and the presidents of the regional factories.

During the meeting Mr Ghedira announced that the government has taken a series of measures to increase large crop production.

He stated that improvement of production depends on better development of the land, indicating that the many measures taken are aimed at helping the farmer observe the deadlines required for judicious exploitation of the land.

The UNA president urged regional and local leaders to explain the new measures to the farmers, to enable them to take advantage of the means available to them. All the measures have been included in a circular which has been sent to all of the regional structures. The measures are aimed at enabling the farmers to acquire their equipment directly by benefiting from easy terms in addition to the possibilities presently offered to them by the availability of banking credits.

They also offer farmers the opportunity to receive credits for maintenance of their equipment.

All of these new provisions are concerned with agricultural and fishing equipment.

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